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Abstract 
The processing of emotion is fundamental in various aspects of human experience. However, our 
understanding of emotional processes is incomplete, particularly in relation to language processing. 
Further, individuals such as those with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often show differences 
in their perception and understanding of emotion. Whilst many characteristics of ASD present to 
varying degrees in the wider population, the extent to which differences in emotion processing 
extend beyond those with a diagnosis of ASD remains largely unknown. The aims of this thesis 
were to determine the links between emotion and language processes in both adults and children, 
and to determine the relationship between emotion processing and non-clinical levels of autism-like 
traits, known as the broader autism phenotype (BAP). These aims were achieved by investigating (i) 
the recognition of facial and vocal emotional cues in relation to autism traits, and (ii) the impact of 
emotional cues on language learning in relation to autism traits. 
Chapter 2 aimed to determine how vocal expressions of emotion influenced subsequent 
recognition of facial emotions, and whether this influence differed according to levels of autism-like 
traits among typical adults. The results revealed that emotions, expressed via a combination of 
semantic meaning and prosody, enhanced subsequent facial emotion recognition when the vocal 
and facial cues were congruent, and impaired recognition when the emotional cues were 
incongruent. However, these effects were apparent only for those with low levels of autism-like 
traits and not for those with higher levels. 
Chapter 3 aimed to determine whether typically developing children were able to match 
various vocal expressions of emotion to facial expressions, and whether this ability differed 
between those with low or high levels of autism-like traits. The results showed that the children‟s 
ability to match emotions differed according to emotion type, such that more errors were made 
when matching expressions of happiness and fear, compared to sadness and anger. However, 
matching ability did not differ between those with low or high levels of autism-like traits. 
Taken together, the results of the two studies outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 indicated that 
adults with higher levels of autism-like traits failed to integrate emotional information across 
modalities. However children with higher levels of autism-like traits were able to integrate cross-
modal emotional information in a similar manner to those with lower levels of autism-like traits. 
These findings suggest that difficulties integrating emotional information across modalities may be 
characteristic of the BAP, but may become apparent between mid-childhood and adulthood. 
Chapter 4 aimed to determine whether vocal emotional cues impacted adults‟ ability to learn 
new words, and explored whether this ability to learn was influenced by levels of autism-like traits. 
The results revealed that fearful prosody interfered with the ability to learn new words for all 
participants. Further, happy prosody also interfered with the ability to learn new words, but only for 
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those with lower levels of autism-like traits, and not for those with higher levels of autism-like 
traits.  
Chapter 5 explored whether emotional cues influenced word learning ability in children who 
had either low or high levels of autism-like traits. Eye-tracking measures were also used to 
determine children‟s visual attention relative to emotion type and autism-like traits. The results 
showed that emotional information did not influence word learning ability. However, different 
patterns of visual attention emerged between those with low and high levels of autism-like traits. 
Specifically, children with lower levels of autism-like traits showed the same looking patterns when 
viewing happy and fearful emotions, which were distinct from their looking patterns in the neutral 
condition. However, children with high levels of autism-like traits showed distinct looking patterns 
between the happy and fearful conditions. 
These studies (Chapters 4 and 5) indicate that, while emotional information was somewhat 
distracting for all adults during word learning, adults with higher levels of autism-like traits were 
affected differently according to the type of emotion. Similarly in children, although emotion had 
no behavioural effect on learning, children with high autism-like traits were affected differentially 
according to emotion type, while those with low autism-like traits responded equally to both 
emotions. This finding suggests that differences in the processing of positive and negative emotions 
within a language learning context may be characteristic of the BAP, and this may have a 
cumulative impact on learning throughout development.  
Overall, the thesis results suggest that links between the processing of emotion and the BAP 
are more pronounced in adulthood. The findings have implications for our understanding of ASD, 
with respect to its underlying risk factors and characteristics. In addition, this thesis provides insight 
into the development of emotion processing and individual differences within typical populations. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Darwin (1872) theorised that behaviours of emotional expression (facial expressions, body 
language, emotional vocalisations, etc.) are involuntary and instinctual actions resulting from 
internal states of mind. Darwin also claimed that interpreting the meaning of such emotional 
expressions is an automatic and natural ability in humans. More recent research confirms that 
emotional expression is a habitual and dominant part of social communication. As infants, the 
primary form of communicating needs is through emotional cues such as crying or laughter. Right 
from birth, we perceive emotional information in many forms every day, typically beginning with 
the joy and comfort of the mother (Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky & Tidball, 2001). Throughout our 
lives, emotional signals influence much of our behaviour, with the perception of negative emotions 
(e.g., fear, anger, and disgust) typically leading to avoidance and withdrawal, and the perception of 
positive emotions (e.g., happiness, comfort, and excitement) typically leading to approach and 
interest (Gunnar & Stone, 1984; Hofmann, Kuchinke, Tamm, Võ & Jacobs, 2009; Kousta, Vinson 
& Vigliocco, 2009). These emotional signals are presented to us via many mediums, mostly through 
the observation of others, but also through animals, advertisements, television, the internet, and 
various other platforms of communication (for a review see Winkielman, McIntosh & Oberman, 
2009). Within interpersonal communication, language is one of the primary modes of delivering 
emotion information.  
Many theorists believe that infants have an innate ability to automatically interpret the 
emotional signals around them (e.g., Ekman, 1992). In turn, infants can make associations between 
these signals and the environment, thereby guiding their own responses to the environment and 
others. Emotion processing is ultimately a large contributor to our understanding of the world and 
the appropriate ways to behave, particularly within social contexts (Camras & Halberstadt, 2017; 
Moses et al., 2001). How then would psychosocial development be impacted if an individual was 
born with a reduced ability to process emotion? Such individuals may fail to process emotional 
signals, thereby slowing their understanding of others‟ actions, as well as the connections between 
these actions, the environment and themselves. Consequently, children‟s learning of how to respond 
to and interact with others and the environment may be delayed (Begeer, Rieffe, Terwogt & 
Stockman, 2006). This idea has stimulated much research investigating the processing of emotion in 
those with social impairments, such as individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Such 
research aids our understanding of emotion processing and the extent to which it influences 
development.  
ASD has the highest prevalence of any developmental neurological disorder in Australia, 
affecting approximately 0.5% of all Australians in 2012 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). It is 
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reported, in both Australia and internationally, that approximately four times as many males are 
diagnosed with ASD than females (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012; US Centers for Disease 
Control, 2012). The prevalence of ASD diagnoses in Australia increased by 79% between 2009 and 
2012, which is largely considered to be the result of a change in diagnostic criteria, raised 
awareness of ASD in the public, and the refinement of methods to recognise and diagnose the 
condition. Whether or not there is an actual increase in the number of people with ASD, or whether 
the increase in prevalence is solely due to these three changes, remains under debate (Matson & 
Kozlowski, 2011). Nevertheless, the understanding and management of ASD has become a major 
focus of the work of many practitioners and researchers.  
The diagnostic criteria for ASD, as specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders 5
th
 edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), involves 
abnormalities in two major areas; social communication and restrictive, repetitive behaviours. The 
social communication criterion is defined as the demonstration of impaired initiation and 
maintenance of conversation, reduced emotion or affect, poor non-verbal communication, and 
impaired understanding of social relationships. The restrictive and repetitive behaviours criterion 
involves repetitive movements or speech, persistent routines or rituals, restricted interests, and 
unusual sensitivity to sensory input (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As indicated by its 
name, ASD is diagnosed along a spectrum ranging from mild to severe. Before the release of the 
DSM-5, autism fell under the broader category of pervasive developmental disorders (PDD). Along 
with the more severe cases of autism, PDDs also included four other diagnoses: Asperger‟s 
Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Rett‟s Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In the 
DSM-5, these conditions have now been merged together to form one category, the autism spectrum 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
The social communication criterion for a diagnosis of ASD often includes impairments in 
language, particularly within social contexts. For example, an individual with ASD may be able to 
proficiently read a passage aloud, but will struggle to maintain a conversation, understand the use of 
metaphors, and use appropriate facial expressions or varying their tone of voice in order to 
communicate emotional states (Bailey, Phillips & Rutter, 1996). Difficulties with emotional 
communication in individuals with ASD are not only evident in the expression of emotional states, 
but also in the identification of emotional states in others (e.g., Dawson, Webb, Carver, 
Panagiotides, & McPartland, 2004), and in the understanding of emotion more generally (Begeer, 
Koot, Rieffe, Terwogt & Stegge, 2008). In the original description, autism was stated as being a 
“disorder of affective contact” (Kanner, 1943), suggesting that these impairments are a major aspect 
of the condition. Accordingly, the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter & Le 
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Couteur, 1994) and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, second edition (ADOS-2; Lord et 
al., 2012), which are the main assessment protocols used in the identification of ASD, both include 
items which assess emotional competence. The deficits seen in emotional perception and expression 
in ASD have received much research attention, as emotional understanding is considered one of the 
most important aspects of social competence (Begeer et al., 2006; Moses et al., 2001; Winkielman 
et al., 2009). However, the extent to which deficits in emotion processing impact the overall 
functioning of these individuals and the associations with other symptoms of ASD remains unclear. 
To determine the nature of emotional deficits in ASD, it can be useful to investigate the 
extent to which differences in emotion processing are associated with the key characteristics of 
ASD. Individuals with ASD are theorised to represent one extreme on a spectrum of such 
characteristics. Thus, certain “autism-like traits”, which align with the symptoms of ASD, include 
reduced social awareness, communication, empathy and imagination. Such traits also refer to more 
frequent repetitive behaviour, and better understanding of systems and attention to detail. All 
individuals in the general population exhibit varied levels of these traits (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001; Wing, 1988). Regardless of the degree to which an 
individual shows autism-like traits, a diagnosis of ASD also depends on the impact of symptoms on 
daily functioning. Those without a diagnosis of ASD who display relatively higher levels of autism-
like traits constitute what is termed the “broader autism phenotype” (BAP). Evidence suggests that 
there is a genetic contribution to these characteristics, as close family members of individuals with 
ASD often fall within the BAP (Bailey et al., 1996; Christensen et al., 2010; Piven et al., 1997). 
Thus, it can be useful to compare cognitive processing abilities among those in the general 
population with different levels of autism-like traits, in order to further our understanding of the 
underlying genetic components of ASD (Landry & Chouinard, 2016). The current thesis proposes 
that differences in emotional understanding and processing represent an underlying genetic 
characteristic of ASD, and differences may therefore be detectable within typical populations with 
higher or lower levels of autism-like traits.  
While impairments in the understanding and expression of emotion are well-established 
features of ASD, little research has investigated the possibility of these deficits being associated 
with autism-like characteristics more generally. Additionally, while language is highly effective for 
communicating emotion, there is little research on how emotion is recognised when communicated 
through speech, and how emotion influences language learning. This chapter provides a 
comprehensive review of the existing literature covering emotion processing in typical 
development, in ASD, and within the BAP. Emotion processing can be divided into two distinct 
types: the explicit recognition and interpretation of emotional information from various sources of 
input, and the implicit influence of emotional information on other aspects of cognition, such as 
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learning (Lartseva, Dijkstra & Buitelaar, 2015). To present a logical account of the literature, this 
chapter will begin with an overview of emotion processing in typical development in section 1.1. 
This will include evidence of both explicit and implicit emotion processing in adults and children. 
Following this, section 1.2 will describe the processing of emotions in ASD. Section 1.3 will further 
discuss the benefit of investigating autism-like traits within typical populations, presenting findings 
to date regarding the abilities and impairments within the BAP. Finally, section 1.4 will summarise 
the reviewed literature and present the aims and rationale of the current thesis.  
1.1 Emotion Processing in Typical Development 
1.1.1 Emotion Recognition 
There are many proposed theories of emotion, and the literature is complex and 
contradictory. “Basic emotions theory” proposes that there are six core types of emotion: happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise, and all other emotions are variations of these core 
categories (Ekman, 1992). According to Ekman, each specific emotion type has a distinct neural 
“signature” that is biologically innate among all humans. As a result, any given emotion has a 
specific set of automatic characteristics and signals for its experience and portrayal. For instance, 
anger is characterised by the physiological changes of increased heart rate and increased skin 
temperature (Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, 1983), and recognised by tightened lips and lowered 
eyebrows that are drawn together (Ekman, 1992). However, it is important to note that the basic 
emotions theory has been subject to much criticism in the literature. Evidence shows that contextual 
information often overrides information from facial expressions when recognising emotions 
(Carroll & Russell, 1996). Additionally, there are differences in the portrayal and recognition of 
certain emotions across cultures, as well as methodological flaws in the way emotion recognition is 
often tested (e.g., exaggerated posed facial expressions, forced-choice responses, etc.), calling into 
question basic emotions theory (Nelson & Russell, 2013).  
Another prominent theory is the “circumplex model of affect” (Posner, Russell & Peterson, 
2005). This theory posits that any emotion can be attributed to variations on two broad 
neurophysiological systems, and that the categorisation of specific emotion types is a matter of 
cultural and linguistic construction. The two dimensions of emotion most often proposed in the 
circumplex model include valence, concerning the degree of positivity and negativity; and arousal, 
concerning the level of energy or wakefulness. For example, a classification of “anger”, would 
involve an experience of highly negative valence and high arousal, while “sadness” would involve 
moderately negative valence and low arousal (Posner et al., 2005). According to this theory, 
emotional signals such as facial expressions still hold importance for the communication and 
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recognition of emotion, but must be considered with reference to the specific cultural and 
situational context.  
Nonetheless, it can be useful to examine how individuals recognise emotions within a given 
context. There are often multiple emotional signals available when determining the emotional state 
of another person. These cues include emotional signals from the individual, such as facial 
expression, tone of voice, and body posture, as well as cues provided by the situational context 
(Stienen, Tanaka & Gelder, 2011). In order to gain a complete understanding of how each of these 
cues contribute to emotion recognition, it is useful to look at the processing of these individual 
sources of information. Firstly, in infancy, the exchange of information via the face serves as the 
primary means of communication between infant and parent (Apicella, Sicca, Federico, Campatelli 
& Muratori, 2013; Campatelli, Federico, Apicella & Muratori, 2013; Camras & Shutter, 2010). The 
face not only communicates emotional information, but is also the primary determinant of identity, 
aids in understanding language by matching lip movements to words, and allows us to share 
experiences with others by following gaze direction, along with enabling many other social 
functions (Gepner, Deruelle & Grynfeltt, 2001). Facial processing is an extensively investigated 
topic of research, as the processes involved in the perception of the human face have been shown to 
be unique compared to the perception of any other object or stimulus (Apicella et al., 2013; 
Campatelli et al., 2013).   
1.1.1.1 Typical adults. Humans are highly efficient in recognising and attending to faces in 
general (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006; Valenza, Simion, Cassia & Umiltà, 1996). Likewise, the 
recognition of facial emotional cues appears to be a relatively easy task for typical adults, who 
consistently show high accuracy identifying facial emotions in laboratory experiments (e.g., de 
Sonneville et al., 2002). One method of examining brain processes in relation to certain stimuli is 
by measuring electrical brain potentials using electroencephalography (EEG). Brain potentials 
which are elicited by a particular stimulus are known as event-related potentials (ERPs), and are 
labelled according to their polarity and time onset. For instance, an N170 refers to a negative going 
potential which occurs approximately 170ms following a stimulus. The N170 is typically larger in 
amplitude following the presentation of facial stimuli compared to other stimuli (Apicella et al., 
2013; Campatelli et al., 2013). Further, the N170 and a P200 component have been found to be 
larger in amplitude when viewing emotional faces compared to neutral faces, particularly for fearful 
expressions (Blau, Maurer, Tottenham & McCandliss, 2007; Ashley, Vuilleumier & Swick, 2004). 
This EEG evidence suggests that emotional faces are attended to, and processed, preferentially.  
While the visual system is an important modality for processing emotional information, 
particularly through facial perception, it is not the only modality involved in emotion processing. 
Emotion is also communicated through auditory means both linguistically, via the meaning of 
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words, and non-linguistically, via vocalisations such as sighing or laughing (Lima, Alves, Scott & 
Castro, 2014), or through tone of voice (i.e., prosody). Prosody refers to changes in the 
characteristics of speech, including pitch, frequency, intonation, stress, rate, duration, rhythm, 
volume, and pausing (O‟Connor, 2012; Scherer, 1986). Speakers can manipulate these 
characteristics for specific communicative purposes. For example, prosody can be used to convey 
grammatical information, such as the difference between a question and a statement, pragmatic 
information, such as applying stress to highlight important words, or affective information, such as 
the difference between an excited prosody and a sad prosody (Shriberg et al., 2001).   
There is limited research investigating how each component of emotional expression in 
vocal communication, such as emotional word meanings (semantics) and emotional prosody, 
contribute to emotion recognition and processing. Typically, in realistic social situations, these 
components of emotional expression are used in combination and are often matching (e.g., a friend 
telling you they are upset in a sad tone), although these cues can be mismatching in some contexts 
(e.g., the use of sarcasm; Pell, Jaywant, Monetta & Kotz, 2011). It is currently unclear whether 
semantic and prosodic emotional information independently contribute to the perception and 
processing of emotion. Research has determined that emotions which are conveyed by prosody 
alone, with no semantic meaning (e.g., via a fake or „pseudo‟ sentence spoken with an emotional 
prosody) can be accurately recognised by healthy adults. Similarly, emotion that is conveyed using 
semantic meaning alone but with no emotional prosody can also be accurately recognised (Pell, 
Paulmann, Dara, Alasseri & Kotz, 2009; Wambacq & Jerger, 2004). Studies have also demonstrated 
faster and more accurate recognition of emotion when emotional prosody and semantic content are 
matching, regardless of whether participants are instructed to identify the emotion based on prosody 
and ignore the meaning, or vice versa (Nygaard & Queen, 2008; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003; Wurm, 
Vakoch, Strasser, Calin-Jageman & Ross, 2001). Further, Kotz and Paulmann (2007) demonstrated 
distinct ERP responses to combined prosodic and semantic emotional information compared to 
prosodic information alone, which reflect faster processing of the combined stimuli.  
While it is useful to examine visual and auditory emotion processing in isolation from one 
another, a deeper examination into the integration of these sources of information is necessary for a 
complete understanding of how we perceive and process emotion. The majority of research 
investigating how neurotypical adults recognise and process emotion has focused on a single 
modality in isolation, and in particular, on facial expressions. However, studies have emerged that 
examine the processing of emotions from multiple modalities at once. Paradigms to investigate 
cross-modality emotion processing typically involve the presentation of faces depicting various 
emotional expressions, which are simultaneously presented with either a written word with 
emotional meaning (Shen, Xue, Wang & Qiu, 2013), or an auditory word or sentence spoken with 
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emotional prosody (de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Focker, Gondan & Roder, 2011). These stimulus 
pairs are either emotionally congruent, where the emotion conveyed by the face and the word/voice 
are matching, or emotionally incongruent, where the emotion conveyed by the face and the 
word/voice are conflicting. Participants are required to identify the emotion presented, and are 
instructed to either focus on the face or the word/voice.  
For example, Focker et al. (2011) presented healthy adults with dynamic facial expressions 
and emotionally congruent or incongruent vocal prosody. Participants were required to determine 
the emotion of either the facial expression or the voice. Regardless of task condition, responses 
were slower when the pairs were emotionally incongruent compared to when they were congruent. 
Additionally, the recognition of emotional facial expressions was faster when paired with an 
emotionally congruent voice, compared to recognising the facial expression on its own. This finding 
demonstrates that individuals automatically integrate emotion across modalities even when 
instructed to only focus on one modality, and that this integration is advantageous for recognising 
emotion. In particular, vocal prosody aids in the recognition of facial expressions. Stienen and 
colleagues (2011) conducted a similar study pairing vocal emotional prosody with visual 
expressions of emotion through body posture. This study showed less accurate emotion recognition 
when the emotional expression was incongruent across modality, compared to when it was 
congruent. 
Studies by Pell et al. (2011) and Schwartz and Pell (2012) have examined cross-modality 
emotion recognition. In these studies, participants viewed a face after hearing a vocal emotional 
prime, and were asked were to judge whether the face was emotional or not. In the study by Pell 
and colleagues, there were three separate tasks in which the emotion of the sentence primes was 
conveyed via different modalities. There was a prosody task, consisting of nonsense sentences 
which were spoken with varied emotional prosody, a semantic task, consisting of sentences which 
had varied emotional meaning spoken with neutral prosody, and a combined task, consisting of 
sentences with varied emotional meaning spoken with the appropriate emotional prosody. In each 
task, the sentence primes were paired with the faces to form both emotionally congruent and 
incongruent prime-target conditions. Overall, a congruency effect was found, such that participants 
responded more accurately to negative faces preceded by a congruent negative prime compared to 
when the prime was incongruent or neutral. This effect was evident regardless of the modality 
conveying the emotion in the primes, suggesting both prosodically and semantically emotional 
information can influence facial emotional recognition. While a congruency effect was not found 
for positive faces, this may have been due to a ceiling effect in this condition. Schwartz and Pell 
also demonstrated a prime-target emotional congruency effect, for happy, sad, and angry 
expressions, regardless of whether the emotion of the prime was conveyed through prosody or 
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semantics. Finally, EEG studies suggest that, when positive or negative emotional faces and voices 
are presented simultaneously, an N100 component is larger in amplitude and a P200 component 
occurs earlier when the emotions are congruent compared to when they are incongruent (Pourtois, 
de Gelder, Vroomen, Rossion & Crommelick, 2000; Pourtois, Debatisse, Despland & de Gelder, 
2002). A similar pattern is found when emotional faces are preceded by a congruent emotional 
voice prime compared to an incongruent prime (Paulmann & Pell, 2010). These results suggest a 
processing advantage for congruent emotional cues compared to incongruent cues, indicating that 
emotional information is automatically integrated across modalities.    
Overall, research to date suggests that, for typical adults, emotional information is processed 
faster and more accurately when there is appropriately matching information presented from 
multiple modalities, compared to when the information is conflicting or presented in a single 
modality. However, to determine whether this ability to integrate emotional information from 
multiple sources is developed with age or is innate, we must examine emotion processing within 
childhood. 
1.1.1.2 Typical children. It seems apparent that much of our understanding about the 
emotions of others is taught to us through our parents, siblings, the environment, and other people 
around us. Infants spend a large amount of their time observing the actions and reactions of others, 
much of which includes social and emotional interactions (Sugden, Mohamed-Ali & Moulson, 
2014). These observations help infants learn how others will respond in certain circumstances and 
how they themselves should respond (Mumme & Fernald, 2003). It has been found that children 
who display a greater understanding of emotions and the mental states of others are from families in 
which emotion is part of everyday communication between parents and children (Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 1991; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006; 2008). However, there is 
still much unknown regarding the development of emotion processing ability across the lifespan.  
In early development, human beings are active learners. Infants actively seek out 
information to aid in learning about the world around them. When an infant is presented with an 
unfamiliar object or circumstance, the typical response is to seek information from their mother or 
the best available adult to determine the appropriate action. This is known as social referencing 
(Gunnar & Stone, 1984). For example, if a 12-month-old infant is faced with an unfamiliar and 
uncertain situation, they are likely to look to their mother for information. If the mother is 
displaying a fearful facial expression, the infant would be likely to avoid the situation. Conversely, 
the infant would be more likely to approach the situation if the facial expression of their mother was 
happy (Gunnar & Stone, 1984). Further, infants react with similar avoidance to any type of negative 
expression (e.g., sad, angry, fearful, or disgusted), suggesting an overall distinction between 
positive and negative emotions, rather than identification of specific types of emotion. Some studies 
9 
 
have explored the effect of vocal emotional cues during social referencing, and found these signals 
alone to be just as effective as facial cues (Moses et al., 2001; Mumme, Fernald & Herrera, 1996; 
Vaish & Striano, 2004). 
Beyond the responses observed during social referencing, it is difficult to determine the 
ability of infants to distinguish between facial expressions. However, neurophysiological evidence 
from EEG studies suggest preferential processing of emotional human faces compared to animal 
faces, and greater amplitude of the N290 and N400 components when viewing emotionally negative 
facial expressions compared to positive expressions in 7-month-old infants (Vanderwert et al., 
2014). Vanderwert and colleagues suggest that this finding indicates the emergence of a processing 
bias for negative expressions at this age. As children grow, the recognition of various facial 
expressions becomes more refined. As mentioned, evidence suggests that infants and young 
children are able to distinguish between general positive and negative expressions of emotion, but 
not specific emotions (Russell & Widen, 2002). In early childhood, around 4 years of age, children 
begin to show more specific recognition of anger and sadness (Widen, 2013). As children develop, 
this differentiation of specific emotion categories becomes more refined. By around 5 years of age, 
children begin to identify fearful expressions, and expressions of disgust are recognised around 7 
years of age (Widen, 2013). There is limited evidence beyond this age until adulthood, but it is 
theorised that this refinement of facial expression identification continues gradually.  
Vicari, Snitzer Reilly, Pasqualetti, Vizzotto and Caltagirone (2000) explored children‟s 
ability to recognise emotional facial expressions using visual means (matching faces with similar 
expressions) and lexical means (selecting a face to suit an emotional story, and free labelling 
expressions). Performance on all tasks improved with age, although even for the oldest children in 
the study (9-10 years), performance was not at ceiling, suggesting that emotion recognition is still 
developing beyond this point. Overall, happiness was the most well recognised emotion, followed 
by sadness, and then anger. Fear and disgust were the least well recognised. However, this pattern 
differed according to the type of task, such that different emotions were recognised better in 
different types of tasks. This finding suggests that the available information in a given context 
influences the way emotions are identified (Vicari et al., 2000). In further support of this, Russell 
and Widen (2002) found that children were more accurate when identifying facial expressions using 
labels, rather than matching to similar facial expressions. Therefore, additional contextual or 
linguistic information improves identification of emotion, compared to facial information alone. 
It is believed that emotional information expressed in the auditory modality may be superior 
to facial expressions in effectively communicating emotion (e.g., Kraus, 2017). This may be 
particularly true for infants, as auditory processing typically develops sooner than visual processing 
(Gottlieb, 1971). Accordingly, it is interesting to observe that adults automatically adjust the way 
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their voice sounds when speaking to infants. They increase their pitch, speak more slowly and 
rhythmically, and exaggerate the positive emotional tone in their speech (Ferguson, 1964). This is 
known as infant-directed (ID) speech (Santesso, Schmidt & Trainor, 2007; Trainor, Austin & 
Desjardins, 2000). Trainor and colleagues (2000) hypothesised that the primary purpose of ID 
speech is to communicate emotion and therefore strengthen the emotional connections between the 
infant and the adult. Thus, they conducted a study comparing ID speech to emotional adult-directed 
speech, investigating similarities in various acoustic parameters (e.g., pitch, tempo, rhythm, etc.) 
between the two types of speech when expressing love, comfort, surprise, and fear. They found very 
few differences in the features of the vocalisations between ID speech and emotional adult-directed 
speech, supporting their theory that ID speech is largely for conveying emotion through emotional 
prosody. Based on their results, the authors concluded that emotional prosody may be the most 
useful tool in expressing emotion to infants (Trainor et al., 2000).  
Beyond infancy, there is very little evidence of childhood recognition of vocal emotional 
expressions. Some research suggests that children are less accurate at recognising emotion from 
voices than from faces. For instance, Nelson and Russell (2011) used a free-labelling task to test 3-, 
4-, and 5-year-old children on their recognition of emotions expressed via the face, voice, body 
posture, and a combination of cues. Overall, performance improved with age, and there was greater 
improvement with age for sad, angry, and scared emotions than for happy emotions. Labelling of 
emotions from the face was significantly more accurate than from the voice. Additionally, 
performance labelling the multi-cue presentations was equal to the face performance, indicating that 
multiple cues did not aid recognition beyond just the face alone. For the face, postural, and multi-
cue presentations, recognition was better for happy, sad, and angry emotions than fear. However, 
for the vocal emotions, performance was best for sad voices, followed by angry, then happy, and 
then fear. For happy voice clips, children were more likely to label them as negative rather than 
positive. These findings indicate firstly that 5-year-old children have difficulty recognising fear 
from any modality, and they have difficulty distinguishing between positive and negative valence 
from the voice specifically.    
Sauter, Panattoni and Happe (2013) asked children aged between 5 and 10 years of age to 
listen to a range of vocal emotional recordings and match them to a selection of emotional images. 
The voice samples were both verbal (i.e., numbers spoken with varied intonation) and nonverbal 
(e.g., laughter, crying, etc.). A range of emotions were tested, including the standard negative 
emotions of anger, sadness, fear, and disgust. A variety of positive emotional expressions were also 
tested, including amusement, contentment, relief, and achievement. The authors note that all other 
studies of emotion recognition at the time only included the positive emotions of happiness and 
surprise, and did not include other positive states. They found that children were better able to 
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identify emotions from nonverbal vocalisations compared to verbal, and that recognition of emotion 
from nonverbal sounds was close to ceiling performance. For the verbal expressions, children as 
young as 5 years old were able to recognise emotions accurately; however, accuracy improved 
significantly with age. Overall, the emotions best recognised were sadness, anger, and fear, and the 
emotions which were least well recognised were contentment, disgust, and surprise. This pattern is 
distinct from that of facial emotion recognition studies with children, which show that positive 
emotions are typically identified more accurately than negative emotions (Vicari et al., 2000). In 
addition, Sauter et al. found that children‟s ability to recognise emotion from nonverbal sounds was 
positively related to their ability to recognise emotion from verbal expressions, such that children 
who performed better on one also performed better on the other. The authors suggest that this might 
reflect the overall social and emotional development of the children. However, no other measure of 
more general social or emotional skills was included.   
Very few studies have investigated the simultaneous processing of emotional information 
from multiple modalities in infants and children. Some studies show that 7-month-old infants will 
look longer at emotional faces presented with congruent emotional voices, compared to incongruent 
faces and voices (Soken & Pick, 1992; Walker, 1982; Walker-Andrews, 1986). However, this effect 
is not seen in infants 5 months or younger, except when they are presented with emotional faces and 
voices of their own mother (Kahana-Kalman & Walker-Andrews, 2001; Walker-Andrews, 1986). 
This finding suggests that younger infants can integrate emotional information if it is presented 
from a familiar source, whereas older infants can achieve this with non-familiar presentations. In 
addition, an EEG study by Grossman, Striano and Friederici (2006) revealed differing patterns of 
brain potentials in response to emotionally incongruent face and voice pairs compared to congruent 
pairs in 7-month-old infants. These findings together suggest an early developed ability to 
effectively integrate emotional cues from multiple modalities. 
Later in childhood, research investigating emotional recognition from multiple modalities at 
once in typical children is exceptionally limited. As discussed, Nelson and Russell (2011) showed 
that emotion recognition was not aided by information from multiple sources. Further, Mondloch 
(2012) presented 8-year-old children and adults with images of people expressing emotion through 
facial expressions and body postures. The images reflected either congruent or incongruent face-
body displays of emotion. A congruency effect was found, particularly for children, such that 
emotion recognition was slower and less accurate when the facial and body cues were incongruent 
compared to when they were congruent. Aguert, Laval, Lacroix, Gil and Le Bigot (2013) asked 
children to identify emotions from prosody which was presented within a non-emotional situational 
context. Accuracy improved between the ages of 5 and 13 years, but the 13-year-olds were still 
much less accurate than adults. These studies suggest that childrens‟ ability to integrate different 
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types of emotional information may depend on modality and age, with improvements occurring 
after 5 years of age. Emotions are also found to have a great impact on other areas of cognition, and 
the following section will discuss the interactions between emotion and cognition in childhood. 
1.1.2 Emotion, Cognition, and Language  
1.1.2.1 Typical adults. Emotional information can influence aspects of cognition such as 
learning and memory (Hooker, Verosky, Miyakawa, Knight & D‟Esposito, 2008; Kensinger, 
Garoff-Eaton & Schacter, 2007; Touryan, Marian & Shimamura, 2007). Humans have an 
attentional bias toward emotional information, and the presence of emotion has been shown to 
impact other processes. Hooker and colleagues (2008) used functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to explore the brain structures involved in a learning task including emotional cues. Healthy 
adult participants were required to make predictions regarding the emotional response of a face to 
one of two objects. The goal was to learn which particular objects were associated with specific 
emotional facial expressions, and therefore to become more accurate in their predictions as the 
experiment progressed. There were two learning tasks, one in which the emotional expressions were 
either neutral or fearful, and one in which they were either neutral or happy. The results showed that 
in both the fearful and happy trials, predictions became faster for objects which were associated 
with emotional expressions compared to neutral expressions, suggesting that participants were 
learning the emotional associations faster than the neutral ones. The fMRI results revealed that, 
compared to the neutral associations, emotional associations elicited greater activation in the 
amygdala and the hippocampus, areas involved in emotion and memory, respectively. Aside from 
faces, other research has shown that images of emotional objects or scenes are remembered better 
than neutral images, particularly for negative emotions (Kensinger et al.,2007; Touryan et al., 
2007).  
Emotional information has also been found to influence memory for words (Kensinger & 
Corken, 2003; Wang & Fu, 2011). In a series of studies by Kensinger and Corkin (2003), memory 
for words with negative meaning compared to neutral words was explored. Participants were 
presented with negative or neutral written words and were required to classify them as being 
concrete or abstract. Later, they were shown another set of words, which included both previously 
seen and unseen words, and were asked to identify which items they had seen and which ones were 
new. Recognition performance was superior for negative words compared to neutral words. 
Similarly, Wang and Fu (2011) presented participants with words that had positive, negative, and 
neutral meanings, and then later tested their ability to recall and recognise the words. Recall 
performance was better for negative words compared to neutral words, and there was a trend 
towards better recall of positive words compared to neutral. Conversely, recognition performance 
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was poorer for negative words compared to neutral words. This suggests that the way in which 
emotion words are encoded and retrieved is dependent on other contextual factors and demands.  
Memory for non-emotional words can also be influenced by emotional information 
presented simultaneously. Anderson and Shimamura (2005) presented participants with neutral 
auditory words while they watched neutral, positive, or negative videos (e.g., playful animals, or 
surgical procedures) with the sound off. Later, they were asked to recall as many of the words as 
they could. Participants recalled significantly fewer of the words presented with negative videos, 
compared to those presented with neutral and positive videos, which did not differ. This finding 
shows that under some circumstances, negative emotional information can interfere with memory 
processes. In this case, such interference may be due to the emotional information being irrelevant 
and distracting to the central task, with participants prioritising the processing of the negative video 
over processing of the words.   
Emotion also influences language processing and production (Hofmann et al., 2009; Kousta 
et al., 2009; Kuperman, 2013; Slevc & Ferreira, 2006). The processing of written words with 
emotional meaning has been the focus of a great deal of research within psycholinguistics 
(Lartseva, Dijkstra, Kan & Buitelaar, 2014). Such research has demonstrated that written emotional 
words are recognised quicker than non-emotional words (Kousta et al., 2009). In addition, written 
emotional words are remembered better in both recognition and free recall tasks (Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003) and can facilitate reaction time performances on speech-related tasks (e.g., picture 
naming) when words are emotionally congruent with images (Liu, Xin, Jin, Hua & Li, 2010). 
Additionally, different types of written emotional information show different effects. For example, 
in many instances, positive emotional words tend to facilitate performance on various word 
recognition tasks, whereas negative emotional words can interfere with performance (Hofmann et 
al., 2009; Lartseva et al., 2014). Researchers suggest that these effects reflect automatic, 
motivational responses in which individuals approach positive information and avoid negative 
information (Kousta et al., 2009).  
The mechanisms of acquiring language are complex and impacted by many factors. In 
adulthood, language learning requires a high level of cognitive effort (Birdsong, 1999). The process 
of learning new words can be influenced by factors such as sleep (Davis, Di Betta, Macdonald & 
Gaskell, 2008), phonological familiarity and vocal rehearsal (Kaushanskaya & Yoo, 2011), and 
working memory ability (Gupta, 2003), among others. Additionally, with more available 
information, and more enriching semantic context, stronger associations for new words are formed 
(Angwin, Phua & Copland, 2014; Craik and Tulving, 1975). Fast mapping is the ability to rapidly 
learn and associate a novel word with a referent within a short time frame and limited exposures. 
This ability is particularly strong in childhood; however, Ramachandra, Rickenbach, Ruda, 
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LeCureux and Pope (2009) also showed approximately half of their adult sample to have proficient 
fast mapping abilities.  
Speech is typically laden with varied prosody. However, little is known regarding the way in 
which emotional prosody influences language learning. Some studies have explored how prosody 
more generally can provide descriptive information and assist with word learning (Reinisch, Jesse 
& Nygaard, 2013; Shintel, Anderson & Fenn, 2014). For instance, Reinisch and colleagues 
presented adult participants with novel words, each with two pictured objects that had opposite 
features (e.g., a big and a small object). The novel words were spoken with a prosody intended to 
match one of the two pictures (e.g., increasing volume and duration to refer to a big object). 
Participants were then asked to identify the appropriate picture to match a word during a test phase, 
in which the words were presented with neutral prosody. Participants were able to accurately match 
the words with the intended images and could generalise to other objects, which shows that prosody 
was a useful tool for learning the meaning of new words. However, when prosody was used in 
isolation (i.e., without images), participants did not accurately learn the intended meaning of the 
words. This finding suggests that prosody acts as a medium to refer individuals toward a particular 
available association (Reinisch et al., 2013). Shintel and colleagues (2014) conducted a similar 
study; however, the learning stage of their test paradigm included an arrow which pointed to the 
image that matched the word. The prosody of the words was either congruent or incongruent with 
the intended meaning of the word (e.g., words spoken with increased volume and duration 
presented with an arrow pointing to either a big or small object, respectively). The results showed 
that when prosody was congruent with the word meaning, word learning was more effective 
compared to when prosody was incongruent, providing further evidence for the importance of 
prosody when making word-object associations. 
Studies have shown that new words which are associated with an emotional meaning are 
learned differently to words with neutral meaning (Altarriba & Basnight-Brown, 2011; Eden et al., 
2015). For instance, Altarriba and Basnight-Brown (2011) presented participants with words in a 
non-native language along with their native language translations. These included concrete, 
abstract, and emotion words. In a testing phase, results indicated that the emotion words were less 
encoded compared to other words. The authors concluded that more context is needed to form 
stronger representations of emotion words (Altarriba & Basnight-Brown, 2011). In contrast, a study 
by Eden et al. (2015) showed that nonsense words which participants had associated with negative 
images were better learned compared to words associated with neutral images. However, pairing 
words with images could be considered a richer context compared to word-word pairs. These two 
studies demonstrate that emotional information can impact language learning when new words are 
explicitly linked with emotion meanings. However, there have been no explorations of how implicit 
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or irrelevant emotional information may influence these processes in adults. Research is even more 
limited when considering how emotion influences language learning and broader cognition in 
childhood. 
1.1.2.2 Typical children. As with adults (e.g., Hooker et al., 2008), emotional information 
has been found to influence various aspects of cognition in childhood, such as memory and 
learning. An area which has been examined in some depth is children‟s memory for information 
from emotional events and stories. Bergen, Wall and Salmon (2015) showed 5- and 6-year-old 
children images of animals depicting various positive, negative, and neutral facial expressions. The 
images were each accompanied by a story, which matched the emotion expressed. When asked to 
recall the information, children were better able to recall emotional information, when compared 
with neutral information, and they were able to remember more general details from the negative 
stories compared to the positive ones. Similarly, emotional images, presented alongside a matching 
emotional story, were better remembered by 8-year-old children when the images were negative, 
rather than neutral (Leventon & Bauer, 2016). Interestingly, Leventon and Bauer also showed that if 
negative images were presented with a neutral story, they were not remembered better than neutral 
stimuli. This suggests that the contextual information provided by emotional narratives is important 
for aiding memory beyond simply presenting visual emotional stimuli.  
When considering emotional attention biases, the results of Bergen et al. (2015) and 
Leventon and Bauer (2016) are in line with evidence showing that, while all emotional stimuli 
capture attention, negative emotions do so more (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Vaish, 
Grossmann & Woodward, 2008; Wang & Fu, 2011). Davidson, Luo and Burden (2001) explored 
whether the advantage for remembering emotional information from stories differed for different 
age groups, as well as for high and low intensities of emotion. They found that, even though 10-
year-olds had greater memory for non-emotional information than the 6- and 7-year-olds, younger 
children remembered just as much of the emotional information as the older children, and both age 
groups remembered emotional information better than non-emotional information. This shows that 
emotion provides more of an advantage to memory than age. Further, emotional information was 
remembered better regardless of the intensity of the emotion (Davidson et al., 2001).  
Within educational research, studies have shown that emotion is an integral part of learning 
processes, which suggests that emotion should be integrated into education practices to achieve 
higher learning outcomes (Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007; Immordino-Yang, 2016). In support 
of this, EEG and fMRI studies show an overlap in brain responses and structures for emotional and 
cognitive processes (Bell & Diaz, 2012; Immordino-Yang, 2016; Leventon, Stevens & Bauer, 
2014). However, other research indicates that the influence of emotion on cognition can be either 
beneficial or detrimental, depending on various factors (Tyng, Amin, Saad, & Malik, 2017). These 
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factors can include individual differences in personality, sex and age, as well as the type of 
emotional stimulus and its relevance (Tyng et al., 2017). Studies also show that a child‟s mood state 
while encoding information can either facilitate or interfere with memory for emotional information 
depending on whether it is congruent or incongruent with the information. For instance, sad or 
angry mood states at the time of encoding can interfere with memory for happy information (Nasby 
& Yando, 1982), whereas happy mood states enhance memory for happy information 
(Christodoulou & Burke, 2016). 
As previously discussed, verbal communication is one of the main ways in which emotion is 
portrayed. In particular, vocal emotions tend to be emphasised and exaggerated when directed 
towards infants and children (Trainor et al., 2000). Although emotional information influences 
cognition, it is unclear how emotion influences language processes. Studies have shown that infants 
are better able to learn language from ID speech compared to adult directed-speech (e.g., Floccia, et 
al., 2016). However, this is typically explained by the way in which ID speech allows for 
appropriate segmentation of words. Additionally, it has been argued that infants respond to highly 
emotional tones of voice, and this allows them to attend to the language and learn (Fernald, 1993). 
However, research in support of this claim is lacking (for a review of this issue, see Doan, 2010).  
It has been established that language-learning is a complex process, with many influencing 
factors. Rapid language learning throughout childhood is thought to involve several mechanisms, 
and infants use a range of cues to aid the process (Bloom, 2000). Many studies have investigated 
such mechanisms and cues through experiments testing fast mapping ability. A large majority of 
children can recognise and determine the correct referent for a word based on a single exposure, and 
with two exposures around half of children can freely recall a word to label a referent appropriately 
(Dollaghan, 1985). Children and infants use various cues to determine correct associations between 
objects and words. However, the types of cues available can affect how well fast mapping occurs 
(Brady & Goodman, 2014). Some studies have explored how emotional cues impact the language 
acquisition processes (Berman, Graham, Callaway & Chambers, 2013; Clement, Bernard, 
Grandjean & Sander, 2013; Herold, Nygaard, Chicos & Namy, 2011; San Jaun, Chambers, Berman, 
Humphry & Graham, 2017).  
Emotional cues may guide attention and aid in forming associations during word learning 
contexts. Clement et al. (2013) presented 3- to 5-year-olds with a task in which they saw two faces 
looking at a novel object. Each face gave a different nonsense word name, and children were 
required to choose which nonsense word was the correct name for a given object. Each of the faces 
expressed either happy or angry expressions. When presented with a happy and angry face, children 
chose the word given by the happy face significantly more often than the angry face. This finding 
shows that children prefer to learn words from a happy face than an angry face, suggesting that 
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emotional information may be important when considering the source of new words (Clement et al., 
2013). However, this study did not examine how well children retained the words. Studies have 
shown that prosody can be useful in providing referential information to guide new word 
associations. For example, Herold et al. (2011) presented 4- and 5-year-old children with picture 
pairs which had opposing features, such as big or small, happy or sad, yummy or yucky, etc. 
Children were asked to identify which image matched a nonsense word name which was spoken 
with a particular prosody to match the features of one image. For example, a deep, slow, loud voice 
referred to something large. They found that 5-year-old children were able to select the appropriate 
images using prosodic information. The 4-year-old children could only do so when specifically 
instructed to attend to prosody. These results suggest that children can make use of prosodic 
information when associating words to objects. 
Emotional cues can provide descriptive or referential information during word learning. San 
Juan and colleagues (2017) showed that when a person expressed a desire for a specific object, and 
were later given a gift, 5-year-olds were able to use happy vocal expressions to determine if the 
person had received their desired object, suggesting that children can integrate desires and 
emotional prosody to reason about outcomes. In a similar study, Berman et al. (2013) showed 4- 
and 5-year-old children images of two novel objects presented alongside one another. Following 
this, the children saw the same objects again, but one had been enhanced (e.g., more colour), while 
the other had been broken. With this, the children were instructed to point or look to one of the 
objects, labelled by a novel word (e.g., “point to the blicket”). The instruction was given with a 
recorded voice which was either positive or negative in prosody. In observing their pointing and 
looking behaviour, Berman et al. found that the children linked words spoken with negative prosody 
to the broken objects and words spoken with positive prosody to the enhanced objects. Even once 
the objects were returned to their original state and the words were spoken with neutral prosody, 
children retained their knowledge of which word referred to which object, indicating that the 
emotional associations had assisted in learning of the new words. However, in the described studies, 
emotional information was directly relevant to the stimuli. In social communication, emotional 
expressions can sometimes be irrelevant to the information being transmitted, particularly given that 
ID and child-directed speech are highly emotional in nature (Trainor et al., 2000). Despite this, no 
studies have explored whether irrelevant emotional information impacts language learning ability. 
In sum, evidence from typical adults and children shows that emotional information is 
recognised and processed efficiently, with recognition improving with age and with increasing 
congruent cues from multiple modalities. An attentional bias toward emotions leads to prioritised 
processing of emotion, which in turn can influence other cognitive processes. Emotion is an 
important component of interpersonal communication, and we regularly incorporate emotional 
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information within our language and communication automatically. However, little is known 
regarding the interactions between emotion processing and language processing, and whether 
emotion impacts language learning. Further, there is great variability between individuals in the 
processing and understanding of emotions. For instance, individuals with ASD often show 
difficulties with emotion processing. To understand emotion processing abilities and the 
relationships between emotion and language processing, it is necessary to explore individual 
differences. The following section will provide an overview of evidence regarding both explicit and 
implicit processing of emotion in ASD. 
1.2 Emotion Processing in ASD 
The expression, recognition, and understanding of emotion have been extensively 
researched within the ASD population. The primary symptom of ASD involves impairments to 
social and emotional function; hence, much research has examined how emotional information is 
communicated to and by individuals with ASD. Emotion processing in ASD may not be completely 
dysfunctional, but rather that emotions are perceived by people with ASD in a different way to 
typically developing individuals (Begeer et al., 2008; Nuske, Vivanti & Dissanayake, 2013). Many 
individuals with ASD may have adequate skills in the recognition and understanding of basic 
emotions; however, in general they have more difficulty compared to controls with processing more 
complex emotions (such as confusion or embarrassment; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2002), partially presented expressions (e.g., when presented via the eyes only; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; Wallace, Coleman & Bailey, 2008), negative emotions 
(e.g., Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O‟Riordan & Bullmore, 2007), and emotions presented 
via different modalities simultaneously (Boucher Lewis & Collis, 2000). The majority of studies 
investigating emotion processing in ASD have focused on facial emotion processing. However, an 
increasing number of studies are emerging that investigate emotion processing in other modalities, 
such as vocal emotional prosody, as well as combined modalities. The following section will 
present the findings to date from emotion processing studies within adults and children with ASD. 
1.2.1 Emotion Recognition 
1.2.1.1 Adults with ASD. Research on emotion recognition in ASD to date has focused 
primarily on children. However, there have been a number of studies which have demonstrated that 
adults with ASD experience difficulties recognising emotion from facial expressions in demanding 
or ambiguous situations (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Humphreys, Minshew, 
Leonard & Behrmann, 2007; Katsyri, Saalasti, Tiippana, Wendt & Sams, 2008). For example, 
Humphreys et al. (2007) examined adults with ASD and typical adults, using a facial emotion 
recognition task in which the expressions portrayed were morphed combinations two different 
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emotions. Each combination varied in the proportion of each of the two emotions portrayed (e.g., 
50% happiness, 50% fear; or 30% happiness, 70% fear), resulting in faces which varied in the 
degree of their emotional ambiguity. Adults with ASD were less accurate than controls in 
identifying the appropriate emotion with emotional combinations in which fear and disgust were the 
dominant expressions. Poorer ability to identify fearful expressions was correlated with severity of 
autistic symptoms. Additionally, in combinations which included 50% happiness, typical adults 
were more likely to recognise them as being happy, rather than the other emotion in the 
combination. Adults with ASD, however, did not show this tendency.  
Katsyri and colleagues (2008) also found that adults with ASD performed more poorly in 
facial emotional recognition tasks when the circumstances were more demanding. Results indicated 
that adults with ASD were as accurate as controls in identifying emotional expressions in ordinary 
images of faces. However, when the spatial frequency of the image was lowered by adding a 
blurred filter, the ASD group performed worse than the typical group. Further evidence that adults 
with ASD are worse at recognising facial expressions under more demanding and ambiguous 
circumstances is seen in a standard Theory of Mind test for adults with ASD, known as the 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001). In this test, 
examinees are presented with an image of two eyes, via which varied emotional expressions are 
conveyed. Individuals are then required to indicate how the pictured person is feeling. The test 
consistently demonstrates that adults with ASD are less accurate in identifying the appropriate 
emotions compared to adults without ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001). A recent 
meta-analysis by Lozier, Vanmeter and Marsh (2014) concluded that individuals with ASD display 
a reduced ability to recognise emotional facial expressions, and that this difference actually 
becomes more apparent with age.  
Similar to the evidence of facial emotion recognition, studies within the auditory modality 
also reveal consistent differences with emotional recognition in adults with ASD. Doi et al. (2013) 
showed that not only did the ASD group perform worse than typical adults when identifying low- 
and medium-intensity emotions from vocal prosody, but they were also impaired at identifying 
high-intensity emotions from the voice. Stewart, McAdam, Ota, Peppe and Cleland (2011) found 
that adults with ASD relied on semantic meaning to identify the emotion of a vocalisation; although 
they performed adequately when emotional prosody was congruent with emotional meaning, they 
performed worse when the prosody and meaning were incongruent, and when there was no 
semantic meaning (e.g., “mmm” sounds with varied emotional prosody). Finally, Philip and 
colleagues (2010) showed emotion recognition impairments in multiple modalities. Adults with 
ASD were found to be significantly less able to identify emotional information presented via the 
face, the voice, and body movements, compared to typical adults. When emotional information was 
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presented in the auditory modality, but via semantic meaning as opposed to prosody, Beversdorf 
and colleagues (1998) revealed that emotional sentences led to improved recall compared to neutral 
sentences for typical adults. This was not the case for adults with ASD, which points to differences 
in the processing of semantically delivered auditory emotion, not just prosodically presented 
emotion.  
When required to label emotions presented from the face and voice, alone or combined, 
adults with ASD show impairments in all tasks, whereas typical adults are aided by the additional 
information in the combined condition (Charbonneau et al., 2013). Additionally, when determining 
whether a face is expressing the same emotion as a voice when presented with emotionally 
congruent and incongruent face-voice pairs, adults with ASD are significantly less accurate 
compared to controls (O‟Connor, 2007). O‟Connor suggested that a fixation with detail often 
observed in individuals with ASD could result in difficulty integrating emotional information from 
various sources at once, as they are overloaded with information. In a more naturalistic setting, 
when observing a video of another individual receiving a gift, adults with ASD showed difficulties 
determining the type of gift received, based on the emotional reactions (both facial and vocal) of the 
observed individual (Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell & Chapman, 2014). However, when an image of the 
emotional reaction is shown to the participants, allowing them to observe the image for as long as 
necessary, the ASD group becomes much more accurate at determining the gift given for most 
emotional reactions (Cassidy, Mitchell, Chapman & Ropar, 2015). These findings are consistent 
with the suggestion that information from multiple modalities at once may be too overwhelming for 
adults with ASD to process efficiently, especially in the brief amount of time these can be presented 
in a realistic situation.  
Finally, further evidence for impaired cross-modality emotional information integration in 
adults with ASD comes from the “Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery” (Golan, Baron-
Cohen & Hill, 2006). This was a further advancement on the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” and 
“Reading the Mind in the Voice” tests, and it also shows that adults with ASD have consistent 
difficulty determining mental state from facial and vocal emotional expressions, compared to 
typical adults. As discussed, research consistently shows that adults with ASD have difficulty 
recognising emotions under demanding circumstances. However, research on emotion recognition 
in children with ASD is much more abundant, and much less conclusive. 
1.2.1.2 Children with ASD. In general, research has shown that children with ASD 
perceive faces differently to individuals without ASD. For instance, eye-tracking studies have 
revealed that children with ASD focus their gaze more to the mouth area when viewing a human 
face, whilst typically developing children tend to look mostly at the eyes (Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar & Cohen, 2002; Klin, Jones, Schultz & Volkmar, 2003). This focus on a different part of 
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the face, in combination with having an impaired understanding of emotional states generally 
(Begeer et al., 2008), might limit the ability of a child with ASD to recognise emotional states from 
facial expressions. For the most part, this is what the evidence suggests. Behaviourally, Begeer and 
colleagues (2006) found that when children with ASD and typically developing children were asked 
to match faces based on how similar they were, children with ASD were more likely to match the 
faces based on similar features, such as moustache or glasses, whereas the typically developing 
children were more likely to match the faces based on similar emotional expressions shown. 
Children with ASD only took emotional expression into consideration when specifically instructed 
to match the faces based on how likely they were to have the same future actions. This result shows 
that, while the participants with ASD might have had the ability to recognise facial expression, they 
did not automatically consider emotion until it was directly relevant to their task.  
Similar to the studies discussed above, Celani, Battacchi and Arcidiacono (1999) found that 
children with ASD performed worse when matching faces according to emotional expression 
compared to matching according to identity. In contrast, both typically developing children and 
children with Down syndrome displayed the opposite effect. Additionally, children with ASD, 
unlike controls, had more difficulty identifying emotions conveyed via a face, compared to 
emotions conveyed in images of emotional situations not involving people (e.g., fireworks). Kamio, 
Wolf and Fein (2006) showed that emotional faces and non-emotional object primes differentially 
influenced typically developing children‟s subsequent liking ratings of Japanese ideographs. 
However, the same effect was not shown in children with ASD. Brosnan, Johnson, Grawmeyer, 
Chapman and Benton (2015) showed that children with ASD were better able to recognise emotion 
presented in cartoon images compared to human faces, which was the opposite to what was seen in 
typically developing children. Additionally, Loukusa, Makinen, Kuusikko-Gauffin, Ebeling and 
Moilanen (2014) showed that children with ASD performed worse than typically developing 
children or children with specific language impairment, when labelling emotion in facial 
expressions. Tell, Davidson and Camras (2014) showed that difficulties recognising emotional 
facial expressions in children with ASD depended on the type of emotion and the direction of the 
posers‟ eye-gaze. Specifically, children with ASD were less accurate than typically developing 
children when identifying fearful emotional expressions, but not happy or angry emotional 
expressions, and were less accurate identifying sad expressions with direct eye-gaze rather than 
averted eye-gaze. Finally, Eussen and colleagues (2015) showed that for individuals with ASD, less 
accurate performance on a facial recognition task in childhood was associated with more severe 
ASD symptoms during adolescence. Importantly though, this association did not exist in a task 
involving identification of emotional facial expressions. 
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Among the research in emotional facial recognition in ASD, there are some studies 
demonstrating conflicting evidence to the above mentioned results. Corona, Dissanayake, Arbelle, 
Wellington and Sigman (1998) presented participants with a scenario, in which an adult hurt 
themselves and reacted either neutrally or with distress. A range of behavioural measures, such as 
looking, body movements, and facial expressions, showed that the children with ASD and a control 
group of developmentally delayed children were equally concerned in the distressed condition, 
when compared with the neutral condition. This result implies that the children with ASD were just 
as able to distinguish between the emotions as the developmentally delayed group. However, the 
control group showed an increase in heart rate for the distressed condition compared to their 
baseline heart rate, whereas heart rate did not vary from baseline for the children with ASD. In an 
experiment conducted by Castelli (2005), children with ASD and typically developing children 
completed a task in which they matched pairs of facial emotional expressions for likeness, which 
varied in their degree of emotional intensity. The aim was to gauge the ability of the children to 
distinguish between different intensities of the same emotion. The children also completed a task in 
which they named the emotion expressed in the faces. The results of the experiments revealed that 
children with ASD performed with the same accuracy as typically developing children on the 
matching and naming tasks. Similarly, De Vries and Geurts (2012) showed no difference between 
children with ASD and typically developing children in their ability to match faces based on 
emotional expression or gender. The only effect shown was that children with ASD had more 
difficulty switching from the emotion-matching task to the gender-matching task compared to 
controls. This may indicate greater cognitive demand for the emotion-matching task, although the 
children with ASD were not slower or less accurate on the task itself. Tracy, Robins, Schriber and 
Solomon (2011) also found no difference in speed and accuracy of identifying emotional facial 
expressions between children with ASD and controls, even with more complex emotions. However, 
this study included higher-functioning and older children than previous studies, as well as simple 
yes/no response options, which may have elicited a ceiling effect.  
Grossman, Klin, Carter and Volkmar (2000) presented children with ASD and typically 
developing children with an emotional facial recognition task in which the faces were presented 
alone, and then alongside written labels which were emotionally congruent (e.g., a happy face 
presented with the label “happy”), emotionally incongruent (e.g., a happy face presented with the 
label “angry”), or irrelevant (e.g., a happy face presented with the label “orange”). When the faces 
were presented alone, children with ASD demonstrated similar emotion recognition accuracy to 
typically developing children. However, when the faces were presented with an incongruent label, 
children with ASD had worse recognition accuracy than typically developing children. Grossman 
and colleagues attributed these results to the increased cognitive demand associated with 
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recognising the emotion in the incongruent condition. These results are consistent with most other 
literature on the subject, in which results suggest that children with ASD may not process emotion 
as effectively and automatically as other children. At the same time, children with ASD may also 
develop compensatory cognitive strategies which enable them to accurately recognise emotions in 
some circumstances (Begeer et al., 2006; 2008; Grossman et al., 2000). Due to the variations in 
samples and methodologies in the studies discussed, it is possible that only certain study designs are 
sensitive enough to reveal this compensatory mechanism. Variation in study design might therefore 
explain why some studies show a difference between emotional facial recognition of children with 
ASD, while others do not.  
There is limited evidence that children with ASD process emotional prosody differently to 
their typically developing peers, with abnormalities in emotional recognition from prosody being 
evident in only a few studies (Peppe, McCann, Gibbon, O‟Hare & Rutherford, 2007; Sourn-
Bissaoui, Aguert, Girard, Chevreuil & Laval, 2013). In contrast, other behavioural studies which 
have investigated the ability of children with ASD to identify and distinguish emotion from vocal 
prosody have shown no difference between ASD and control groups (Baker, Montgomery & 
Abramson, 2010; Grossman, Bemis, Skwerer & Tager-Flusberg, 2010; Heikkinen et al., 2010). That 
said, such studies may have been too simple to identify more subtle group differences. Chevallier, 
Noveck, Happe and Wilson (2011) developed a series of vocal emotion recognition tasks, which 
increased in cognitive demand in attempt to uncover compensatory mechanisms of adolescents with 
ASD. In their two more simple emotion labelling tasks, participants with ASD were as accurate as 
typically developing children in identifying vocal emotions. In their most difficult task, participants 
were required to count the number of times they heard the letter “T” at the same time as identifying 
the emotion. In this experiment they did find a difference between the groups, such that the ASD 
participants were less accurate at identifying emotional prosodic information compared to the 
controls. This finding supports the idea that the children with ASD may have been using 
compensatory mechanisms to process emotional information with the same efficiency and accuracy 
as typically developing individuals. However, this compensatory mechanism became less useful 
when task related cognitive demands were increased.  
While simultaneous emotional expression cues presented via both the face and voice can aid 
recognition in some contexts, individuals with ASD show difficulty integrating these different 
sources of information. Boucher et al. (2000) tested whether children with ASD could match faces 
with voices, based on the stimuli‟s emotional content, as effectively as typically developing 
children and children with specific language impairment. Additionally, they administered other 
recognition and matching tasks unrelated to emotion, as well as a task involving recognition of 
emotion in vocal prosody alone. The results showed no difference between the children with ASD 
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and the controls on their performance in the non-emotional matching and recognition tasks, and no 
difference between the groups in their ability to identify emotion from vocal prosody alone. 
However, the children with ASD performed more poorly compared to both control groups when 
matching emotional facial and vocal expressions. These results suggest that, even when children 
with ASD have intact perception of emotional prosody and non-emotional cross-modality stimuli, 
their ability to integrate emotion across multiple modalities is impaired.  
Consistent with these findings, while some studies which have examined emotion 
recognition in both facial expression and vocal prosody separately have found no difference 
between adolescents with ASD and typically developing controls (e.g., Jones et al., 2011), studies 
which have presented the same information simultaneously have shown an impaired ability of 
children and adolescents with ASD to recognise the emotion (Brandwein et al., 2015; Grossman & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2012). Grossman and Tager-Flusberg demonstrated that this effect depended on the 
level of intensity in the emotional expressions. In their study, adolescents with ASD and typically 
developing adolescents were presented with two faces depicting different emotions, along with an 
emotional voice. The participants were required to match the voice to one of the faces. The 
emotional intensity of the faces and voice was consistent within each trial, but varied across trials. 
Both participant groups were less accurate with matching low-intensity emotions compared to the 
high-intensity emotions. However, the ASD group was more affected, being even less accurate than 
the controls in the low-intensity condition. Contrastingly, the two groups were comparable in the 
high-intensity condition. This shows that individuals with ASD rely on more overt emotional 
expression when integrating emotional information effectively. Grossman and Tager-Flusberg 
comment that the results presented is this study explain the inconsistency of findings related to 
emotional recognition within ASD, and the failure of some studies to reflect the real-life difficulties 
in emotional understanding typically observed in children with ASD.  
However, Vannetzel, Chaby, Cautru, Cohen and Plaza (2011) found the opposite effect to 
the above studies. They found that children with ASD had greater difficulty compared to controls 
when identifying emotional expressions in one modality, but matched emotions across modalities in 
a typical manner. The authors suggested that children with ASD have impairments processing 
emotion; however, the presence of information from more than one modality aids, rather than 
hinders, their emotional recognition. Such contrasting findings across studies suggest that 
multimodal emotional information can assist or hinder emotional recognition, depending on the 
circumstances. For example, multimodal information may assist performance on tasks in which 
participants determine whether the face and voice are emotionally the same or different. On the 
other hand, multimodal information may hinder performance on tasks in which participants choose 
a face to match the voice out of multiple choices.  
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The studies reviewed so far describe the emotion processing capabilities of individuals with 
ASD. Overall, it is clear that there are some differences in the processing of emotion, although these 
seem to depend on various factors, such as the complexity of the task, the types of emotions and 
intensities used, symptomatology, modality, and age. As discussed, individuals with ASD may 
develop compensatory mechanisms to recognise emotions, and this may also contribute to the 
mixed findings in the literature (Begeer et al., 2006; 2008; Grossman et al., 2000). Examining 
implicit processing of emotion may be useful for determining the processing of emotion in ASD 
with less opportunity for compensation. The following section reviews evidence concerning the 
interactions between emotion, cognition, and language in adults and children with ASD.  
1.2.2 Emotion, Cognition, and Language 
While much research has investigated the general recognition and processing of emotional 
information in ASD, there is limited evidence exploring how emotion influences cognitive abilities 
in this population. However, some research suggests that emotional information may not influence 
processes like attention, memory, language, and learning in the way that emotion influences these 
processes in typical individuals (Lartseva et al., 2015). From a young age, individuals with ASD are 
found to attend less to social information compared to typical individuals (Chawarska, Macari & 
Shic, 2012). Thus, it can be expected that an attention bias toward emotion may be reduced or 
absent. Further, even though individuals with ASD often show proficient memory and learning 
abilities, episodic memory can often be impaired, a type of memory which is largely influenced by 
emotion (Boucher, 2012; Leventon & Bauer, 2016). In adults with ASD, emotional images have 
been found not to influence memory differentially to neutral images (Deruelle, Hubert, Santos & 
Wicker, 2008). In some circumstances, emotion may interact with cognition in typical ways in those 
with ASD, but the more implicit the measure, the more likely to reveal atypical emotion processing.  
1.2.2.1 Adults with ASD. To investigate the processing of written emotional words, 
Lartseva and colleagues (2014) conducted a lexical decision task in which adults with ASD and 
typical controls were required to identify whether a word was a real word or a nonsense word. The 
real words were either emotional or neutral in meaning and the dependent variables were reaction 
time and EEG measures. Individuals with ASD performed the same as controls behaviourally, such 
that emotional words were identified faster than neutral words. However, the control group showed 
a late positive ERP component in response to emotional words, which was not seen in those with 
ASD. This demonstrates that the processing of semantically emotional words is affected in ASD, 
but potentially less so than emotional facial expressions given that differences were only evident in 
ERPs and not behavioural performance. Consistent with this behavioural finding, Corden, Chilvers 
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and Skuse (2008) observed similar enhanced recognition of emotional words compared to neutral 
words across both adults with ASD and typical adults. 
When asking participants to memorise sentences which were either emotional or neutral in 
meaning, Beversdorf et al. (1998) showed that adults with ASD were less able to recall emotional 
sentences, despite having proficient memory for sentences overall, compared to typical adults. 
Gaigg and Bower (2008) showed that adults with ASD performed the same as typical controls in 
recalling emotional and neutral words, such that the emotional words were better remembered 
compared to the neutral words immediately after encoding for all participants. However, when 
recall was tested 24 hours later, typical adults still recalled more emotional words, whereas 
participants with ASD showed a drop in performance for emotional words. This finding suggests 
that adults with ASD have superior encoding of emotional, compared to neutral, information, as 
with other adults, but poorer consolidation of this information over time (Gaigg & Bower, 2008). 
Other than these few adult studies, much of the research on the interactions between emotion, 
cognition, and language in ASD has focused on childhood. 
1.2.2.2 Children with ASD. In children with ASD who do not have a language impairment, 
language processes are often comparable to typical children, although some of the mechanisms 
involved in learning language may be different (Boucher, 2012). It is believed that atypical attention 
to social cues is the primary cause for language delay in children with ASD, and that those who do 
not have a language delay have similarly reduced social attention, but have other abilities to 
compensate, such as superior rote learning and associative abilities (Bloom, 2000). For instance, 
children with ASD perform equally to typically developing children when making unambiguous 
associative pairing of objects and words, although they perform worse when required to follow 
social cues in more ambiguous settings (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin & Crowson, 1997). 
As previously discussed, a speaker‟s face holds important information during word learning. 
The eyes can give information about to whom the person is speaking and/or to what they are 
referring. The mouth can provide information about the word itself and how it is produced. The face 
also provides information about how the speaker is feeling, which may or may not be related to 
what they are saying. Tenenbaum, Amso, Abar and Sheinkopf (2014) used eye-tracking to explore 
where young children with and without ASD looked during a word learning task. Children watched 
videos of a woman labelling an object while looking to one of two possible objects. Children who 
looked towards the speaker‟s eyes and mouth were better able to recognise the objects as associated 
with the appropriate labels. This finding was the case for both typically developing children and 
children with ASD, which suggests that attention toward social stimuli assists with learning new 
words for all children (Tenenbaum et al., 2014). Further, Akechi, Kikuchi, Tojo, Osanai and 
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Hasegawa (2013) showed that children with ASD will use overt social cues, such as pointing, to aid 
word learning, but not more subtle cues, such as eye gaze. 
Norbury, Griffiths and Nation (2010) also examined eye-tracking during a word learning 
task with 6- to 9-year-old children with ASD and typical controls. In their study, children watched 
videos of a woman who gave a nonsense word label for one of three objects presented 
simultaneously. In half of the trials, the woman looked toward one of the objects when labelling, 
and in the other half she looked straight ahead, rather than looking toward a particular object. They 
found that all participants learned the object names more accurately when the woman was looking 
toward an object compared to when she was not. There were a couple of key differences between 
the typically developing children and the children with ASD. Firstly, children with ASD looked less 
toward the face during the middle of the trial (the time period in which the label was produced) 
compared to typical controls. The authors suggested that typically developing children were using 
the face as an information source more than children with ASD. Secondly, with regard to how well 
the words were learnt, children with ASD showed superior recall performance but inferior 
performance describing the target object for a given label, compared to typically developing 
children. The authors concluded that children with ASD were learning the words through 
phonological memorisation, whereas typically developing children were learning words by using 
social cues to link words to meaning. Thus, phonological skills in children with ASD may 
compensate for poorer social attention when learning language (Norbury et al., 2010). 
Diminished attention toward emotional cues may also have implications for the way 
individuals with ASD learn language. Research into the role of emotion in language learning in 
relation to individuals with ASD is exceptionally limited. Some studies have found that children 
with ASD use fewer emotion words in speech and have poorer comprehension of words associated 
with emotion (Boucher, 2012). Thurman et al. (2015) asked children with ASD and typically 
developing children to learn new words with only emotional reactions as referential cues to objects. 
In the task, the researcher searched for a particular object (labelled with a nonsense word) within an 
array of buckets. When they revealed an object in a bucket, they reacted with either a disappointed 
or excited expression, allowing for children to make inferences about whether that was the correct 
object for the label or not. All children were able to learn the words; however, typically developing 
children performed better at correctly recognising the words than children with ASD. This finding 
suggests that children with ASD have some difficulty using emotional expressions as sources of 
relevant information when word learning. 
It is evident that certain abilities and impairments affect other domains in children with ASD 
to a greater extent than typically developing children. Dyck, Piek, Hay, Smith and Hallmayer 
(2006) found that performance levels across different domains, such as language, social cognition, 
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and motor coordination, were more strongly correlated with one another in individuals with ASD 
compared to typical children and cognitively impaired children. Frith and Happe (1994) proposed 
the “weak central coherence theory”, which suggests that individuals with ASD are less able than 
others to see the “greater picture” or overall configuration, and more able than others to see specific 
details and features. This ability applies not only to visual perception, but other modalities of input, 
as well as more abstract cognitive processes. Weak central coherence theory has been used to 
explain facial emotion processing abnormalities seen in ASD, which suggest impaired configural 
processing of faces (e.g., Doi et al., 2013; Katsyri et al., 2008; Tseng et al., 2015). 
When considering different types of emotional content, the emotion that individuals with 
ASD most often seem to process abnormally is fear (Ahswin et al., 2007; Dawson et al., 2004; 
Humphreys et al., 2007; Tell et al., 2014). Fear is often viewed as being distinct from other 
emotions as it is specifically relevant to survival. Fear can be beneficial if it is directed towards 
something dangerous and therefore triggers avoidance of that danger (Hofmann et al., 2009). As 
children with ASD are reported to experience more stress and anxiety compared to other negative 
emotions, Rieffe, Terwogt and Kotronopoulou (2007) speculate that fear is even more salient to 
individuals with ASD and there is greater difficulty responding to other negative emotions, 
compared to typically developing individuals.  
Overall, it is evident that individuals with ASD present with differences in emotion 
processing, both in childhood and as adults, and that these differences cannot be explained by a 
single mechanism. However, it does seem reasonable to explain the inconsistencies seen in some of 
the literature with the hypothesis that individuals with ASD can use compensatory cognitive 
processing strategies to recognise emotion in some circumstances (Begeer et al., 2006; 2008). This 
is evident from the finding that individuals with ASD can often perform as well as typical 
individuals in recognising emotions. However, when the complexities of the task are manipulated, 
or more implicit processing is investigated, there are many circumstances in which individuals with 
ASD perform differently to typical individuals. These differences in emotion processing may 
underlie many of the symptoms presented in ASD, such as impairments in social communication 
(Charbonneau et al., 2013). Such impairments have been identified not only in those with the 
diagnosis, but within the BAP (Christensen et al., 2010). Therefore, investigating emotion 
processing in those without a diagnosis of ASD but with higher autism-like traits could shed light 
on the associations between emotion related deficits and other social impairments in ASD. The next 
section will explore the growing body of literature aiming to uncover more about ASD by 
investigating the BAP. 
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1.3 The Broader Autism Phenotype 
A phenotype refers to observable characteristics or traits which result from interactions 
between genetics and environment (Persico & Sacco, 2014). The BAP encompasses those who have 
high, albeit non-clinical, levels of autism-like traits. Due to the genetic component, close family 
members of individuals with ASD, such as parents and siblings, are often considered to fall within 
the BAP. However, high autism-like traits can be observed in other individuals who have no family 
history of ASD. There are multiple ways to determine whether someone falls within the BAP. One 
common measure of autism-like traits in the general population is the Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). The AQ is a self-report questionnaire 
which assesses known autism-like behaviours to provide information as to where an individual 
would lie on the spectrum. For instance, the AQ includes questions designed to measure social 
skills, communication, attention switching, and attention to detail, which are all major components 
of autism behaviour. Validation of the AQ revealed that individuals with ASD scored significantly 
higher than those who do not have a diagnosis. Additionally, scientists score higher on average than 
non-scientists, and males score higher on average than females (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, et al., 2001). Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. claimed that, while the AQ is not 
sufficient for determining a diagnosis of ASD, it can provide useful information in relation to the 
autism spectrum in the general population and the presence or absence of autism-like traits in 
neurotypical adults of average intelligence. The use of this tool to investigate behaviours and 
abilities which may be associated with higher levels of autism traits can aid in understanding more 
about the BAP, with respect to what separates individuals who fall into this category from those 
with clinical levels of ASD symptoms (Grinter et al., 2009). 
Much research has examined levels of autism traits in typical adults and how these traits 
relate to performance on various tasks. Tasks which are commonly examined include those which 
individuals with ASD show difficulty, in order to determine whether these difficulties are specific 
to those with clinical levels of ASD, or extend to the BAP. For instance, Bayliss and Tipper (2005) 
found that individuals who showed higher levels of autism-like traits were less likely to look 
towards a target following a directional cue, when the target was presented on an intact face, as 
opposed to a scrambled face. In contrast, individuals who had lower levels of autism-like traits 
showed greater cueing towards a target on an intact face compared to a scrambled one. This reflects 
the lower attention to social information in those with ASD. Along a similar line of inquiry, 
Jakobson, Pearson, Kozub, Hare and Rigby (2018) looked at social perception abilities in adults 
who varied in their level of autism-like traits. Participants watched videos of social interactions and 
were required to identify the intentions of a speaker based on various cues. The target intentions 
included compliments, criticisms, humorous sarcasm, negative sarcasm, and lies. Those who 
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reported higher levels of the autism-like trait of behavioural rigidity were better able to identify 
speaker intentions, which the authors explain was due to higher rigidity being associated with 
greater attention to detail. However, differences in levels of the social traits of autism were not 
related to performance on the task. Jakobson and colleagues suggest that dynamic stimuli provided 
more enriching information than the static stimuli used in previous studies, and thus were not 
sensitive to differences in social perception related to autism-like traits. 
Other studies have shown that those with higher autism-like traits demonstrate greater 
performance on visuospatial tasks (Fugard, Stewart & Stenning, 2011; Grinter et al., 2009; Stewart, 
Watson, Allcock & Yaqoob, 2009), poorer performance on verbal-analytic tasks (Fugard et al., 
2011), greater repetitive behaviours (Poljac, Poljac & Yeung, 2012), greater attention to detail, and 
reduced perceptual learning (Reed, Lowe & Everett, 2011). Additionally, the AQ has been found to 
be correlated with certain personality characteristics often typical of those with ASD, such as low 
novelty seeking, low extraversion and agreeableness, and high neuroticism (Austin, 2005; Kunihira, 
Senju, Dairoku, Wakabayashi & Hasegawa, 2006). Of particular interest is the association between 
autism-like traits and measures of emotional understanding. As the expression and processing of 
emotion is something with which individuals with ASD often have difficulty, a small number of 
researchers have examined whether this is also the case for typical adults who have high levels of 
autism traits.  
Studies which have investigated associations between autism-like traits and emotion 
processing have utilised various methods. One useful behavioural measure of emotion processing 
and empathy is to look at facial expression imitation, which typically occurs naturally when 
observing emotional facial expressions (Hermans, van Wingen, Bos, Putman & van Honk, 2009). 
Hermans and colleagues (2009) used electromyography (EMG), in which electrodes are attached to 
the face to record subtle muscle movements. Participants viewed images of faces depicting 
emotional expressions while their facial EMG was recorded. It was revealed that women who 
scored low on the AQ showed the strongest imitation of the facial expressions, in comparison to 
women who scored highly on the AQ and all men. Failure to find an association between AQ scores 
and emotional imitation in men was attributed to a floor effect in which men overall showed low 
imitation. This is consistent with the theory that men on average show higher autism-like 
characteristics and behaviours compared to women (Baron-Cohen, 2002).  
Other studies have used facial recognition tasks to examine emotion processing. Poljac, 
Poljac and Wagemans (2012) selected participants who had the highest scoring and lowest scoring 
AQ results out of a large sample. These participants were required to identify the emotional 
expressions presented on images of faces which varied in their emotional intensity. Additionally, 
participants completed a basic facial recognition task to ensure results were not due to general 
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difficulties recognising faces, which revealed no differences between the two groups. The high 
autism-trait group had poorer performance when recognising anger, disgust and sadness, as shown 
by more errors and a higher intensity needed to identify the emotions, compared to the low autism-
trait group. Similarly, Hosokawa, Nakadoi, Watanabe, Sumitani and Ohmori (2015) found that 
higher AQ scores were negatively correlated with the ability to identify fearful facial expressions. 
These two studies together show that individuals with higher levels of autism traits show difficulties 
with processing negative facial emotional expressions.  
Looking beyond facial expressions, Ingersoll (2010) examined the understanding of 
nonverbal cues, including facial expressions, body language, and vocal prosody, in the context of 
general social communication as well as identifying emotions specifically. Overall, those with 
lower AQ scores showed a greater understanding of general social non-verbal behaviours and 
greater recognition of emotion from faces, compared to those with higher AQ scores. While an 
association between AQ scores and emotion recognition from vocal prosody was not found, the 
study by Ingersoll has been the only one so far to investigate it. Overall, from the few existing 
studies examining facial emotion processing and autism-like traits, it appears evident that less 
efficient emotion processing is not specific to those who have a diagnosis of ASD, but extends to 
the BAP. Further research using varied methods and modalities are needed to investigate this effect 
in more depth.  
Other research aiming to investigate characteristics which form the BAP has examined first 
degree family members of individuals with ASD. Research has examined emotional expression and 
emotional perception in the younger infant siblings of children with ASD, who are considered to be 
high-risk of ASD. This research shows that high-risk infants, regardless of whether they later 
receive a diagnosis of ASD or not, display less smiling and lower levels of positive affect in general 
compared to low-risk infants (Cassel et al., 2007; Garon et al., 2009; Lambert-Brown et al., 2015). 
With regard to the perception and processing of emotion in high-risk infants, a study by Campbell, 
Leezenbaum, Schmidt, Day and Brownell (2015) examined high-risk and low-risk infant emotional 
responses to perceiving distress in another individual, in an attempt to measure empathy. High-risk 
infants who were later diagnosed with ASD were less likely to show an empathic response than 
high-risk infants who did not later receive a diagnosis, who in turn showed less empathic responses 
than low-risk infants. This hierarchy of degree of differences is to be expected when comparing 
those with a diagnosis, to those without a diagnosis but higher autism-like traits, and to those with 
low autism-like traits (Persico & Sacco, 2014). Cornew, Dobkins, Akshoomoff, McCleery and 
Carver (2012) conducted a social referencing paradigm with 18-month-old high-risk infants. The 
results of this study showed that the high-risk infants, regardless of later diagnostic outcomes, failed 
to show the expected pattern of appropriate behavioural modification according to each emotional 
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signal. Together, these findings indicate that differences in expression and perception of emotion is 
related to the BAP, and this relationship can be detected early in life. Further supporting these 
findings, unaffected siblings later in childhood are found to fit into the expected hierarchy of 
characteristics when recognising emotion from facial expressions. Unaffected siblings performed 
better than those with ASD, although they showed poorer performance in comparison to children 
with families with no history of ASD (Oerlemans et al., 2014). Therefore, it is apparent from the 
existing evidence that differences in the expression and processing of emotion may be a genetic 
underlying factor of ASD symptoms.  
A small number of researchers to date have also examined emotion processing in parents of 
children with ASD. Such researchers have conducted facial emotional recognition tasks with ASD 
parents compared with non-ASD parents (Adolphs, Spezio, Parlier & Piven, 2008; Bolte & Pouska, 
2003; Kadak, Demirel, Yavuz & Demir, 2014; Palermo, Pasqualetti, Barbati, Intelligente & Rossini, 
2006). Kadak and colleagues (2014) used a basic facial emotional recognition task and found that 
ASD parents were worse than controls at recognising surprised and neutral faces. Other studies 
have utilised more demanding and ambiguous methods, similar to those which have been used with 
adults with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Humphreys et al., 2007; Katsyri et 
al., 2008), to examine emotion processing in parents of children with ASD. Bolte and Pouska 
(2003) employed a morphed expression method in which children with ASD and their parents and 
siblings were required to identify emotion in faces expressing basic emotions as well as morphed 
combinations of each pair of emotions. Overall, the participants from families with ASD performed 
significantly worse than participants from families with schizophrenia and neurotypical families. 
Further, Adolphs et al. (2008) showed ASD parents images of emotional faces in which only a 
small part of the face could be seen within a “bubble” at any given time. Additionally, these 
researchers took measures of an “aloof” component known to be associated with the BAP (Piven et 
al., 1997) and separated ASD parents into two groups based on their scores. The results of this 
study showed that ASD parents in both the aloof and non-aloof groups as well as parents of 
typically developing children performed equivalently when identifying facial expressions. 
However, the aloof ASD parents relied significantly more on the mouth bubbles, whereas all other 
parents relied more on the eye bubbles. This suggests different processing strategies for recognising 
facial emotions in ASD parents who are more likely to be a part of the BAP. 
ASD research currently attempts to understand more about the BAP and bring together 
cross-disciplinary evidence to decipher the underlying aetiological factors involved in ASD. ASD is 
a complex disorder, with much variability in its presentation and prognosis. Beginning to establish 
underlying characteristics of ASD assists in forming a risk model and understanding more about the 
development of ASD, which may have clinical impacts. A further benefit of examining those with 
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relatively high or low levels of autism-like traits is that such investigations can provide insight into 
individual differences in emotion processing within typical populations. Thus, research examining 
the BAP can aid our understanding of development more generally (Landry & Chouinard, 2016). 
 
1.4 Thesis Aims and Rationale 
The literature presented in this review has outlined the existing evidence regarding explicit 
and implicit emotion processing in typical adults and children, individuals with ASD, and within 
the BAP. It is clear from the evidence provided that emotional perception and understanding are 
important aspects of social development, and that typical individuals process emotional information 
preferentially compared to non-emotional information. For most individuals, this occurs from birth 
right through to adulthood. In contrast, individuals with ASD often differ in their ability to process 
emotion. This is particularly evident in complex cognitive situations, which are more representative 
of the processing demands of real life situations. Considering the importance of emotion for social 
development, this thesis questions whether differences in emotion processing are linked with 
autism-like traits more broadly. Identifying such links can shed light on the mechanisms underlying 
the difficulties faced by those with ASD. To date, some research has provided evidence of emotion 
processing differences between neurotypical adults with higher levels of autism-like traits compared 
to those with lower levels of autism-like traits. However, this evidence is limited, such that there is 
no information regarding the relationship between autism traits and emotion recognition in typically 
developing children in the general population, and there is a lack of research exploring the 
interactions between emotion and language in relation to autism-like traits. Thus, the extent to 
which emotion processing differences are related to the traits of autism remains unclear. In addition, 
there is a limited understanding of the interaction between emotion processes and language 
processes. Therefore, the aims of the current thesis were to: 1) examine cross-modal emotion 
processing in both adults and children, 2) determine the interaction between emotion and language 
processes in both adults and children, and 3) determine the relationship between emotion processing 
and the BAP. 
A series of studies were conducted to address the aims of the thesis. Chapters 2 and 3 
investigated the contribution and interplay between vocal and facial emotional cues during emotion 
recognition tasks with typical individuals who varied in their levels of autism-like traits. Chapter 2 
aimed to determine the influence of multiple aspects of vocal emotional expressions (prosody and 
semantics) on facial emotion recognition in adults with high and low levels of autism-like traits. A 
priming task was employed in which vocal emotions expressed through prosody, semantics, or a 
combination, preceded emotional facial images. Voices and faces were congruent or incongruent in 
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their emotional content, and reaction time to identify emotion in the face was measured. Chapter 3 
aimed to determine the ability of school-aged children, with high and low levels of autism-like 
traits, to match emotional voices to a selection of emotional faces.  
The studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5 examined how an attentional bias in the processing 
of emotion might influence other cognitive processes, specifically language learning, in typical 
individuals who varied in their levels of autism-like traits. Chapter 4 examined this in adults, who 
were required to learn novel words as names for alien characters. The alien names were presented 
vocally and spoken in either a happy, fearful, or neutral prosody. Participants‟ subsequent recall and 
recognition of the words were measured. Chapter 5 examined school-aged children, who watched 
videos of an actress presenting novel words as names for novel toys. The actress utilised facial 
expression, prosody, and emotional adjectives to express either happy, fearful, or neutral emotional 
cues. Children‟s recognition and recall of the words were tested, and eye-tracking measures were 
used to determine how long the children looked at either the actress or the object when learning the 
words. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the interpretation of the findings of this series of studies overall, 
and the implications for understanding emotion processing and the BAP.  
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Chapter 2. Effects of Prosodic and Semantic Cues on Facial Emotion Recognition in Relation 
to Autism-Like Traits 
 
Previous research has shown that prosodic, semantic, and combined prosodic and semantic 
emotional information in speech influences adults‟ subsequent recognition of facial expressions, 
depending on whether the emotion is congruent or incongruent (Pell et al., 2011). This chapter 
aimed to replicate and extend this research. Specifically, the study explored whether the influence 
of emotional speech on facial emotion recognition was different for adults with low or high levels 
of autism-like traits. The content of this chapter was published as a manuscript entitled: “Effects of 
prosodic and semantic cues on facial emotion recognition in relation to autism-like traits” in the 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders (West et al., 2018; See Appendix A for a URL link 
to the published manuscript)
1
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
1
 The content included in Chapter 2 is identical to the published manuscript, except for minor changes to formatting, 
numbering, size and positioning of figures and tables, additional detail added to the methods section, and the inclusion 
of a “Conclusion” subheading, to ensure consistency with the remainder of the thesis.    
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2.1 Abstract 
The current study investigated whether those with higher levels of autism-like traits process 
emotional information from speech differently to those with lower levels of autism-like traits. 
Thirty-eight neurotypical adults (22 female) completed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient and an 
emotional priming task. Vocal primes with varied emotional prosody, semantics, or a combination, 
preceded emotional target faces. Prime-target pairs were congruent or incongruent in their 
emotional content. Overall, congruency effects were found for combined prosody-semantic primes; 
however, no congruency effects were found for semantic or prosodic primes alone. Further, those 
with higher levels of autism-like traits were not influenced by the prime stimuli. These results 
suggest that failure to integrate emotional information across modalities may be characteristic of the 
broader autism phenotype.  
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2.2 Introduction 
In a natural social context, emotional information is often expressed via multiple sources, or 
modalities, of communication, such as the meaning of the words used (semantics; e.g., “I am 
happy”), facial expressions, tone of voice (prosody), and other non-linguistic means. Emotions 
conveyed by prosody alone are accurately recognised by healthy adults, as are emotions conveyed 
by semantic meaning alone (e.g., Wambacq & Jerger, 2004). Further, emotion recognition is 
typically improved when presented via multiple modes, provided the emotion is matching (e.g., 
Nygaard & Queen, 2008). However, the degree that semantic and prosodic emotional information 
independently contribute to the perception and processing of emotion in speech is unclear. 
Investigations into the processing of multiple emotion cues, either within the same modality 
or cross-modality (i.e., across visual and auditory sensory inputs) have consistently revealed an 
“emotional congruency” effect, demonstrating that participants recognise emotions more accurately 
and efficiently when they are presented with a matching emotional cue from either the same or a 
different modality (e.g., de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). Processing of multiple emotion cues is often 
explored using priming paradigms. A prime stimulus (e.g., written word, voice clip, or facial image) 
is presented shortly before a target stimulus, to determine the influence of the prime on target 
processing. For example, Carroll and Young (2005) found an emotional congruency effect within 
modality, such that visual images of faces depicting emotional expressions influenced the 
recognition of emotional written (visual) target words, and vice versa. They additionally found an 
effect across modalities, such that auditory nonverbal emotional primes (e.g., laughter or screaming) 
influenced the recognition of visual emotional faces and written words. These findings suggest a 
shared representation of emotion in the brain regardless of the source of the information (Carroll & 
Young, 2005).  
Pell (2005) developed the Facial Affect Decision Task (FADT) in which participants decide 
whether a face is expressing an emotion (e.g., a happy face) or not (non-emotional facial 
manipulations, e.g., puffed cheeks). In the FADT, faces are presented following vocal primes which 
are emotionally congruent or incongruent with the face, or neutral. Pell et al. (2011) used the FADT 
to determine the individual and combined influences of semantic and prosodic emotional primes on 
facial affect decision making. They found that facial affect decisions were faster and more accurate 
for faces following an emotionally congruent prime compared to an incongruent prime, and this was 
equally true for primes expressing emotion via prosody alone, semantics alone, and a combination. 
This finding suggests that emotional concepts are activated equally by prosodic and semantic 
information (Carroll & Young, 2005).  
The emotional congruency effect is far less robust in adults with an autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD). Whilst many studies have shown emotional recognition, such as labelling 
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emotional faces, to be intact in adults with ASD (e.g., Begeer et al., 2008; Nuske et al., 2013), 
research suggests that individuals with ASD have difficulty integrating emotional information from 
multiple modalities (e.g., Charbonneau et al., 2013; O‟Connor, 2007). Additionally, Ben-Yosef, 
Anaki and Golan (2017) administered an emotional priming task with individuals with ASD and 
neurotypical controls, using emotional vocal primes and emotional facial expression targets with 
varied spatial frequency (i.e., manipulations to the level of detail shown in the facial images). 
Individuals with ASD had slower performances than controls overall, and failed to show an 
emotional congruency effect when faces were presented with low spatial frequency. The authors 
concluded that their findings indicate a lack of integration of emotional information across 
modalities when there is higher cognitive demand.  
Individuals with ASD may represent only one extreme end of a broad spectrum, as the 
general population also shows a wide variation in the degree of autism-like traits (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). The “broader autism phenotype” (BAP) refers to the 
presentation of autism-like traits in non-diagnosed individuals (Landry & Chouinard, 2016). The 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) is a measure designed to determine the level of autism-like traits 
in neurotypical individuals (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). This tool 
investigates behaviours and abilities which may be associated with higher levels of autism traits and 
provides further understanding about the BAP in comparison to clinical levels of ASD symptoms 
(Landry & Chouinard, 2016).  
Several studies have demonstrated associations between non-clinical autism-like traits and 
differences in emotion processing. Participants with higher levels of autism-like traits show less 
spontaneous imitation of facial expressions, and poorer recognition of negative facial expressions, 
compared to those with lower levels of autism-like traits (Hermans et al., 2009; Hosokawa et al., 
2015; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012). Additionally, those with higher levels of autism-like 
traits show poorer understanding of general social non-verbal behaviours and poorer recognition of 
facial emotion, compared to those with lower levels of autism-like traits (Ingersoll, 2010). Further 
research is needed on vocal emotion processing as well as cross-modality emotion processing 
among typical adults using the AQ, to determine the extent to which inefficiencies with emotion 
processing extend to the BAP.  
The aim of the current study was to examine associations between performance on the 
FADT, using auditory primes and visual targets, and scores on the AQ to determine how cross-
modal emotion processing abilities relate to the BAP. We utilised Pell et al.‟s (2011) version of the 
FADT in a sample of healthy adults, employing three conditions: 1) emotionally prosodic primes, 
2) emotionally semantic primes, and 3) emotionally prosodic and semantic combined primes. We 
compared the facial affect decisions made by those with high to those with low levels of autism-like 
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traits to determine the influence of each source of emotional information independently, as well as 
combined. Consistent with Pell et al.‟s (2011) findings, it was expected that responses to target 
faces would be faster and more accurate when preceded by emotionally congruent primes compared 
to incongruent primes, and that this congruency effect would occur regardless of prime condition. 
Overall, participants were expected to respond faster and more accurately to happy faces compared 
to sad faces, regardless of prime condition and congruency, and would respond slower in the 
prosody prime condition compared to the other conditions, due to the increased demand of 
processing pseudo-language (Pell et al., 2011). In addition to these effects, it was expected that 
measures of task performance would differ according to self-reported levels of autism-like traits. 
Specifically, those who scored higher on the AQ (reflecting higher levels of autism-like traits) 
would be slower and less accurate when making facial affect decisions overall compared to those 
with lower scores on the AQ, and would be less influenced by the congruency of the prime 
stimulus. Due to limited research in this area, no directional predictions were made regarding 
whether these associations would vary between conditions (prosody, semantic, or combined 
emotional primes).  
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Participants 
Participants were thirty-eight healthy adults (22 female; 18-39 years, M = 22.6, SD = 5.7). 
Fifteen participants were recruited via community advertisements and social media, and were 
entered into a prize draw as incentive to participate. Twenty-three students participated to receive 
course credit towards an undergraduate psychology course. All participants reported having normal 
vision and hearing, no history of psychological or neurological conditions (including an Autism 
Spectrum condition), and English as their primary language. Three participants reported being left-
handed. The study was approved by the University of Queensland Medical Research Ethics 
Committee, and all participants provided written informed consent prior to participation. 
2.3.2 Stimuli 
The priming experiment involved vocal (prime) and facial image (target) stimuli, based on 
those used in Pell et al. (2011). The present study contained three prime conditions, including the 
prosody condition, semantic condition, and a combined prosody-semantic condition (hereafter 
referred to as the “combined” condition). Each condition consisted of 36 prime stimulus sentences, 
spoken by each of four actors (two male; two female), resulting in a total of 144 trials per condition. 
The prosody condition consisted of 12 meaningless pseudo-utterances (e.g., “The rivix joled the 
silling”), each spoken with a happy, sad, or neutral prosody. The semantic condition consisted of 36 
sentences which varied in their emotional meaning; 12 happy (e.g., “I love sitting by the fire”), 12 
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sad (e.g., “I‟ve been out of work for ages”), and 12 neutral (e.g., “The cookies come in packs of 
three”) sentences, all spoken with neutral prosody. The combined condition consisted of 36 
sentences which were either happy, sad or neutral in their semantic meaning with appropriately 
matched emotional prosody.  
The validation procedures for the prosodic pseudo-utterances are described in detail in Pell 
et al., (2009). Validation involved asking 24 participants to rate each stimulus for which emotion 
was being expressed. Based on the dataset provided by M. D. Pell (personal communication, 
December 12, 2015), the prosodic primes selected for the current study were rated as expressing the 
intended emotion by at least 77% of participants. Validation procedures for the semantic and 
combined primes are described in Pell et al. (2011) and involved 20 participants rating each 
stimulus for the emotion expressed. The primes selected for the current study were rated as 
expressing the intended emotion by at least 90% of participants. Further, all vocal stimuli were 
matched across conditions and emotions for volume intensity, pitch, number of syllables, speech 
rate, and duration (duration range for prosodic primes = 1.17s – 2.64s, M = 1.68s; semantic primes 
= 1.14 – 2.28, M = 1.75; sad primes = 1.49 – 2.64, M = 1.91; happy primes = 1.17 – 2.29, M = 1.68; 
neutral primes = 1.14 – 2.29; M = 1.57).  
Facial stimuli were identical across the three conditions, and were posed by three male and 
three female actors. Each actor posed for eight distinct images: two happy expressions, two sad 
expressions, and four non-emotional expressions (see Figure 2.1). This resulted in a total of 48 
different facial stimuli; 12 sad, 12 happy, and 24 non-emotional. Validation procedures for the 
facial stimuli are described in Pell et al. (2011), and involved participants rating each face for the 
emotion being expressed. Based on the dataset provided by M. D. Pell (personal communication, 
December 12, 2015), the emotional faces selected for the current study were rated as expressing the 
intended emotion by at least 81% of participants. The non-emotional faces were not rated by more 
than 30% of participants on any particular emotion.  
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2.3.3 Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
To measure levels of autism-like traits, the AQ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001) 
was completed by all participants. The AQ requires participants to indicate the extent to which they 
agree with 50 statements, using 4-point Likert-type response scales, ranging from “definitely agree” 
to “definitely disagree”. The 50 statements are intended to measure five different traits related to 
ASD. These include social skill (e.g., “I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own”), 
attention switching (e.g., “I prefer to do things the same way over and over again”), imagination 
(e.g., “If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind”), attention to 
detail (e.g., “I often notice small sounds when others do not”), and communication (e.g., “Other 
people frequently tell me that what I‟ve said is impolite, even though I think it is polite”). Half of 
the items are reverse scored (e.g., “I find social situations easy”). The measure has been shown to 
have strong validity and reliability for measuring the degree of autism-like traits among 
neurotypical individuals (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath 
& Boomsma, 2008), and has also demonstrated sufficient validity and reliability when used with an 
Australian sample (Broadbent, Galic & Stokes, 2013). The AQ has been used extensively in 
research investigating variations of autism-like traits in neurotypical samples (see Ruzich et al., 
2015 for a review).  
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001) specified a scoring system in which the 
four possible response options were collapsed and scored as either 1 or 0 depending on whether 
they indicated the presence of an autism-like trait (i.e., collapsing responses which indicate 
“slightly” or “definitely” agreeing or disagreeing). Consistent with Austin (2005), the current study 
utilised an alternative scoring system in which scoring ranges from 1 to 4 in accordance with the 
Likert-type responses. For instance, for statements which are designed to reflect the presence of an 
Figure 2.1 Examples of happy, sad, and non-emotional facial stimuli. Permission to publish these 
stimuli was obtained from the stimuli developer Marc D. Pell. 
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autism characteristic, responses of “slightly agree” or “definitely agree” would receive a score of 3 
or 4, respectively, and the levels of disagreement would receive a score of 1 or 2. Thus, a total AQ 
score can range from 50-200, with higher scores indicating higher levels of autism-like traits. This 
system of scoring has been suggested to be more sensitive to detecting levels of autism-like traits 
among individuals (Austin, 2005), and has been used in validation studies (Hoekstra et al., 2008). 
2.3.4 Procedure  
The task was split into the three prime conditions, all administered within the same testing 
session, and were presented on a Dell 12.5” laptop (LCD display, resolution = 1366 x 768, refresh 
rate = 60 Hertz) using E-prime 2 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), at 
approximately 40cm viewing distance. Vocal primes were delivered through AKG K550 closed 
back reference class headphones, with volume adjusted to a comfortable listening level for each 
individual. Each condition consisted of 72 YES trials, where the target face expressed an emotion, 
and 72 NO trials, where the target face did not express an emotion. For the YES trials, prime/target 
stimuli were paired such that there were 24 emotionally congruent trials (happy prime paired with a 
happy face or a sad prime paired with a sad face), 24 incongruent trials (happy prime paired with a 
sad face or vice versa), and 24 neutral trials which contained neutral primes paired with either a 
happy or sad face. The NO trials consisted of non-emotional faces which were preceded by either a 
happy, sad, or neutral prime, with 24 trials with each prime emotion. The gender of the face and the 
voice were always matching, and the same voice was always paired with the same face. Each 
condition took approximately 10 minutes to complete, and was divided into six blocks of 24 trials. 
These blocks were pseudo-randomised such that the same prime or face did not occur more than 
once within a block, and the same emotional congruency condition was not presented on more than 
four consecutive trials.  
Prior to beginning the experiment, participants were given the following verbal instructions: 
“You will see some pictures of faces, some of them will have an emotional expression, and others 
will be pulling a random funny face that is not necessarily emotional. Please use the buttons to 
indicate whether each face is emotional or not, as quickly and accurately as you can. Press the 
[blue] button for emotional faces, and the [yellow] button for faces which are not emotional.” The 
instructions were also written on the screen. Participants were also told that they would hear a voice 
before seeing each face, but were encouraged to focus on responding correctly to the target face. 
Participants completed four practice trials (two of each YES and NO conditions) before beginning 
the experiment proper. 
Each trial consisted of a fixation cross for 350ms followed by a blank screen for 500ms. The 
vocal prime was then played, with the target face appearing immediately after prime offset (target 
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was 3.83 x 5.18cm in size; see Figure 2.2). Participants were asked to decide whether each target 
face was emotional or not as quickly and accurately as possible. Target faces remained on the 
screen until the participant made a response, which triggered the fixation cross for the next trial. 
This required response was identical for all conditions, with only the prime differing between 
conditions. Participants provided their response using buttons on a serial response box (Psychology 
Software Tools, Model #: 200A). Half the participants were required to respond YES with their 
right index finger (yellow button) and NO with their left index finger (blue button), and the other 
half responded with the opposite options, which was held constant across the three conditions for 
each participant. Participants were given an opportunity for a short break between each block of 
trials. The order of the three conditions and the order of blocks within each condition were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Individual trial sequence with timing 
 
2.3.5 Data Analysis 
AQ scores ranged from 63-119, with a mean of 98.47 (SD = 12.67). There was no 
significant difference in AQ scores between genders (Mmale = 101.69, Mfemale = 96.14; t(36) = 1.35, 
p = .186, ns). Participants were divided into high and low groups based upon a median split, such 
that all participants scoring 100 and above were classified as high AQ (n = 19) and all participants 
scoring 99 and below were classified as low AQ (n = 19). A Mann-Whitney test indicated that AQ 
scores were significantly greater in the high AQ group (Mdn = 107) compared to the low AQ group 
(Mdn = 87), U = 361.00, p < .001. 
Data were analysed using SPSS (v24) software. Only trials in which the target face reflected 
an emotion (YES trials) were included in the analyses. Further, all trials involving an error or with 
reaction time (RT) less than 300ms or greater than 2000ms were excluded from analysis. Trials with 
a RT greater than 2 standard deviations from the conditional mean for a given participant were also 
subsequently removed. Overall, 9.4% of trials were removed from each of the high and low AQ 
groups. Following the removal of these outliers, tests of normality revealed that the RT data were 
not normally distributed (skewness = 1.57, kurtosis = 4.01). Therefore, a logarithmic transformation 
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was performed on RT data to improve normality (skewness = 0.62, kurtosis = 0.68). A 4-way 3 x 3 
x 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the reaction time data, with prime 
condition (prosody, semantic, combined), prime emotion (happy, sad, neutral), and target emotion 
(happy, sad) as within-subjects factors and AQ (low, high) as a between-subjects factor. Significant 
main effects and interactions were followed-up with a series of paired-samples t-tests. Mauchly‟s 
test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated for any effect (ps > 
.504). 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Accuracy 
The mean error rate across all conditions was 3.7%. Mean accuracy for YES trials was 91% 
or higher across all conditions. Therefore, the data were highly negatively skewed and accuracy was 
not analysed further.  
2.4.2 Reaction Time 
Results of the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of target emotion, F(1, 36) = 
78.65, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .686, with pairwise comparisons revealing significantly faster responses for 
happy faces compared to sad faces, t(37) = 8.94, p < .001. Additionally, there was a significant 
interaction between prime emotion and target emotion, F(2, 72) = 3.88, p = .025, ηp
2
 = .097, and a 
three-way interaction between prime condition, prime emotion and target emotion, F(4, 144) = 
3.14, p = .016, ηp
2
 = .080. Pairwise comparisons of each prime-target emotion combination were 
conducted separately for each prime condition, controlling for false discovery rate (FDR), using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) for comparisons within each 
condition. These analyses revealed that in the combined condition, responses were faster for happy 
faces following happy primes, compared to sad primes (t(37) = 2.54, p = .032) and neutral primes 
(t(37) = 2.89, p = .018), and were faster for sad faces following sad primes compared to happy 
primes (t(37) = 3.06, p = .018) and marginally faster compared to neutral primes (t(37) = 2.08, p = 
.066). In both the prosodic and semantic conditions, there were no significant congruency effects 
between prime and target. There were no significant main effects or interaction effects of AQ 
scores.  
Due to our a priori predictions regarding AQ, separate 3 (prime condition) x 3 (prime 
emotion) x 2 (target emotion) ANOVAs were conducted for the low and high AQ groups. For the 
low AQ group, the analysis showed a significant main effect of target emotion, F(1, 18) = 65.38, p 
< .001, ηp
2
 = .784, such that responses were faster for happy faces compared to sad faces, regardless 
of prime emotion or condition, t(18) = 8.09, p < .001. Additionally, there was a significant 
interaction between prime emotion and target emotion, F(2, 36) = 3.27, p = .050, ηp
2
 = .154. 
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Pairwise comparisons, controlling for FDR, revealed that responses were faster for happy faces 
following a happy prime compared to a neutral prime, t(18) = 3.17, p = .030. No other comparisons 
were significant. For the high AQ group results also showed a main effect of target emotion, F(1, 
18) = 25.93, p < .001, with faster responses for happy faces than sad faces overall, t(18) = 5.09, p < 
.001. However, there were no further significant effects in the high AQ group (see Figure 2.3). 
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Table 2.1  
Untransformed means (ms; SD in parenthesis) of reaction time for YES trials, as a function of task, prime emotion, target emotion, and AQ group. 
Bold figures indicate congruent prime-target pairs. 
AQ = Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
  Prosody task Semantic task Combined task 
  Prime emotion Prime emotion Prime emotion 
AQ group Target 
emotion 
Happy Sad Neutral Happy Sad Neutral Happy Sad Neutral 
Low AQ Happy 617 (149) 628 (157) 630 (157) 570 (128) 582 (136) 592 (139) 558 (117) 577 (122) 588 (124) 
Sad 708 (177) 727 (215) 717 (185) 683 (195) 669 (181) 685 (195) 697 (205) 659 (184) 674 (172) 
           
High AQ Happy 588 (128) 602 (161) 591 (138) 534 (110) 570 (131) 582 (130) 572 (129) 597 (162) 583 (125) 
 Sad 664 (168) 663 (165) 683 (202) 660 (154) 647 (148) 664 (186) 671 (186) 643 (153) 670 (206) 
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Figure 2.3 Reaction time for each target emotion with each prime emotion, separated into low and high groups of scores of the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient.  
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2.5 Discussion 
This study investigated the influence of emotional prosody and semantics on subsequent 
facial affect decision making in individuals with low and high levels of autism-like traits. Firstly, 
the hypothesis that those with higher levels of autism-like traits would have poorer performance 
overall than those with lower trait levels was not supported, which likely reflects the simplicity and 
ease of the task. However, the prediction that those with higher levels of autism-like traits would be 
less likely to show congruency effects compared to those with lower trait levels was supported. No 
congruency effects were found in any condition for the group with higher levels of autism-like 
traits, whereas the group with lower autism-like traits showed a congruency effect when responding 
to happy faces following happy primes compared to neutral primes. This effect was evident 
regardless of prime condition, and supports evidence that emotion processing difficulties in ASD 
extend to neurotypical individuals with higher levels of autism-like traits (Hermans et al., 2009; 
Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012; Hosokawa et al., 2015).  
The current evidence suggests that emotion processing differences between neurotypical 
adults with higher and lower levels of autism-like traits may extend to vocal and cross-modal 
emotion processing. The participants with higher autism-like traits were just as efficient as those 
with lower autism-like traits in the simple task of classifying faces as emotional; however, the vocal 
emotional primes did not influence their emotional decisions. These findings imply that the less 
automatic integration of emotional information in those with higher autism-like traits allowed them 
to more effectively ignore the primes during task performance, and suggests that a weakened shared 
emotional activation network may be characteristic of the BAP.  
This finding furthers our understanding of ASD, by showing that differences in emotion 
processing may not be unique to those with a diagnosis, but may be related to the core traits of 
ASD. Landry and Chouinard (2016) argue that ASD can be considered a combination of particular 
degrees of many characteristics, and in order to understand ASD we must examine the varying 
degrees of such characteristics among all individuals. The current research suggests that a 
difference in the automatic integration of emotional information across modalities is one such 
characteristic that may contribute or relate to the aetiology of ASD. Future research should aim to 
compare the performance of those with high autism-like traits to those with a diagnosis of ASD to 
determine whether there are differences in the degree of weakness of the shared emotional 
activation network between such individuals. It should also be noted that, while different results 
were obtained when analysing each group separately, there was no overall effect of AQ or 
interaction effects in the main analysis. Accordingly, further research with larger participant 
numbers is needed to validate the present results regarding high and low AQ groups.  
49 
 
Regarding performance across all participants, some findings were consistent with those of 
Pell et al. (2011). For example, as predicted, responses for happy faces were significantly faster 
compared to sad faces. However, the hypothesis that responses would be slower in the prosody task 
compared to the other tasks was not supported. Additionally, congruency effects were evident, as 
predicted, and were dependent on prime condition. The combined condition elicited the expected 
prime-target congruency effects, however the semantic and prosodic conditions did not reveal any 
congruency effects. Thus, the current findings suggest an additive effect of semantic and prosodic 
emotional information in their influence on facial affect decision making, such that, in isolation, 
each type of emotion does not influence facial affect decisions; however, emotionally semantic and 
prosodic information in combination do influence facial affect decisions. 
This distinction from the findings of Pell et al., (2011), who found no difference in the 
congruency effect between conditions, may be due to differences in the samples. Such differences 
between the current sample and the sample in Pell et al. include geographical (Australian vs. 
Canadian participants), University level and degree (first year psychology students vs. university 
wide undergraduate and graduate students), and a greater proportion of females in the current study. 
Further replication studies are warranted to explore this issue. It should also be noted that the 
stimuli were not matched on their level of intensity of the emotion (i.e., how emotionally arousing 
the stimuli were). This is a limitation in the current study, and future work should determine the 
emotional intensity of the stimuli to ensure this is not influencing the results. 
In relation to theories about a shared emotional activation network (Carroll & Young, 2005), 
these findings indicate that emotion presented via prosody alone or semantics alone failed to 
activate emotional concepts to an extent which would influence subsequent emotion processing in 
another modality. In contrast, when emotion was delivered through both semantics and prosody, 
shared emotional concepts were activated and influenced subsequent emotion processing for facial 
emotional stimuli. This finding supports previous evidence which has demonstrated a processing 
advantage for combined emotional semantic and prosodic information, compared to when each 
delivery of emotion is presented alone (Kotz & Paulmann, 2007; Wambacq & Jerger, 2004)  
2.5.1 Conclusion 
Overall, this study demonstrates a benefit of combining prosodic and semantic emotional 
information within speech on audio-visual cross-modal emotion processing. Further, conflicting 
emotional information across modalities has less impact on emotion recognition ability for those 
who may fall within the BAP.  
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Chapter 3. Cross-Modal Emotion Recognition and Autism-Like Traits in Typically 
Developing Children. 
 
Chapter 2 showed that emotion expressed through combined prosodic and semantic vocal cues 
influenced adults‟ recognition of facial expressions, suggesting automatic integration of cross-
modal emotional information. However, this finding was only evident for adults with lower levels 
of autism-like traits, and not for those with higher levels of autism-like traits, suggesting that 
reduced integration of vocal and facial emotions is related to the broader autism phenotype. To 
further explore the relationship between cross-modal emotion recognition and autism traits 
throughout development, Chapter 3 explored the integration of vocal and facial emotions in school 
aged children with low or high levels of autism-like traits.     
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3.1 Abstract 
The ability to recognise emotions develops gradually throughout childhood, and children usually 
have greater difficulty recognising emotions from the voice than from the face. However, little is 
known about how children integrate vocal and facial cues to recognise an emotion, particularly in 
mid to late childhood. Further, children with an autism spectrum disorder often show a reduced 
ability to recognise emotions, especially when integrating emotion from multiple modalities. The 
current study explored the ability of typically developing children aged 7 to 9 years to match 
emotional tones of voice to facial expressions, and whether this ability varied between children with 
higher and lower levels of autism-like traits. Children completed a task in which they matched voice 
samples with happy, fearful, sad, and angry prosody to a selection of emotional faces. The 
children‟s parents completed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient: Child‟s version. Overall, children 
were the least accurate when matching happy voices to faces, commonly pairing happy voices with 
angry faces. Children were also less accurate in matching fearful voices to faces relative to sad and 
angry voices and faces, commonly pairing fearful voices with sad faces. However, there were no 
differences in the accuracy of the children with higher and the children with lower levels of autism-
like traits. These results suggest that 7- to 9-year-old children have difficulty integrating vocal and 
facial emotional expressions, but that differences in emotion recognition in relation to the broader 
autism phenotype are not evident in this task for this age group.   
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3.2 Introduction 
The effective recognition and understanding of emotional signals (e.g., facial expressions 
and tones of voice) is important for understanding the world and having successful social 
interactions. It is believed by some that humans are equipped with an innate ability to identify and 
interpret emotional information from early infancy (Izard, 1971; Moses, 2001). However, it has also 
been widely demonstrated that there are various factors influencing the ability to recognise 
emotions, such as age, the types of emotions, the complexity of the information, and individual 
differences in emotion processing (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Vicari et al., 2000; Widen, 2013).  
Infants are able to discriminate between the broad categories of positive and negative 
emotional expression. Throughout early childhood, the ability to distinguish between specific 
emotions within the broader positive and negative categories (e.g., angry, sad) begins to improve 
gradually (Widen, 2013). This ability appears to be somewhat dependent on certain individual 
characteristics. For instance, children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often show delays in 
their ability to accurately identify emotion (e.g., Dawson et al., 2004). There is speculation that the 
traits associated with autism, even non-clinical levels of such traits, may be related to differences in 
the processing of emotion (e.g., Hosokawa et al., 2015; Ingersoll, 2010; Poljac, Poljac & 
Wagemans, 2012).  
Within typical development, children‟s ability to recognise emotions varies depending on 
the modality used to express the emotion. For instance, the ability to recognise emotions from the 
voice is usually poorer than recognition of emotion from the face (Nelson & Russell, 2011). It is 
largely unknown how children integrate emotional information from different sources. The majority 
of research on emotion recognition focuses on facial emotions. Children begin to give accurate 
labels to facial expressions of happiness, sadness and anger sooner than other emotions, such as fear 
and disgust, typically at approximately 3-4 years of age (Vicari et al., 2000; Widen, 2013). At any 
stage in childhood, the recognition of happy faces tends to be better than other emotions. 
Additionally, children are better able to categorise emotional facial expressions using labels (e.g., 
happy, sad, etc.) rather than pairing with similar faces, a phenomenon known as the Label 
Superiority Effect, which is evident until at least 7 years of age (Russell & Widen, 2002). This 
effect suggests that the use of another modality, in this case language, aids the recognition of 
emotional faces. Thus, the testing of facial expressions alone is an incomplete way to determine 
emotion recognition ability. Some studies indicate that, not only is facial emotion recognition 
ability an insufficient reflection of broader emotional understanding (Russell & Widen, 2002), but 
other sources of emotional information, such as context and vocal expressions, may be more 
important for children‟s emotional understanding (Bugental, Kaswan, Love, & Fox, 1970; Widen, 
2013). 
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While limited, the research examining the recognition of emotion conveyed by tone of voice 
(i.e., prosody) suggests a similar developmental trajectory to facial emotion recognition. Infants 
show differential behavioural responses to highly positive or negative prosody (e.g., Vaish & 
Striano, 2004). Likewise, young children can distinguish between happy and sad prosody (Morton 
& Trehub, 2001), but not necessarily between other emotional voices within the same emotional 
valence, such as sad and fearful prosody. Nelson and Russell (2011) examined children‟s 
recognition of emotion from the face, voice, and bodily posture, each separately and all cues in 
combination. Children aged 3-5 years were less accurate when labelling vocal emotions compared 
to facial and postural emotions. This result suggests that the ability to distinguish between specific 
emotions in the voice develops slower than facial emotion recognition, and is relatively poor at 5 
years of age. Additionally, while recognition of happy expressions was the most accurate in the 
facial and postural conditions, in the vocal condition, the recognition of sad and angry emotions 
were more accurate than that of happy and fearful emotions, suggesting that children learn about 
negative vocal expressions before positive ones. 
Sauter et al. (2013) also explored the ability to recognise emotions conveyed by prosody in 
older children, 5-10 years of age. The task included a multiple-choice response, in which children 
selected one of four emotional images to indicate their interpretation of a vocal sample. The images 
included various mixtures of facial expressions, bodily postures, and contextual information. The 
voice recordings were actors saying three-digit numbers with varied emotional intonation. Accuracy 
was above chance for all emotions, and significantly improved with age. This result suggests that, 
while 5-year-olds can identify emotions based on prosody, this ability may continue to develop 
between 5 and 10 years of age. Further supporting the results of Nelson and Russell (2011), Sauter 
et al. found that children‟s recognition of anger and sadness during task performance was more 
accurate than their recognition of fear and amusement. Additionally, children who were more 
accurate identifying emotion from prosody were also more proficient at identifying emotion from 
non-verbal vocal expressions (e.g., crying, laughter) compared to children who had lower vocal 
emotion recognition accuracy, showing a pattern in broader emotion recognition ability (Sauter et 
al., 2013). The images used by Sauter et al. were an alternative to having a selection of written 
emotional labels, as is the standard in emotion research (Nelson & Russell, 2013). Thus, the images 
were the same across trials, and were not controlled for the type of emotional content (e.g., body 
postures in some, contextual information in others). Therefore, the cues provided within the images 
were not controlled across emotion, and interpretation of these findings are limited with regard to 
the integration of emotional cues from multiple modalities.    
Research suggests that young children have difficulty identifying emotion from prosodic 
cues, and rely more heavily on semantic or contextual information. Morton and Trehub (2001) 
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found that when identifying emotion from speech, young children paid more attention to the 
content/meaning of what was being said than prosody. With increasing age, the focus on prosody 
increases, and by 10 years of age children pay more attention to prosody than to meaning. Further, 
Aguert et al. (2013) showed that children could not accurately interpret emotions from prosody 
when it conflicted with the situational context, whereas adults could. These findings further 
demonstrate that emotion recognition from the voice develops more slowly than the recognition of 
emotion from other cues. 
When judging others‟ emotions in natural social settings, we must process and interpret 
multiple emotion cues in combination. This multi-modal emotion processing can either be a 
hindrance to emotion recognition, where emotional signals are conflicting, or can be an advantage, 
where the different sources complement one another in their emotional expression. Research into 
children‟s ability to simultaneously interpret emotions from multiple sources is limited. Some 
evidence suggests that infants can distinguish between congruent and incongruent facial and vocal 
expressions when comparing extreme positive and negative emotions (Grossmann et al., 2006; 
Walker-Andrews, 1986). Mondloch (2012) investigated the ability of 8-year-olds and adults to 
identify emotions from images in which the emotion conveyed by facial expressions and body 
postures was either congruent or incongruent. The results showed that both children and adults were 
less accurate and slower to detect emotions when the facial and body cues were incongruent 
compared to when they were congruent, and that this effect was larger for children.  
Moreover, Nelson and Russell (2011) showed that children were equally able to recognise 
emotions from displays with multiple emotional cues (e.g., facial, vocal, and postural) as they were 
to recognise emotions from the face alone. This research suggests that children are unable to 
consider multiple sources of emotion simultaneously, as multiple cues provide no aid to emotion 
recognition. However, as the task did not demand that children attend to the various cues, it is 
possible that children focused solely on the face and ignored other cues when determining emotion. 
Studies which require children to specifically attend to multiple emotion cues, for instance asking 
children to match cross-modal information based on emotional expression, are lacking in the 
typically developing literature. A small number of studies have investigated this ability in children 
with ASD.  
While the evidence is mixed, several studies show that children with ASD often display 
similar abilities to recognise emotions from the face and voice to their typically developing peers 
(e.g., Baker et al., 2010; Castelli, 2005; Grossman et al., 2010). However, children with ASD have 
greater difficulty compared to typically developing children when required to match emotions 
across different modalities (Boucher et al., 2000). Further, there is a consistent finding across 
studies that as the task becomes more cognitively demanding, such as when the child is required to 
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switch between tasks or when incongruent emotional distractors are introduced, difficulties are 
more likely to emerge (De Vries & Geurts, 2012; Grossman et al., 2000). Similar patterns have been 
found with regard to vocal emotional recognition in children with ASD relative to typically 
developing children (Chevallier et al., 2011).  
As with typically developing children, the majority of studies investigating emotion 
recognition in children with ASD have focused on facial expressions. However, some studies have 
investigated the ability to integrate emotional information from multiple modalities in ASD. For 
instance, Boucher et al. (2000) administered a task in which school-aged children with ASD and 
typically developing children heard an emotional voice, and were required to choose a facial 
expression which matched the voice from a range of options. They also performed an emotion 
labelling task with vocal expressions alone. Children with ASD performed less accurately than 
typically developing children when matching voices to faces, even though they performed equally 
when labelling vocal expressions. This finding suggests that, while vocal emotion recognition was 
intact, the additional processing of facial expressions resulted in greater difficulty for children with 
ASD. Similarly, Grossman and Tager-Flusberg (2012) found that adolescents with ASD were less 
accurate than typically developing controls when matching vocal expressions to one of two facial 
expressions, but only when the expressions were more subtle in their emotional intensity (i.e., more 
ambiguous). In contrast, the same study showed similar performance between those with ASD and 
controls for expressions that were more emotionally intense, suggesting that the difficulty of 
individuals with ASD to recognise emotions may improve with less ambiguous stimuli. Moreover, 
the type of task may impact the performance of children with ASD, such that the children show 
similar accuracy to typically developing children during less complicated two-option tasks, but 
reduced accuracy in tasks with multiple options, as in the Boucher et al. (2000) study.  
It appears that the method used to determine cross-modal emotion recognition in children 
with ASD impacts the pattern of results. For instance, Vannetzel et al. (2011) asked children aged 
8-9 years with and without ASD to determine whether pairs of emotional stimuli were matching or 
not. These stimuli included pairs of faces, pairs of voices, and voice-face combinations. Children 
with ASD were less accurate than typically developing children at recognising correct matches for 
angry expressions in the face only and voice only conditions, but performed equally when 
determining whether a voice and face matched. The task used in this study was less cognitively 
demanding than those by Boucher et al. (2000) and Grossman and Tager-Flusberg (2012). 
Specifically, there is less competing information when deciding whether or not two stimuli match, 
compared to selecting a matching stimulus from multiple options. The results of Vannetzel et al. 
suggest that under less complex conditions, cross-modal emotional information can be useful for 
emotion recognition in children with ASD. However, Golan, Gordon, Fichman and Keinan (2018) 
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also examined both within-modality and cross-modality emotion matching, but with a multiple-
choice response, such that children were required to match either a word, face, or voice to one of 
multiple facial images. The results showed that children with ASD performed worse than typically 
developing children on all three conditions. This finding is in line with Boucher et al. (2000) in 
demonstrating that children with ASD have difficulty integrating emotional information from 
different modalities under complex or demanding circumstances. Golan and colleagues (2018) 
additionally found that performance in the voice-face matching condition was related to 
communication skills in the ASD group. This finding suggests that there might be an association 
between communication skill within ASD and the ability to integrate emotional information across 
modalities.  
A diagnosis of ASD is believed to reflect a combination of extreme degrees of otherwise 
typical traits (for instance, extremely low degree of social awareness, and high degree of attention 
to detail; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). All individuals in the population vary 
with respect to their level of such “autism-like” traits. The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) was 
developed to measure variation in the degree of autism-like traits in the general population (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). Those individuals who have high levels of autism-like 
traits that are nonetheless not extreme enough to warrant a diagnosis, are considered to be a part of 
the broader autism phenotype (BAP). Investigating the BAP can aid in distinguishing between 
factors unique to ASD and factors which are associated with individual differences in autism-like 
traits, and potentially linked to underlying processes. Research has shown that levels of autism-like 
traits are related to emotion recognition abilities in typical adults (Hosokawa et al., 2015; Ingersoll, 
2010; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012; West, Copland, Arnott, Nelson & Angwin, 2018; Chapter 
2). Although such an association has not been explored in childhood, research has demonstrated that 
social skills are related to emotion recognition abilities in children (Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, 
Zubernis, & Balaraman, 2003). Given this finding, and the findings showing emotion recognition 
difficulties in children with ASD, it appears possible that autism-like traits might relate to 
individual differences in emotion recognition abilities in childhood.  
The current study aimed to address the following questions: 1) does the ability to match 
vocal emotional information to facial emotional expressions vary with emotion for school-aged 
children? And 2) is the ability to match vocal emotional information to facial emotional expressions 
different for children with high levels and children with low levels of autism-like traits? To address 
these questions, children completed a task in which they matched emotional voices to emotional 
faces, using a multiple-choice response. In addition, parents completed a child version of the AQ 
(AQ-Child; Auyeung, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & Allison, 2008) to assess autism-like traits, and 
children were also tested on their general emotional understanding. As the literature suggests that 
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the identification of emotions from vocal expressions appears more accurate for sad and angry 
emotions compared to happy and fearful emotions (Nelson & Russell, 2011; Sauter et al., 2013), it 
was expected that children would be more accurate at matching sad and angry voices to faces 
compared to happy and fearful voices. Additionally, it was expected that children who score higher 
on the AQ-Child (indicating higher levels of autism-like traits) would be less accurate at matching 
emotions across modalities compared to children with lower AQ-Child scores. Finally, it was 
expected that cross-modality emotion matching ability would be associated with general emotional 
understanding.   
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
A total of 53 children participated in the study. Of these, three were excluded from analyses 
due to a parent-reported developmental condition. Thus, data from 50 participants (26 female), aged 
7 to 9 years (M = 7.81, SD = 0.74), were analysed. Children were recruited through a research 
database maintained by the School of Psychology Early Cognitive Development Centre at the 
University of Queensland. Families in the current study were predominantly middle- to high-
income and Caucasian. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, 
attended mainstream schooling, had no known neurological or psychological conditions, and all 
except five children were right-handed. Written informed consent was obtained from 
parents/guardians prior to participation, as well as verbal assent from children. In addition, 19 
healthy adults (15 female; Mage = 34.59) participated in a pilot study to validate the vocal stimuli 
used in the task.  
3.3.2 Assessments 
 3.3.2.1 Autism-like traits. Levels of autism-like traits were assessed using the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient: Children‟s version (AQ-Child; Auyeung et al., 2008). This measure was 
adapted from the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001) 
which was designed to determine levels of autism-like traits in adults. The AQ-Child is a parent 
report questionnaire for children between 4 and 11 years of age. Parents use a 4-point Likert-type 
response scale to indicate the extent to which they agree with 50 statements designed to reflect an 
autism-like trait (e.g., “S/he prefers to do things the same way over and over again”), half of which 
are reverse scored (e.g., “S/he prefers to do things with others rather than on her/his own”). 
Responses are given on a 4-point Likert-type response scale, with 1 indicating “definitely agree” 
and 4 indicating “definitely disagree”. Each response is allocated a score of 0-3 depending on how 
strongly it reflects the presence of an autism-like trait. Thus, total scores range from 0-150, with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of autism-like traits. The AQ-Child has been used in a range 
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of studies to measure variations of autism-like traits in typical children (Melling & Swinson, 2016; 
Petalas et al., 2012; Ruzich et al., 2016), and has been determined to have sufficient validity and 
reliability (Auyeung et al., 2008). 
 3.3.2.2 General emotion recognition. The Assessment of Children‟s Emotional Skills 
(ACES; Schultz, Izard & Bear, 2004) was used to measure broader emotion recognition and 
understanding abilities. This assessment includes three subscales designed to measure the 
identification of emotion from facial expressions, descriptions of behaviours and situations, and is 
administered by the experimenter with the child. The expressions subscale presents children with 26 
images of children‟s faces and asks them to identify whether each face is feeling happy, angry, sad, 
or scared. In the behaviours subtest, the experimenter reads 15 short descriptions of another‟s 
behaviour to the children (e.g., “Rosa has her arms crossed”), who are required to determine 
whether the person is feeling happy, angry, sad, or scared. In the situations subtest, the experimenter 
reads 15 short scenarios to the children (e.g., “Kelly just finished colouring a picture. You tell her 
that it looks nice”), who are then required to determine whether the person in the scenario feels 
happy, angry, sad, or scared. Responses across all three subtests are scored as being correct or 
incorrect and correct answers are summed, resulting in a total score between 0-56, with higher 
scores indicating greater emotional skill.  
3.3.3 Experimental Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of voice clips and facial images.  
3.3.3.1 Voice clips. Voice clips, taken from Sauter et al. (2013) were recordings of two male 
and two female actors verbalising three-digit numbers with happy, fearful, angry, and sad emotional 
prosody. Prior to use in the current study, these stimuli were validated for their emotional 
expression. To validate the stimuli, a pilot study was conducted in which adult participants labelled 
28 voice clips (7 for each emotion type) as being either happy, fearful, angry, sad, or other. Based 
on the ratings given, 20 voice clips were chosen for use in the study, five for each emotion. Overall, 
half of the voice clips were female, and gender was balanced across emotions. Each emotional 
voice clip was rated as reflecting the appropriate emotion by at least 67% of participants (≥67% 
rated each angry voice as angry, ≥83% rated each fearful voice as fearful, ≥72% rated each happy 
voice as happy, and ≥72% rated each sad voice as sad). 
3.3.3.2 Facial images. Facial images were taken from previously validated stimuli (Langner 
et al., 2010) and were images of four female and four male actors posing happy, fearful, angry, and 
sad emotional expressions. One image for each emotional expression was obtained from each of the 
eight actors, with a total of 32 images used in the study. For the faces selected for the current study, 
previous validation data showed that there was an average of 98% agreement that the happy faces 
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reflected happiness, 84% agreement that the fearful faces reflected fear, 95% agreement that the 
angry faces reflected anger, and 80% agreement that the sad faces reflected sadness (see Langner et 
al., 2010).  
3.3.4 Procedure 
The objective of the task was to match each voice clip to one of four facial expressions. The 
task was presented to children using E-prime 2 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA), as a game titled “Who said that?”. Children were told that they would see some pictures of 
people‟s faces and then hear someone saying something, and they should point to the person who 
would have said that. Two practice trials were conducted to familiarise children with the task before 
the experiment commenced. Each trial began with the word “ready” in the centre of the screen 
(duration controlled by the experimenter), followed by the presentation of four facial images, 
presented simultaneously in a horizontal row across the screen. The four images in each trial 
included one from each actor of the same gender and each expressing a different emotion. There 
was a 1000ms delay before a vocal recording played, which was matched in gender to the faces. 
Faces remained on the screen until the child indicated which face matched the voice, at which point 
the experimenter entered their response on the keyboard, and the next trial commenced. The 
experimenter gave mild encouragement (e.g., “Good”) after each trial. Five facial images, each a 
different poser, were used as the targets for each of the four emotions, evenly balanced across 
genders. Thus, there was a total of 20 trials, five for each emotion. The order of trials was 
pseudorandomised to ensure that the same target emotion, gender, target position, actor position, 
emotion position, and the same actor posing a given expression, did not occur on more than two 
subsequent trials. Additionally, repetition of images was equal across actors and emotions, and each 
type of emotion appeared in each position for an equal number of trials. There were two versions of 
the experiment, each with a different order of trials, which were counter-balanced across 
participants. Following completion of the task, the experimenter administered the ACES with the 
child. Parents completed the AQ-Child during testing. 
3.4 Results 
AQ-Child scores ranged from 19 to 96. Participants were split into two groups based on 
AQ-Child scores using a median split (median = 51). This resulted in low and high AQ-Child 
groups, each with 25 participants (M = 37.84, SD = 8.85; M = 68.60, SD = 10.00, respectively). A 
Mann-Whitney test confirmed that scores were significantly lower in the low AQ-Child group (Mdn 
= 41) compared to the high AQ-Child group (Mdn = 67), U = 625.00, p < .001. AQ-Child scores did 
not significantly differ between females and males (M = 54.58, SD = 15.96; M = 51.75, SD = 20.48, 
respectively; t(48) = 0.58, p  = .587). Additionally, age did not significantly differ between the low 
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and high AQ-Child groups, t(48) = 0.09, p = .925; nor did performance on the ACES, t(48) = 0.78, 
p = .439. 
Emotion matching data were entered as proportions of correct responses for each emotional 
condition. Tests of normality for each emotion within each AQ-Child group determined the data to 
be normally distributed, as all values of skewness were within the acceptable limits of -2 and +2 
(George & Mallery, 2010).  
Figure 3.1 depicts the accuracy for each group and emotion condition. A 4 x 2 mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with target emotion (happy, sad, fear, anger) as a 
within-subjects variable and AQ score (low, high) as a between-subjects variable. The analysis 
revealed no significant main effect of AQ (p = .778) and no interaction between emotion and AQ (p 
= .301). However, a main effect of emotion was evident, F(3, 144) = 20.88, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .303. 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons between each target emotion revealed that accuracy was 
significantly lower for happy emotions compared to all other emotions, and was significantly lower 
for fear compared to anger and sadness. Accuracy for angry and sad emotions did not significantly 
differ (see Table 3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Proportion accuracy for each emotion condition for each AQ-Child group (error bars 
represent standard error). 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
H A P P Y  F E A R  A N G R Y  S A D  
A
C
C
U
R
A
C
Y
 
EMOTION 
Low AQ-Child 
H A P P Y  F E A R  A N G R Y  S A D  
EMOTION 
High AQ-Child 
61 
 
Table 3.1 
Statistical results of pairwise comparisons (using paired samples t-tests) between each emotion 
condition (collapsed across AQ-Child groups). 
 t(49) d 95% CI p 
Sad – angry 1.64 0.23 0.01, 0.13          .108 
Sad – fear 4.27 0.60 0.09, 0.25       < .001*** 
Sad – happy 7.03 0.99 0.23, 0.42       < .001*** 
Angry – fear 2.54 0.36 0.02, 0.19          .014* 
Angry – happy 5.36 0.76 0.17, 0.37       < .001*** 
Fear – happy  3.15 0.45 0.06, 0.26          .003** 
***p < .001, **p < .005, *p < .05 
 
To inspect the patterns of errors, a confusion matrix, separated by AQ-Child group, is 
displayed in Table 3.2. Of note, for both groups, happy voices were most often incorrectly paired 
with angry faces, and fearful voices were most often incorrectly paired with sad faces.  
 
Table 3.2 
Confusion matrix for voice-face matching responses per AQ-Child group. 
  Chosen response (%) 
  Happy face Fear face Angry face Sad face 
Low AQ-
Child 
Happy voice 50.4 15.2 25.6 8.8 
Fear voice 4.0 68.8 4.0 23.2 
Angry voice 4.0 12.0 76.8 7.2 
Sad voice 1.6 3.2 4.8 90.4 
      
High AQ-
Child 
Happy voice 56.0 10.4 27.2 6.4 
Fear voice 5.6 69.6 0 24.8 
Angry voice 6.4 5.6 83.2 4.8 
Sad voice 2.4 3.2 12.8 81.6 
AQ-Child = Autism-Spectrum Quotient: Children’s Version 
 
3.4.1 Correlations 
Pearson‟s bivariate correlations were performed to examine the relationships between task 
accuracy for each emotion (absolute number of correct responses), age, AQ-Child score, and ACES 
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score. Accuracy for anger was significantly positively correlated with age, r = 0.28, p = .048, and 
ACES score, r = 0.32, p = .022. Age and ACES score were not significantly correlated with 
accuracy for any other emotion. Additionally, age and ACES score were significantly positively 
correlated, r = 0.41, p = .003. AQ-Child score showed no significant correlations with task accuracy 
or other variables.  
3.5 Discussion 
The current study examined the ability of school-aged children to match vocal emotional 
prosody to facial expressions. This study aimed to determine whether the ability to match emotions 
across modality would vary for different emotions, and for children with different levels of autism-
like traits. Based on previous literature (Nelson & Russell, 2011; Sauter et al., 2013), we expected 
that children would be better able to accurately match sad and angry voices to faces, compared to 
happy and fearful expressions. In addition, we expected that children with higher levels of autism-
like traits would be less accurate matching emotional voices to faces compared to children with 
lower levels of autism-like traits. These hypotheses were partially supported, and we discuss the 
implications of the results with regard to general emotion recognition abilities, and in relation to 
autism-like traits. 
3.5.1 General Emotion Recognition 
 As expected, we found that children were less accurate when matching happy and fearful 
expressions compared to sad and angry expressions. Further, matching accuracy in the happy 
condition was less accurate compared to the fearful condition. Inspecting the patterns of incorrect 
responses allowed for further clarification as to where the inaccuracies were with matching 
emotional voices and faces. Specifically, children paired happy voices with angry faces, and fearful 
voices with sad faces, on approximately a quarter of the trials. Nelson and Russell (2011), in finding 
that children up to 5 years old often mistake happy voices with a negative emotion, suggested that 
the ability to distinguish between positive and negative emotions in the voice continues to develop 
beyond 5 years. Our findings suggest that this ability continues to develop beyond 9 years. It is 
possible that children in the current study were relying more on the level of arousal in the voice than 
the valence when matching happy voices to faces, which caused the children to confuse the happy 
voices for being angry. 
The tendency to mistake fearful voices for sadness in childhood has been demonstrated in 
previous research. Nelson and Russell (2011) showed that children incorrectly labelled fearful 
voices as sad more than as other emotions, including fear. Sauter et al. (2013) also showed that 
fearful voices tended to be mistaken equally for either sadness, achievement, or surprise. Therefore, 
the current findings indicate that school-age children have difficulty differentiating fear and sadness 
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from the voice, and supports previous findings that the recognition of fear develops later than other 
emotions (Vicari et al., 2000; Widen, 2013).  
Additionally, we found that children who showed greater general emotional understanding, 
as evidenced by higher ACES scores, were more accurate in matching angry voices to faces. This 
finding indicates that children who show a better ability to identify emotion from a range of visual, 
behavioural, and situational cues, show an enhanced ability to also recognise anger from cross-
modal vocal and facial cues. Accuracy in matching angry expressions also improved with age. This 
relationship suggests that the recognition of anger from the voice is perhaps particularly improved 
between 7 to 9 years of age, whereas improvements in recognising other emotions from the voice 
may occur at later stages of development. 
3.5.2 Emotion Recognition and Autism-Like Traits 
Contrary to predictions, there was no difference in matching ability between the subgroups 
of children with lower and higher levels of autism-like traits. Evidence regarding emotion 
recognition abilities in children with ASD is mixed, and our findings align with those showing 
equal performance between children with ASD and typically developing children (e.g., Baker et al., 
2010; Castelli, 2005; Grossman et al., 2010). With regard to matching emotions across modalities, 
previous studies have shown that the more cognitively demanding the task, the more likely it is to 
differentiate between typically developing children and children with ASD (De Vries & Geurts, 
2012; Grossman et al., 2000). The stimuli used in the current study were high in emotional 
intensity, and therefore more exaggerated and easier to recognise than lower intensity and more 
subtle emotional expressions. It is possible that the high intensity expressions resulted in similar 
recognition ability for children with higher and lower levels of autism-like traits. This supports 
Grossman and Tager-Flusberg (2012), who only demonstrated differences in emotion matching 
ability of children with ASD when the emotions were low intensity, but not when they were high 
intensity.  
However, as performance was not high overall, an explanation of task simplicity is not 
sufficient to explain these null findings. It is possible that the reduced ability to match emotions 
across modality seen in children with ASD (e.g., Boucher et al., 2000) is unique to children with a 
diagnosis of ASD and does not extend to the BAP. It is important to note that, although the groups 
with low and high levels of autism-like traits were significantly different in their AQ scores, it is 
possible that the degree of difference and overall variance in AQ scores may not have been 
substantial enough to detect differences in emotion recognition between the groups. Thus, future 
research should aim to include a larger variance in autism-like traits, perhaps by collecting a larger 
sample and selecting only the extreme upper and lower ends of AQ scores for comparison. 
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Moreover, future research should investigate whether children with higher and lower levels 
of autism-like traits show similar recognition and processing of emotional information which is 
more subtle or in tasks where emotion processing is implicit rather than explicit. This would 
provide insight into whether the lack of group differences in the current study is due to emotion 
processing differences being unique to those with a clinical diagnosis of ASD. Alternatively, it is 
possible that those without a diagnosis but with high levels of autism-like traits have stronger 
compensatory strategies that allow them to recognise emotions despite differences in processing 
compared to those with low levels of autism-like traits. The use of compensatory strategies has been 
suggested to explain findings showing similar emotion recognition performance in children with 
ASD compared to typically developing children (e.g., Begeer et al., 2008). Our previous work 
examining cross-modal emotion processing in adults in relation to autism-like traits (West et al., 
2018; Chapter 2) shows that adults with high levels of autism-like traits do not integrate vocal and 
facial cues, while those with lower levels of autism-like traits do. However, the current study 
showed no difference in the ability to integrate vocal and facial emotional cues between children 
with high or low levels of autism-like traits. These distinct findings could be due to task differences, 
or to age-related differences, such that reduced integration of vocal and facial emotional cues in 
those with higher levels of autism-like traits might only become apparent after 9 years of age.  
3.5.3 Conclusion 
This study was the first to examine the ability to match vocal and facial emotional 
expressions in childhood, with respect to levels of autism-like traits. Overall, the findings support 
previous evidence showing that some emotions are more difficult to recognise from prosody 
compared to other emotions. Further, the findings suggest that this ability continues to develop 
throughout childhood. Finally, the results suggest that the ability to explicitly match emotions 
across modality in childhood does not differ according to the child‟s level of autism-like traits. 
However, further investigations are needed to determine the implications of this finding with regard 
to emotion processing and the BAP.  
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Chapter 4. Effects of Emotional Prosody on Novel Word Learning in Relation to Autism-Like 
Traits 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 explored the integration of cross-modal emotional information during explicit 
emotion recognition in both adults and children with low and high levels of autism-like traits. For 
adults, those with higher levels of autism-like traits did not show automatic integration of vocal and 
facial cues, whereas those with lower levels of autism-like traits were influenced by combined 
prosodic and semantic vocal emotional cues when recognising emotional facial expressions. For 
children, there was no difference between those with low and high levels of autism-like traits in the 
ability to match vocal and facial emotional expressions, suggesting that a difficulty with cross-
modal integration in relation to autism traits may become evident after 9 years of age. Chapters 4 
and 5 examined more implicit emotion processing by exploring the influence of emotional 
information on word learning ability in both adults and children with low or high levels of autism-
like traits. Chapter 4 focused on the influence of emotional prosody on word learning ability in 
adults. The content of this chapter has been published in the journal Motivation and Emotion, as a 
manuscript entitled: “Effects of emotional prosody on novel word learning in relation to autism-like 
traits” (West et al., 2017; see Appendix B for a URL link to the published article)2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
2
 The content included in Chapter 4 is identical to the published manuscript, except for minor changes to formatting, 
numbering, size and positioning of figures and tables, the inclusion of a “Conclusion” subheading, and “nonword” has 
been changed to “nonsense word”, to ensure consistency with the remainder of the thesis. Additionally, some 
information has been omitted from the methods and results sections to avoid repetition with previous chapters. 
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4.1 Abstract 
Emotional information can influence various cognitive processes, such as attention, motivation, and 
memory. Differences in the processing of emotion have been observed in individuals with high 
levels of autism-like traits. The current study aimed to determine the influence of emotional 
prosody on word learning ability in neurotypical adults who varied in their levels of autism-like 
traits. Thirty-eight participants learned 30 nonsense words as names for 30 “alien” characters. Alien 
names were verbally presented with happy, fearful, or neutral prosody. For all participants, recall 
performance was significantly worse for words spoken with fearful prosody compared to neutral. 
Recall performance was also worse for words spoken with happy prosody compared to neutral, but 
only for those with lower levels of autism-like traits. The findings suggest that emotional prosody 
can interfere with word learning, and that people with fewer autism-like traits may be more 
susceptible to such interference due to a higher attention bias toward emotion.  
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4.2 Introduction 
The exchange of emotional information (e.g., facial expressions, tone of voice, etc.) is 
widely accepted to occur automatically during communication (Moses et al., 2001). The processing 
of emotion not only enhances the quality of social communication, but can aid in the recognition of 
threat (i.e., an individual expressing fearful or angry emotions may signal threat to others), or 
benefit (i.e., positive emotions may signal an opportunity for gain; Kuperman, 2013). However, 
certain individual characteristics may impact the ability to process emotion. For example, along 
with characteristics such as reduced social functioning and increased rigid and/or repetitive 
behaviours, individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show impaired processing and 
understanding of emotion (e.g., Begeer et al., 2008; Golan et al., 2006; Nuske et al., 2013). There is 
evidence to suggest that, even without a diagnosis of ASD, individuals with higher levels of autism-
like traits have poorer recognition of emotion compared to those with lower levels of autism-like 
traits (Hermans et al., 2009; Hosokawa et al., 2015; Ingersoll, 2010; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 
2012). The broader autism phenotype (BAP) refers to genetic similarities between those with ASD 
and neurotypical individuals with high levels of autism-like traits.  
In the general population, research has demonstrated that emotional information is processed 
more efficiently than neutral information, and can influence various cognitive processes (e.g., 
Hinojosa, Rtolo & Pozo, 2010). Life events associated with strong emotional reactions are better 
remembered compared to other events (Calev, 1996; Kensinger et al., 2007). Emotional information 
can also be useful during the acquisition of new knowledge, particularly when emotion can be used 
as a referent towards a particular piece of novel information. For instance, Hooker et al. (2008) 
asked participants to learn associations between novel objects and either emotional or neutral faces. 
Objects were presented alongside images of happy, fearful or neutral facial expressions. Participants 
were faster at learning objects associated with the emotional expressions compared to the neutral 
expressions. Such results suggest a processing bias exists for emotional information during 
associative learning and memory tasks. 
Within language processing, words with positive (e.g., “kindness”) or negative (e.g., 
“danger”) emotional meaning are more quickly recognised and better remembered compared to 
non-emotional words, such as “tower” (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Kousta et al., 2009). 
Although some studies have shown preferential processing for positive emotion words (Calev, 
1996; Hofmann et al., 2009), a large body of evidence shows a stronger bias toward negative 
emotion words (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Vaish et al., 2008; Wang & Fu, 2011). This negativity 
bias is believed to be due to the evolutionary advantage in attending quickly to negative emotional 
information. It is advantageous to attend to positive emotional information as a signal for gaining 
something beneficial, however this is not often as immediately essential for survival as recognising 
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negative, and potentially threatening, information (Kuperman, 2013; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). 
Although the influence of emotion on the ability to remember known words has been explored, it is 
yet to be determined whether an emotion bias influences the ability to learn new words.  
Word acquisition is a complex mental process which can be influenced by multiple factors. 
For example, some factors which enhance the learning and retention of new words include vocal 
rehearsal (Kaushanskaya & Yoo, 2011), native language phonology (Baddeley, Gathercole & 
Papagno, 1998), tone of voice (i.e., prosody; Reinisch et al., 2013; Shintel et al., 2014), additional 
semantic information (Angwin et al., 2014), and greater verbal short-term memory ability (Gupta, 
2003). Interestingly, both Reinisch et al. (2013) and Shintel et al. (2014) found that the way in 
which a word was said, for example increasing the volume when referring to something large, can 
aid in forming associations between novel words and meaning. These studies show that an 
informative prosody can be a useful tool during word learning if it is consistent with the context. 
Given the influence of emotion on our attention, emotional prosody during word learning may 
influence attentional processes and, consequently, word learning processes. 
There is evidence indicating that additional semantic information can enhance word learning 
ability (Angwin et al., 2014), consistent with previous work showing that a deeper level of encoding 
enhances memory for words (Craik & Tulving, 1975). However, research into whether emotional 
information provides such a benefit is exceptionally limited. Eden and colleagues (2015) 
demonstrated an advantage for learning words with an emotional meaning compared to other words 
in neurotypical adults. Written novel pseudo-words were paired with images of known objects 
which had been rated as emotionally negative or neutral. A word learning paradigm was used 
whereby the participants arbitrarily indicated whether a pseudo-word was the appropriate label for 
an image. They continued to make such judgements until they met a threshold of consistency 
regarding their chosen word and image pairs. Following this task, a cued recall task was 
administered in which participants recalled the object that each pseudo-word was associated with to 
measure the retention of word meaning. The object and word associations were better remembered 
when the objects were negative compared to neutral. Similar to the memory research described 
previously (Bower, 1981; Calev, 1996; Hooker et al., 2008; Kensinger et al., 2007), these results 
show a processing advantage for information which is explicitly linked with emotion, in this 
instance in regard to word learning.  
The results of Eden and colleagues (2015) demonstrate that emotional visual stimuli can 
influence word learning. However, it can be argued that this study was limited in representing 
natural word learning scenarios in two ways. Firstly, new words are typically linked with unfamiliar 
objects, without an existing lexical representation, rather than familiar objects. Secondly, it is rarely 
the case that new words would be paired with a visual stimulus without additional information, such 
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as vocal prosody. As we are typically exposed to new words via speech, it is possible that the way 
in which a word is spoken may influence learning (Reinisch et al., 2013; Shintel et al., 2014). 
Indeed, vocal prosody is also one of the most useful and effective modalities for communicating 
emotion (Schirmer & Kotz, 2003; Shriberg et al., 2001). Thus, it is important to determine the 
extent to which emotional prosody influences our ability to learn new words.  
Berman et al. (2013) investigated whether word learning in 5-year-old children was 
facilitated by informative emotional prosody. Objects were presented in either a broken or enhanced 
(i.e., attractive attributes added, such as stars) state and paired with pseudo-words spoken with 
either positive or negative emotional prosody. Analysis of eye gaze showed that 5-year-olds 
appropriately associated the broken and enhanced objects with the negatively and positively spoken 
pseudo-word, respectively. Further, children showed an ability to generalise the pseudo-word 
learned with negative prosody by correctly associating the word with the object both when the 
object was returned to its original unbroken state, and when an alternative version of the object was 
presented. The results from this study suggest that the use of emotional prosody, particularly 
negative emotional prosody, to guide word-object associations may be an important mechanism for 
learning new words throughout development. Exploring the extent to which emotional prosody can 
impact word learning in more complex scenarios in adulthood may further elucidate current 
understanding regarding how emotion in speech impacts word learning. For example, it is yet to be 
determined whether emotional prosody can aid in word learning when it is not directly relevant to 
the referent or the focus of the task.  
It is also important to determine whether an emotion bias elicited during word learning 
varies as a function of autism-like traits. Research has demonstrated a lack of memory bias for 
emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli in adults with ASD when recalling emotional or neutral 
sentences (Beversdorf et al., 1998), or recognising emotional or neutral images (Deruelle et al., 
2008). In these experiments, emotional stimuli were remembered better than neutral stimuli for 
typical adults, but not for those with ASD, despite the groups having equivalent overall 
performance. Further, evidence in childhood has shown that children with ASD are less influenced 
by positive emotions when required to use this information to associate pseudo-words with objects, 
but they do not show difficulty making these associations when given negative emotional 
information (Thurman et al., 2015).  
The results of these studies suggest that individuals with ASD may have a weaker automatic 
attention bias toward emotional information than those without ASD. It has been theorised that 
autism-like traits exist on a spectrum, and that every individual in the population has a place along 
this spectrum (Wing, 1988). The higher end of the spectrum includes those who show a lower 
interest or ability in social behaviours, and more systematic cognitions and behaviours. On the 
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lower end of the spectrum are those who are more socially competent and have a higher capacity for 
empathy, but may struggle with routines and understanding systems. It is believed that those who 
have a diagnosis of ASD fall at the extreme high end of this spectrum, and typical adults fall 
somewhere below this. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001) devised an assessment 
termed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) to measure these traits in the general population. In 
regard to emotion processing and understanding, research has found that neurotypical adults who 
obtain high scores on the AQ, indicating a relatively high non-clinical level of autism-like traits, are 
less able to accurately recognise, as well as imitate, emotional facial expressions compared to 
individuals who obtain low scores on the AQ (Hermans et al., 2009; Hosokawa et al., 2015; 
Ingersoll, 2010; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012). No studies to date have examined the 
relationship between AQ scores and the extent to which emotional information can influence 
cognitive processes such as memory and learning.  
The current study aimed to determine whether the word learning ability of neurotypical 
adults with relatively higher or lower levels of autism-like traits is differentially affected by 
emotion. Participants were required to learn the names of novel alien drawings during a single 
session. Names were auditory novel pseudo-words spoken with happy, fearful, or neutral emotional 
prosody. It was hypothesised that words spoken with both positive and negative emotional prosody 
would be learned more effectively than words spoken with neutral prosody, and that words spoken 
with emotionally negative prosody would be learned more effectively than words spoken with 
positive prosody. It was further hypothesised that this emotional bias would be less pronounced or 
absent in those who score higher on the AQ, relative to those with lower AQ scores.  
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Participants 
 The participants described in Chapter 2 also participated in the current study. These were 38 
healthy adults (22 females, 16 males; M age = 22.6 years, SD = 5.7), with normal vision and 
hearing, no history of any psychological or neurological conditions (including an autism spectrum 
condition), and English as their primary language. Three participants reported being left-handed. 
All participants provided written informed consent prior to participation, and ethical approval for 
the study was granted by the University of Queensland Medical Research Ethics Committee. 
4.3.2 Measures 
 4.3.2.1 The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ). As described in Chapter 2, the AQ (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001) was used in the current study to measure the level of 
autism-like traits. Participants indicated their level of agreement with 50 statements reflecting 
autism-like traits, using a 4-point Likert-type response scale. Each response received a score of 1-4, 
71 
 
rather than the original dichotomous scoring system, for improved sensitivity (Austin, 2005). Thus, 
total scores ranged from 50-200, with higher scores indicating higher levels of autism-like traits.  
 4.3.2.2 Additional measures. Three measures of cognition were also included to determine 
whether cognition impacted word learning ability relative to AQ scores. These consisted of the 
National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson & Willison, 1991), to assess word reading and verbal 
IQ, a Digit Span forwards and backwards test, to assess working memory, and a measure of 
nonword repetition ability. The Digit Span tests require participants to immediately repeat strings of 
numbers which progressively increase in length. The nonword repetition task was developed using 
nonsense word stimuli from Gupta et al. (2004) that were not already being used as stimuli in the 
word learning task. The stimuli progressively increased in number of syllables such that there were 
10 items of 3-syllable words (e.g., “bokonip”), 10 items of 5-syllable words (e.g., “ponokasidin”), 
and 10 items of 7-syllable words (e.g., “tasedibutarimon”). Words were recorded by a female 
Australian speaker and delivered on a Dell laptop using E Prime 2 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Participants were instructed to repeat each nonsense word immediately after 
hearing it. Responses were scored as correct only if pronunciation was exact.  
4.3.3 Word Learning Task 
 4.3.3.1 Stimuli. The study consisted of a word learning paradigm in which participants were 
required to learn novel names for images of unique “alien” characters, drawn from Gupta et al. 
(2004). These names were 30 three-syllable nonsense words consisting of random combinations of 
English phonemes, such as “Bekinore”, and were presented vocally. Three of Gupta et al.‟s pre-
arranged lists of 10 pseudo-words were chosen, with each list having equal variation of onset 
letters, such that each list contained an equal number of words beginning with b, d, g, k, p, and t.  
Auditory recordings of each nonsense word were created by a female acting student who 
vocalised each pseudo-word with happy, fearful, and neutral emotional prosody. Each of the 30 
pseudo-words was recorded twice for each of the three intonations, resulting in 180 recordings. 
These recordings were then presented to 19 healthy adults (13 female; M age = 29.93 years, SD = 
9.41), who were not participating in the word learning experiment, in an online survey for 
validation of the emotional expression. In the survey, participants listened to the 180 recordings one 
at a time, and rated each on its level of both fearful and happy emotional expression using Likert-
type scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Of the two recordings per word for the fear 
and happy conditions, the recordings with the highest mean rating on the appropriate emotion were 
chosen for use in the study. Paired samples t-tests were performed on the ratings for the chosen 
stimuli. Due to technical error, 25.85% of ratings were missing overall. The findings revealed that 
the 30 fearful recordings were rated significantly higher on the fear scale (M = 4.65, SD = 1.16) 
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compared to the happy scale (M = 1.08, SD = 0.26), t(14) = 12.20, p < .001, d = 3.15, 95% CI [2.94, 
4.20], and that 80% of responses were ratings of 4 or above on the fear scale. For the happy 
recordings, the selected recordings were rated significantly higher on the happy scale (M = 5.05, SD 
= 1.49) compared to the fear scale (M = 1.34, SD = 0.42), t(16) = 10.32, p < .001, d = 2.50, 95% CI 
[2.95, 4.48], and 79% of responses were ratings of 4 or above on the happy scale. Of the 60 words 
spoken in neutral prosody, the 30 which were rated lowest on both the fear and happy scales were 
chosen for use in the study. Results revealed that the fear ratings (M = 1.29, SD = 0.51) and happy 
ratings (M = 1.35, SD = 0.73) for these 30 neutral recordings were not significantly different, t(13) 
= 0.31, p = .765, ns, and only 5% of responses were ratings of 4 or above on either the happy or fear 
scales. In addition, the neutral recordings were rated as significantly less fearful than the fearful 
recordings, t(14) = 11.52, p < .001, d = 2.98, 95% CI [2.81, 4.09], and significantly less happy than 
the happy recordings t(13) = 11.13, p < .001, d = 2.98, 95% CI [2.98, 4.41]. 
The aliens were 30 unique alien images taken from the Gupta et al. (2004) database. In this 
database, aliens were developed to vary with respect to four main characteristics; the number of 
arms, the presence or absence of a tail, the head shape, and the body shape. Three sets of 10 aliens 
were selected for the current study. Each set was matched for the number of aliens with each 
variation of the previously mentioned characteristics.    
Three versions of the experiment were created and were randomly assigned to each 
participant. Each version consisted of the 30 aliens and 30 pseudo-words, with each of the three lists 
of 10 pseudo-words allocated to an emotional condition. This resulted in 10 fearful, 10 happy, and 
10 neutral sounding words. The pairing of each set of aliens with each set of words was randomised 
using a Latin square and counterbalanced across emotional conditions. This ensured that each 
version of the experiment contained different alien-word pairings in each emotional condition. See 
Table 4.1 for a visual representation of the three versions of the experiment. In addition, trials 
within the experiment were pseudo-randomised to ensure that the same emotional condition did not 
occur on five or more subsequent trials, and that each emotional condition was evenly distributed 
throughout any given sequence.  
 
Table 4.1 
Counter-balanced experiment versions 
 Fearful condition Happy condition Neutral condition 
Version 1 Alien set 1 + word set 1 Alien set 2 + word set 2 Alien set 3 + word set 3 
Version 2 Alien set 2 + word set 3 Alien set 3 + word set 1 Alien set 1 + word set 2 
Version 3 Alien set 3 + word set 2 Alien set 1 + word set 3 Alien set 2 + word set 1 
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4.3.4 Procedure 
 Prior to the experiment proper, participants completed a repetition test in order to verify 
their capacity to accurately pronounce each of the nonsense word stimuli. Participants were 
presented with each of the verbal nonsense words one at a time, without accompanying visual 
stimuli, and were asked to repeat each nonsense word aloud. The experimenter scored the 
participant‟s response by either marking the item as correct if it was pronounced correctly, or by 
noting the alternate pronunciation used, and then indicated when the participant could proceed to 
the next trial. Responses were also audio recorded for later verification. If a word was pronounced 
with more than one syllable incorrect during the word practice, or was pronounced such that it 
resembled a real word (e.g., “bonikak” pronounced as “bunny-kak”), that item was removed from 
all analyses for that participant. In total, 7.90% of items were removed on this basis. For words 
which were pronounced with only one syllable incorrect and did not resemble a real word, the 
alternative pronunciation was considered correct for that participant for the remainder of the task. 
Participants wore AKG K550 closed back reference class headphones, and volume was adjusted to 
a comfortable listening level for each individual.   
The word learning task involved three phases: a learning phase, a recall phase, and a 
recognition phase, with each task presented on a Dell laptop using E Prime 2 software. In the 
learning phase, participants viewed images of each alien, one at a time, while simultaneously 
hearing a vocal recording of a nonsense word spoken with happy, fearful, or neutral emotional 
prosody. Participants were instructed to remember the names of each of the aliens. Each trial 
consisted of a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 1500ms, followed by the alien image and 
the vocal recording. There was a 250ms delay between the onset of the alien and the onset of the 
word. Each alien remained on the screen for a total of 5000ms for each trial, followed by a blank 
screen for 500ms before automatically beginning the next trial. The presentation of all 30 aliens and 
their names was repeated twice before beginning the subsequent recall phase. Participants were 
given the opportunity for a short break between each set of 30 aliens within a learning phase. The 
duration of the breaks was controlled by the participants, who were instructed to press a button 
when they were ready to proceed.  
 In the recall phase, participants were shown each of the 30 aliens one at a time in a random 
order, and were required to state the name of each alien aloud while their responses were recorded 
using an Olympus digital voice recorder. Each alien remained on the screen for a maximum of 
5000ms; however, participants could press a button prior to this to proceed to the next trial. The 
5000ms time limit was applied to ensure that participants were not fixating on one stimulus for too 
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long. Responses were scored online as either correct or incorrect, with mispronunciations of any 
part of the word scored as incorrect. Scoring was later verified from the audio recordings. The 
learning and recall phases were repeated five times, with a different pseudo-randomised order of 
trials used in each sequence. Each word-alien pair and emotional condition remained consistent 
across all sequences for each participant.  
 At the end of the five learning and recall phases, there was a final recognition phase. In this 
phase participants were again presented with each of the 30 aliens in a random order. Alongside 
each alien were three written nonsense words which included the “correct” word that had been 
associated with the alien throughout the experiment, and two “incorrect” words which had been 
paired with other aliens. Participants were required to indicate which word was the correct name for 
the alien by pressing one of three buttons on a serial response box. The correct response option was 
pseudo-randomised such that the same button was not allocated to the correct option more than five 
times consecutively. The two incorrect options were always selected from the same emotional 
condition as the target alien for each trial, and all three options always had different onset letters. 
Each trial consisted of a fixation cross for 1000ms, followed by the alien and the word options. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, and a 4000ms time 
limit was imposed on each trial. After a participant had responded, or after 4000ms had elapsed, the 
trial would automatically proceed to a blank screen for 250ms prior to the commencement of the 
next trial. Following the completion of the word learning task, the experimenter administered the 
NART, digit span, and nonword repetition tests, and the participant completed the AQ. 
4.4 Results 
 Scores from the AQ ranged from 63 – 119 (M = 98.47, SD = 12.67), with no impact of 
gender, and participants were allocated into high and low AQ groups by splitting at the median 
score of 100 (see Chapter 2). Additionally, any potential effects of gender on recall or recognition 
performance were investigated, with no significant main effects or interactions.  
An arcsine square root transformation was performed on proportional data for both recall 
accuracy and recognition accuracy in order to improve normality, as is deemed most appropriate for 
proportional data (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989). Prior to performing the transformation, values of 0 
were replaced with [1/(4n)], with n equal to the number of trials in each condition (10). Values of 1 
were replaced with [1 – (1/(4n))]. To improve normality for recognition latency, a square root 
transformation was performed on reaction time data (Howell, 2007).  
4.4.1 Recall 
 A 5 x 3 x 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed, with recall (phases 1 – 5) 
and emotion (happy, fearful, neutral) as within-subjects factors, and AQ (low, high) as a between 
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subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of recall, F(4, 144) = 188.69, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.840, which was indicative of the improved overall recall performance across learning phases. A 
main effect of emotion, F(2, 72) = 9.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .207, was evident, with pairwise 
comparisons revealing that accuracy was significantly worse in the fearful condition overall, 
compared to the happy, t(37) = 2.78, p = .009, d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.02, 0.13], and neutral, t(37) = 
4.38, p < .001, d = 0.71, 95% CI [0.06, 0.15], conditions. A significant interaction was observed 
between recall and emotion, F(8, 288) = 2.03, p = .043, ηp
2
 = .053, which was further explored with 
pairwise comparisons at each recall phase (see Table 4.2). These comparisons revealed that 
performance in the fearful condition was significantly worse than the neutral condition at all recall 
phases, except for phase 2, and was significantly worse than the happy condition at recall phase 3. 
Further, although recall performance in the happy and neutral conditions did not significantly differ 
during recall phases 1-4, performance in the happy condition was significantly worse than the 
neutral condition at recall phase 5.   
 
Table 4.2 
Results (t statistic) of pairwise comparisons between each emotion condition, at each recall phase 
(collapsed across AQ).  
 Recall phase 
1 
Recall phase 
2 
Recall phase 
3 
Recall phase 
4 
Recall phase 
5 
Happy – fear 1.88 2.01 2.49* 1.96 1.42 
Neutral – happy 0.41 0.83 1.02 0.80 2.37* 
Neutral – fear  2.21* 1.13 4.19** 2.82* 3.83** 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .001. 
 
An interaction between emotion and AQ was just outside significance, F(2, 72) = 2.87, p = 
.062, ηp
2
 = .076. Due to the a priori predictions relating to AQ, this interaction was further 
investigated by conducting separate 5 (recall) x 3 (emotion) mixed ANOVAs on the high and low 
AQ groups. The analysis for the low AQ group produced significant main effects of recall, F(4, 72) 
= 98.55, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .846, and emotion, F(2, 36) = 4.152, p = .024, ηp
2
 = .187. Additionally, 
there was a significant interaction between recall and emotion in this group, F(8, 144) = 2.08, p = 
.042, ηp
2
 = .103. Pairwise comparisons revealed that this group showed worse overall performance 
in the fear condition compared to neutral, t(18) = 2.63, p = .017, d = 0.60, 95% CI [0.02, 0.16], and 
significantly worse performance in the happy condition compared to neutral, t(18) = 2.24, p = .038, 
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d = 0.51, 95% CI [0.00, 0.14]. The fear and happy conditions did not differ significantly. 
Comparisons at each recall phase revealed that the impairment in recall performance in the fear 
condition compared to neutral for the low AQ group was evident at the third recall phase only, t(18) 
= 3.63, p = .002, d = 0.83, 95% CI [0.07, 0.25], whereas the impairment in performance in the 
happy condition compared to neutral was evident at the fifth recall phase only, t(18) = 3.32, p = 
.004, d = 0.76, 95% CI [0.07, 0.29]. No further comparisons were significant.  
The analysis for the high AQ group indicated significant main effects of recall, F(4, 72) = 
91.54, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .836, and emotion, F(2, 36) = 7.67, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .299, however the 
interaction between recall and emotion was non-significant in this group, F(8, 144) = 1.48, p = .169, 
ns. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that accuracy was significantly lower in the fearful 
condition overall compared to both the happy, t(18) = 3.32, p = .004, d = 0.76, 95% CI [0.05, 0.21], 
and neutral, t(18) = 3.50, p = .003, d = 0.80, 95% CI [0.05, 0.19], conditions. The happy and neutral 
conditions did not differ significantly. Figure 4.1 presents the means for recall accuracy for both the 
low and high AQ groups for each emotion condition, at each recall phase.  
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Figure 4.1 Arcsine transformed recall accuracy for each emotion condition, separated into low and high groups based on Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ) score. 
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4.4.2 Recognition 
 Three participants from the low AQ group failed to complete the recognition task due to 
technical difficulties. Thus, the recognition accuracy analysis included 16 participants in the low 
AQ group and 19 participants in the high AQ group.  
 4.4.2.1 Accuracy. For recognition accuracy, errors included incorrect responses in addition 
to trials in which a response was not given within the 4000ms time limit. The overall error rate was 
13.8%. 
A 3 x 2 (emotion x AQ) mixed ANOVA produced a significant main effect of emotion, F(2, 
66) = 12.04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .267. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that accuracy was 
significantly worse in the fearful condition compared to both the neutral condition, t(34) = 4.42, p < 
.001, d = 0.75, 95% CI [0.08, 0.21], and the happy condition, t(34) = 3.76, p = .001, d = 0.64, 95% 
CI [0.06, 0.20]. There was no significant difference in recognition accuracy between the happy and 
neutral conditions, and there was no significant interaction with AQ, F(2, 66) = 2.70, p = .075, ns. 
Table 4.3 shows the arcsine transformed means and standard deviations for recognition accuracy for 
each AQ group in each emotion condition. 
 
Table 4.3  
Arcsine transformed mean recognition accuracy as a function of emotion and AQ (SD in 
parenthesis) 
 Emotion condition 
 Happy Fear Neutral 
Low AQ 1.28 (0.16) 1.13 (0.27) 1.22 (0.15) 
High AQ 1.24 (0.18) 1.13 (0.19) 1.32 (0.16) 
AQ = Autism-Spectrum Quotient.    
 
 4.4.2.2 Reaction time (RT). Only correct trials were analysed for RT, and further trials 
were excluded if the RT exceeded 2 standard deviations from the conditional RT mean for a given 
participant (1.35% of otherwise eligible trials). Additionally, participants were removed from the 
reaction time analysis if their data did not contribute six or more items to each emotion condition. 
As a result, data from eight participants were removed from the reaction time analysis, three of 
these were from the low AQ group and five from the high AQ group. Thus, the reaction time 
analysis included 13 participants in the low AQ group and 14 participants in the high AQ group.  
A 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA (emotion x AQ) produced a main effect of emotion, F(2, 50) = 7.97, 
p = .001, ηp
2
 = .242. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that reaction times were significantly 
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slower in the fearful condition (M = 2223, SD = 774) compared to both the happy condition (M = 
2015, SD = 658), t(26) = 3.26, p = .003, d = 0.63, 95% CI [0.79, 3.50], and the neutral condition (M 
= 1988, SD = 575), t(26) = 3.18, p = .004, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.81, 3.78]. There were no further 
significant main or interaction effects of reaction time.       
4.4.3 Additional Measures 
 Pearson bivariate correlation analyses were performed for each AQ group separately to 
determine the relationships between overall recall performance, digit span scores, nonword 
repetition accuracy, predicted verbal IQ based on number of errors in the NART (Nelson & 
Willison, 1991), and years of education. For the low AQ group, recall performance was 
significantly positively associated with the Digit Span forward and backwards tests (r = 0.67, p = 
.002; r = 0.49, p = .032, respectively), and nonword repetition (r = 0.51, p = .027), such that better 
performances on these measures were related to higher recall performance. Verbal IQ scores were 
not significantly correlated with recall performance (r = 0.38, p = .109, ns). Years of education was 
not correlated with any measures for the low AQ group. 
For the high AQ group, overall recall performance was significantly positively associated 
with only the Digit Span forwards test (r = 0.49, p = .035). There were no other significant 
correlations in this group.   
 Independent samples t-tests were performed to compare scores on these measures between 
high and low AQ groups. The results revealed that there were no significant differences in scores on 
the Digit Span forwards and backwards tests, the nonword repetition task, or in years of education 
(ts (36) < 0.87, ps > .397). Verbal IQ scores based on the NART performance were significantly 
different between the high and low AQ groups, with the high AQ group showing higher verbal IQ, 
t(36) = 2.05, p = .048, d = 0.67, 95% CI [0.04, 7.96]. Table 4.4 presents the means and standard 
deviations of each additional measure for the high and low AQ groups.  
 
Table 4.4  
Mean (SD in parenthesis) Digit Span scores, nonword repetition performance, verbal IQ scores, 
and years of education for the high and low AQ groups. 
 Digit Span 
forwards 
Digit Span 
backwards 
Nonword 
repetition 
Verbal IQ Years of 
education 
Low AQ 7.42 (1.31) 5.26 (1.41) 20.32 (3.96) 102.32 (5.70) 13.68 (2.34) 
High AQ 7.47 (1.22) 5.47 (1.39) 20.53 (3.02) 106.32 (6.33) 14.32 (2.21) 
AQ = Autism-Spectrum Quotient.    
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4.5 Discussion 
 This study investigated the influence of vocal emotional prosody on word learning ability in 
neurotypical adults with higher or lower levels of autism-like traits. It was first hypothesised that, 
for all participants, words spoken with emotional prosody, particularly negative emotional prosody, 
would be learned more effectively than words spoken with neutral prosody. The results did not 
support this hypothesis. However, the hypothesis that those participants with high AQ scores would 
be less affected by the emotional information than those with low AQ scores was supported.  
Overall, emotional information resulted in interference to word learning processes. Much of 
the previously discussed research showing that emotional information facilitates learning and 
memory (Berman et al., 2013; Eden et al., 2015; Hooker et al., 2008) have utilised tasks which 
require explicit association of the novel stimuli with emotion. Thus an attentional bias toward 
emotional information in these tasks was beneficial for linking the novel stimuli with that 
information. However, in the current study, there was no benefit of attending to the emotional 
information presented in the task. There is evidence to suggest that emotion can interfere with the 
processing of unrelated stimuli via the modulation of attention (Anderson & Shimamura, 2005; 
Christianson, 1992; Touryan et al., 2007), which may explain the negative impact of emotional 
prosody on word learning in the present study.  
The attentional narrowing hypothesis (Christianson, 1992) suggests that automatic attention 
toward emotional information reduces the processing of irrelevant and non-central information. In 
support of this, Anderson and Shimamura (2005) presented participants with short video clips 
which were emotionally positive, negative, or neutral in nature, and which were accompanied by 
voice clips saying neutral words. Participants were then tested on their memory for the words they 
heard. Performance was worse for words which were played during the negative video clips 
compared to the other clips. Similarly, Touryan et al. (2007) presented participants with negative 
emotional images and neutral images, each paired with an unrelated object. Participants were then 
tested for their memory of the images and the associations between the images and the objects. 
Memory was better for negative emotional images compared to neutral images; however, the 
associations with the objects were remembered worse when the image was negative. The results of 
both Anderson and Shimamura (2005) and Touryan et al. (2007) suggest that negative information 
captures attention to a greater degree than neutral information, but that this serves as a distraction to 
associating the stimuli with non-emotional stimuli. These studies are distinct from previously 
discussed work suggesting a memory advantage for emotional information when the emotion is 
relevant and central to the task (e.g., Berman et al., 2013; Hooker et al., 2008; Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003; Kousta et al., 2009). Thus, evidence suggests that task design has a critical influence on the 
impact of emotional information on performance. In the current study, it can be argued that the 
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emotional prosody in which the words were spoken had no relevance to the word itself and its 
association with a given alien. Thus, the emotional prosody captured attention in such a way that 
distracted from the task of associating the words with aliens and that hindered learning 
performance.  
In regard to particular emotions, learning was worse for words spoken with a fearful 
prosody relative to words with happy or neutral prosody across recall phases, whereas recall 
performance for words spoken with happy prosody was worse than those spoken with neutral 
prosody in only the final recall phase of the task. Thus, the emotional interference effect was 
particularly evident for the fearful condition, suggesting a stronger attentional bias toward negative 
information in this particular paradigm. This finding supports the negativity bias found in previous 
research, and the view that it is more advantageous for survival to attend quickly to negative 
emotional information than to positive information (Kuperman, 2013; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). 
It is interesting to consider the implications of these findings in the context of word learning. This 
study is unique in investigating the influence of emotional information on word learning, and yet it 
may be expected that varied degrees of emotional prosody are naturally present during everyday 
speech. Therefore it is logical to expect that some type of emotional prosody is often naturally 
present in circumstances of new word learning. The current findings are the first to suggest that 
consideration should be given to the emotional context within which language learning occurs. It 
would be interesting to investigate the effects of a broader range of emotions.  
Pertaining to the second hypothesis, emotional prosody had a differing influence on the 
recall performance in those with higher or lower levels of autism-like traits. The interference effect 
found in the fearful condition was evident for all participants; however, performance in the happy 
condition was lower than neutral only for those with lower levels of autism-like traits. The findings 
of the current study are consistent with observations suggesting a reduced emotion bias in 
individuals with ASD (Beversdorf et al., 1998; Deruelle et al., 2008; Thurman et al., 2015), and 
extend on this research by showing that word learning is impaired by positive emotional 
information in neurotypical adults with lower levels of autism-like traits but not those with higher 
levels of autism-like traits. This research can inform our understanding of the underlying 
characteristics of ASD and the BAP (Landry & Chouinard, 2016), and suggests that a weaker 
emotion bias is related to the BAP and may be either a consequence of autism-like traits, or an 
underlying factor. The lack of difference between the groups in the fearful condition supports the 
notion that fearful stimuli capture attention more strongly than happy stimuli. The attentional bias 
toward this information was just as strong regardless of the level of autism-like traits. It would be 
interesting to determine in future research the comparative performance of individuals with ASD in 
this paradigm. Further, it may be important to determine whether similar influences of emotional 
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prosody on word learning would be observed in children, as childhood is a more critical period for 
language development and therefore such research could have wide implications. 
The recognition task revealed close to ceiling performance, particularly in the happy and 
neutral conditions. This is an unsurprising finding given that this task was completed after five 
learning and recall sequences, and recognition involves less cognitive effort than recall (Anderson 
& Bower, 1972). However, in revealing less accurate and slower performance for the fearful 
condition compared to the happy and neutral conditions, the recognition results further support the 
notion that fearful information demands greater attention than happy information. The simplicity of 
the recognition task can explain the lack of effects for the happy condition, as well as the lack of 
difference between levels of autism-like traits.  
4.5.1 Conclusion 
Overall, this research implies that emotional information can interfere with the processes 
involved in new word learning. We argue that this interference is due to increased attention being 
allocated to the emotional properties of the stimuli, which distract away from other properties of the 
stimuli. The results of this study demonstrate that, for neurotypical adults who have low levels of 
autism-like traits, words spoken with happy emotional prosody are more difficult to learn than 
words spoken with neutral prosody. However, those with higher levels of autism-like traits do not 
show difficulty learning happy sounding words relative to neutral words, and thus are suggested to 
attend less to emotional signals. Potential relationships between such findings and symptoms of 
alexithymia could be considered in future research. Despite this difference with happy sounding 
words, all participants showed greater difficulty learning words spoken with fearful emotional 
prosody compared to words spoken with neutral prosody. This finding suggests that fearful 
information captures attention in neurotypical adults regardless of individual sensitivity to emotion 
or level of autism-like traits. 
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Chapter 5. Effects of Emotional Cues on Novel Word Learning in Typically Developing 
Children in Relation to Autism-Like Traits 
 
Chapter 4 showed that emotional prosody interferes with adults‟ ability to learn new words. 
However, those with higher levels of autism-like traits were less affected than those with lower 
levels of autism-like traits. Specifically, those with lower levels of autism-like traits recalled fewer 
words which were spoken with a happy and fearful prosody compared to words with neutral 
prosody. In contrast, only the fearful prosody interfered with word learning relative to both happy 
and neutral prosody for those with higher levels of autism-like traits. These results suggest that 
reduced automatic attention toward emotion may be related to the broader autism phenotype. 
Chapter 5 explored the influence of emotional prosody, facial expressions, and adjectives on word 
learning ability in school-aged children who had low or high levels of autism like traits. Word 
learning performance was measured in addition to eye-tracking measures to explore visual attention 
during the task.  
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5.1 Abstract 
Emotion interacts with cognition, and can influence attention, memory, learning, and language 
processing. Communication with children often involves exaggerated emotional expressions and 
descriptive language, such as the use of emotional adjectives. Children with autism spectrum 
disorder often show a reduced tendency to attend to emotional information. The current study aimed 
to examine the influence of emotional prosody, facial expressions, and adjectives, on the ability of 
typically developing children with low or high levels of autism-like traits to learn new words. 
Children aged 7 to 9 years were required to learn the nonsense word names of nine novel toys, 
which were presented with either happy, fearful, or neutral emotional cues. Eye-tracking technology 
determined the time children spent looking at the speaker compared to the object while learning the 
words, and children‟s parents completed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient: Child‟s version. Emotional 
cues had no influence on word recognition or recall performance, and performance did not differ 
between the children with low and the children with high levels of autism-like traits. Eye-tracking 
data showed that the children with higher levels of autism-like traits looked more at the objects, and 
less at the face, when they were presented with happy cues compared to fearful cues. In contrast, the 
children with lower levels of autism-like traits looked less at the objects when they were presented 
with happy or fearful cues, compared to neutral cues. The findings suggest that the influence of 
emotion on attention during word learning differs according to whether the children have lower or 
higher levels of autism-like traits, but this influence does not affect word learning outcomes. 
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5.2 Introduction 
The ability to recognise and decode the emotional expressions of others is a vital component 
of human communication and learning and the understanding of emotion develops throughout 
childhood. Overall, evidence suggests that children can first differentiate between general positive 
and negative emotions, and then gradually identify more specific categories of emotion as they get 
older (Widen, 2013). For instance, children tend to recognise emotional expressions such as 
happiness, sadness and anger earlier than they recognise expressions such as disgust and surprise 
(Sauter et al., 2013; Vicari et al., 2000).  
Emotional recognition and understanding appear to vary depending on a range of individual, 
familial, and environmental factors. For example, emotional understanding is related to better 
language ability and theory of mind skills, more secure attachment, being female, more discussion 
about feelings within the family, higher quality of family interactions, and higher parental education 
and status of occupation (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Dunn & Cutting, 1999). Additionally, children 
with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often display delays or deficits in their ability to decode 
and respond to emotional information (e.g., Dawson et al., 2004). Even adults who show “autism-
like” traits, but do not meet a diagnosis for ASD, show differences in their recognition of emotion 
(e.g., Hosokawa et al., 2015; Ingersoll, 2010; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012). However, the 
extent to which autism-like traits relate to emotion processing in childhood is unknown.   
Research suggests that emotional information is attended to and processed more efficiently 
than other types of information (e.g., Hinojosa et al., 2010). Consequently, perceiving emotional 
stimuli has been shown to influence cognitive processes, such as attention, memory, and learning, in 
typical children. For example, children are better able to remember emotional stories and emotional 
details from stories compared to non-emotional stories and details (Bergen et al., 2015; 
Christodoulou & Burke, 2016; Davidson et al., 2001), and can remember events better when they 
are associated with emotion (Leventon & Bauer, 2016). Recent work in the fields of education and 
neuroscience show that the experience and perception of emotion can have complex and profound 
impacts on learning processes. Emotion processing recruits areas of the brain which are also 
involved in other cognitive processes, such as memory and reasoning. Therefore, emotion should be 
considered and used appropriately to facilitate learning in children (Immordino-Yang, 2016; Tyng 
et al., 2017).    
When adults communicate with infants, they often express exaggerated emotions in their 
facial expressions and tone of voice (i.e., prosody). Infant-directed speech has similar qualities to 
highly emotional adult-directed speech, and is thought to serve a primary function of 
communicating emotional information to infants (Trainor et al., 2000). Research shows that infant-
directed speech is important for facilitating language learning in early life (Floccia et al., 2016; 
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Nelson, Hirsh-Pasek, Jusczyk & Cassidy, 1989). This is primarily attributed to the properties of 
infant-directed speech, which assist infants to appropriately segment continuous speech into 
meaningful units. However, it is possible that emotional prosody and its attention capturing effects 
might also play a role in aiding language acquisition. Further, how prosody influences language 
learning in later childhood is yet to be explored, despite evidence that older children regularly view 
exaggerated expressions (Holodynski, 2004).  
Multiple factors can influence the process of acquiring new words in childhood. Children 
have the ability to learn new words for new objects even after hearing the word just once; a process 
known as fast mapping. The ability to learn the words can be impacted by the level of familiarity of 
the objects, the semantic context (such as other descriptive information about the objects), and 
social cues like eye gaze (Brady & Goodman, 2014; Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Halberda, 2006). In 
relation to emotion, Singh, Morgan and White (2004) showed that infants preferred listening to 
happy sounding voices over neutral voices. However, happy voices provided no advantage to the 
recognition of new words. Similarly, Clement, Bernard, Grandjean and Sander (2013) showed that 
children preferred to learn words from a happy face rather than an angry face, although it is unclear 
whether such emotional context influences the ability to learn words. Children can use emotional 
information appropriately as a referent for determining correct associations between objects and 
words, for example associating a word spoken with sad prosody with sad faces or something broken 
(Berman et al., 2013; Herold et al., 2011). However, the influence of emotional information on 
word learning ability, when the emotion is not used as referential information (i.e., emotional cues 
which have no direct relevance to the object or the context) remains undetermined, despite the 
tendency of adults to speak to infants in exaggerated emotional tones regardless of the context 
(Trainor et al., 2000). Therefore, research is needed to determine the influence emotion may have 
on language learning (for a review on this issue, see Doan, 2010). Additionally, there is variability 
among individuals in the processing and understanding of emotions, particularly when considering 
individuals with ASD (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Dawson et al., 2004). Children with ASD also often 
have impaired or delayed language, and this can include deficits in both receptive and expressive 
single word vocabulary (Boucher, 2012). Thus, an investigation of whether emotion influences 
language learning should consider potential individual differences in these processes. 
5.2.1 Emotion and Language in ASD 
Children with ASD perceive emotional faces differently to typically developing children. 
For example, children with ASD look more to the mouth than the eyes (Klin et al., 2003), and they 
are less likely to spontaneously match faces based on similar emotional expressions than they are to 
match faces based on other features (e.g., similar physical features such as wearing glasses; Begeer 
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et al., 2006). A prominent theory in the literature suggests that language impairments in ASD can be 
explained by the socio-emotional-communicative impairments that are characteristic of ASD, 
including reduced attention toward social stimuli such as faces and voices (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997; Boucher, 2012). However, higher nonverbal IQ has been found to be associated with better 
language outcomes in ASD children, suggesting that they may be using compensatory mechanisms, 
such as high rote learning ability, to learn words (Prizant, 1983). Therefore, while such children 
may seem similar in their language learning ability to typical children, impairments may become 
evident when considering the links between social information and word learning. For example, 
children with ASD may not show the same preference for learning words from emotional faces and 
voices as typical children do (Clement et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2004).  
A number of studies have used eye-tracking to determine the degree to which children with 
ASD use social cues to learn words. Norbury et al. (2010) found that children with ASD looked less 
at a speaker‟s face when they spoke a new word, compared to typically developing children. 
Despite this, children with ASD were better able to recall the words than typically developing 
children, although they were less able to describe features of the object associated with the word. 
Norbury and colleagues suggested that the children with ASD showed superior memorisation ability 
which acted as a compensatory strategy for learning the words, as opposed to typically developing 
children who used social cues to associate words with meaning. Further, Tenenbaum et al. (2014) 
found that both children with ASD and typically developing children who looked more to a 
speaker‟s face (mouth and eyes) during a word learning task recognised the words faster than those 
who look to the speaker‟s face relatively less. This finding suggests that attending to social 
information can facilitate word learning. 
 Children with ASD generally perform similarly to typical children when making associative 
pairings between a label and an object, although they perform worse when social cues (e.g., gaze 
direction) are necessary for determining object-word pairings, and do not benefit from social 
feedback in the same way as typically developing children (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Bedford et 
al., 2013; Norbury et al., 2010). When required to use emotional cues as a referent to guide object-
word associations during a task measuring fast mapping ability, children with ASD did not learn the 
words as accurately as typically developing children. This finding suggests that children with ASD 
do not attend to or process the emotional information as effectively (Thurman et al., 2015). 
Eye-tracking technology has also been used to inform theories of facial and emotion 
processing more generally in children with ASD; however, there have been mixed findings. Some 
studies have shown that children with ASD tend to look less at faces compared to typically 
developing children (Tsang, 2016). Nuske, Vivanti and Dissanayake (2014) showed that children 
with ASD looked less at neutral faces compared to typically developing children, although children 
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with ASD and typically developing children looked an equal amount at fearful faces. This finding 
suggests that the presence of an emotional expression helps to capture the attention of children with 
ASD relative to neutral faces. However, when looking at emotional faces, children with ASD tend 
to focus on different areas of the face compared to typically developing children. For instance, 
Johnels and colleagues (2017) found that typically developing children looked more at the mouth of 
happy faces compared to other emotions, but children with ASD did not. This finding suggests that 
emotional faces have differential impacts on the attention of children with ASD, compared to 
typically developing children. 
5.2.2 Emotion, Language, and the Broader Autism Phenotype 
Individuals with a diagnosis of ASD are theorised to represent an extreme end of a spectrum 
of traits which vary amongst the entire population. Those who present with higher levels of autism-
like traits but do not meet the criteria for a clinical diagnosis for ASD are considered to make up 
what is termed the “broader autism phenotype” (BAP; Piven et al., 1997). Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001) developed the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) to measure the 
degree of autism-like traits in the general population. Regarding emotion processing, using the AQ 
with typical populations can provide insight into how emotion processing varies as a function of 
autism-like traits, and progresses understanding of the BAP. Having a deeper understanding of the 
BAP can aid with understanding the complexities of ASD, such as aetiologies and risk factors. 
Among adult populations, differences in the processing of emotion have been observed according to 
individual differences in autism-like traits, such that those with higher levels of traits show less 
proficient recognition of emotional facial expressions and cues (Hosokawa et al., 2015; Ingersoll, 
2010; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012). Although the AQ has been adapted to measure autism-
like traits in children (AQ-Child; Auyeung et al., 2008), this measure has not been explored with 
respect to individual differences in emotion processing in childhood, or differences in language 
learning, despite demonstrated differences in these abilities in children with ASD.  
West, Copland, Arnott, Nelson and Angwin (2017; Chapter 4) conducted a word learning 
study with adults in which nonsense words for novel objects were presented with happy, fearful, 
and neutral prosody, which was irrelevant to the novel objects. Participants were required to learn 
the words within a single session, and were measured for their autism-like traits using the AQ. 
Results showed that word recognition accuracy was poorer for words presented with fearful 
prosody compared to words presented with neutral prosody for all participants, suggesting that non-
referential emotional cues interfere with word learning processes for adults, potentially due to the 
emotional prosody being distracting. Further, individuals with lower levels of autism-like traits also 
had poorer performance learning words spoken in a happy voice compared to words spoken in a 
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neutral voice, suggesting that these individuals were more susceptible to this interference. This 
finding supports evidence that those with higher levels of autism-like traits process emotion less 
efficiently (Hosokawa et al., 2015; Ingersoll, 2010; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012). However, 
given the research outlined regarding emotion processing and word learning in both typically 
developing children and children with ASD, it is important to investigate when and how emotional 
information influences word learning throughout development. 
The current study aimed to address the question of whether non-referential emotional 
information influences word learning in childhood, and how this might differ for children with 
higher or lower levels of autism-like traits. Eye-tracking was utilised during a word learning task to 
determine whether visual attention toward a speaker versus a novel object interacts with autism-like 
traits, emotion, and word learning performance. Emotional information conveyed by the speaker 
included facial expressions, prosody, and emotional adjectives (e.g., “lovely”, “scary”). It was 
expected that children would learn new words differently if they were presented with emotional 
information compared to neutrally presented words. The direction of the influence of emotion on 
word learning was difficult to predict; however, emotional information enhances general learning 
for children and social information is valuable in word learning (Boucher, 2012; Immordino-Yang, 
2016; Tyng et al., 2017). Therefore, it was hypothesised that emotionally presented words would be 
learned better than neutrally presented words. Further, it was expected that children with higher 
levels of autism-like traits, as indicated by higher scores on the AQ-Child (Auyeung et al., 2008), 
would be less affected by emotional cues during word learning, such that they would show no 
difference in word learning performance between emotionally and neutrally presented words.  
In regard to eye gaze, we expected that children would fixate more on the face of the 
speaker, and less on the object, when an emotion was being expressed compared to when 
expressions were neutral. However, children with higher AQ-Child scores were expected to show a 
similar pattern of eye gaze on faces and objects for both emotional and neutral conditions. 
Additionally, we expected that children with higher AQ-Child scores would fixate less on the face 
overall, and more on the object, in comparison to children with lower AQ-Child scores. Finally, 
given evidence showing that attention toward social cues can influence word learning (Brady & 
Goodman, 2014; Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Halberda, 2006; Tenenbaum et al., 2014), we investigated 
the relationships between eye-gaze and learning performance in each emotion condition. We 
expected that children who looked more at the face of the speaker would be more influenced by 
emotional cues when learning words.  
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5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Participants 
A total of 66 children participated in the study. Of these, eight were excluded from analysis 
due to having a diagnosis of a developmental or neurological disorder (4), being bilingual (3), or 
having missing data (1). Additionally, parents completed the Children‟s Communication Checklist, 
2
nd
 ed. (CCC-2; Bishop, 2006) to check for communication difficulties. Eight children were 
excluded for having CCC-2 scores which indicated potential language impairment or ASD (Global 
Communication Composite score <55 in combination with either scaled scores <5 on the social 
relationships and interests subscales, or a Social Interaction Deviance Composite score of ≤ -15; 
Bishop, 2006), and two were excluded for incomplete forms. Thus, data from 48 participants (26 
male), aged 7 to 9 years (M = 7.89) were included in the behavioural analyses. Participants were 
recruited via a research database managed by the University of Queensland‟s School of Psychology 
Early Cognitive Development Centre. Families in this database are predominantly middle- to high-
income and Caucasian. All children attended mainstream schooling and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and hearing. Four children were left-handed. Written informed consent was obtained 
from parents/guardians prior to participation, along with verbal assent from children.  
5.3.2 Assessments 
As described in Chapter 3, the Autism-Spectrum Quotient: Children‟s version (AQ-Child; 
Auyeung et al., 2008) was used to measure autism-like traits, and the Assessment of Children‟s 
Emotional Skills (ACES; Schultz et al., 2004) was used to measure general emotional 
understanding. The AQ-Child determines the degree to which a child displays traits similar to those 
with a diagnosis of ASD. Parents indicate their level of agreement with 50 statements using a 4-
point Likert-type response scale. Each item is scored from 0-3 depending on the degree to which the 
response endorses an autism-like trait. Thus, possible total scores range from 0-150, with lower 
scores indicating lower levels of autism-like traits.  
The ACES includes three subtests designed to assess children‟s identification of emotion 
from expressions, behaviours, and situations. Children are asked to determine whether an individual 
is feeling happy, angry, sad, or scared from images of faces or short scenarios describing behaviours 
or situations. Scores are determined by the sum of items answered accurately across the three 
subtests, with possible scores ranging from 0-56.  
5.3.3 Stimuli 
5.3.3.1 Images. Stimuli included images of nine distinct novel objects for the learning trials 
and nine alternate versions of the stimuli for the generalisation trials, selected from the Novel 
Object and Unusual Name (NOUN) database, 2
nd
 edition (Horst & Hout, 2014), which consists of 
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images of unusual toys for which no known name exists. Objects which had available images of 
alternate versions (i.e., different colours) for use in the generalisation portion of the current study 
were chosen from the database. Object images were arranged into three groups to be randomly 
allocated to the three emotional conditions. The groups were formed to ensure that objects within a 
group were different colours, and general shape of the object (round or vertical) was balanced 
between the groups. In addition, eight images of familiar objects (e.g., balloon, shovel) were used 
for practice trials. 
5.3.3.2 Words. Nine nonsense words were sourced from a list on the NOUN database, 
which is compiled from previous childhood word learning research (Horst & Hout, 2014). All 
chosen nonsense words were two syllables long and had different onset letters (e.g., “blicket” and 
“modi”). Nonsense words were arranged into three groups to be randomly allocated to the three 
emotional conditions. The words within a group differed in their second letter and offset sounds, to 
ensure that each word was distinct within a given condition. 
5.3.3.3 Videos. A trained actress, holding a framed picture of an object, and stating a 
sentence using each of the nonsense words with happy, fearful, or neutral emotional cues was 
filmed for the learning trials. Images of the object stimuli were superimposed onto the frame in the 
video using Adobe After Effects software, such that it appeared that the actress was holding a 
framed image of each object. In each video, the nonsense word was stated twice using the following 
script: “Look, it‟s a [nonsense word], what a/an [emotional adjective] [nonsense word]”.  
There were three emotional conditions: happy, fearful, and neutral. For the happy condition, 
the emotional adjective “lovely” was used, along with a happy facial expression and prosody. For 
the fearful condition, the emotional adjective “scary” was used, with a fearful facial expression and 
prosody. Finally, for the neutral condition, the adjective “ordinary” was used, with a neutral face 
and voice. The actress generally maintained eye contact with the camera, but looked to the object 
each time she said the nonsense word. All videos were 10 seconds in duration. Each subgroup of 
three nonsense words was paired with each set of three objects and presented in each emotion 
condition, which resulted in 27 videos to be split over three experiment versions (see Table 5.1). 
Thus, each version of the experiment consisted of nine videos, three from each emotion condition, 
and with each video paired with a different novel object. Participants were randomly assigned to 
experiment versions. 
To validate the emotional expressions, the 27 videos were presented to 21 undergraduate 
psychology students (Mage = 18.62 years, SDage = 1.96 years) who rated the level of happiness, fear, 
anger, and sadness presented in each video on 7-point Likert scales (1 = slightly, 7 = very much). 
The anger and sadness scales were included to ensure that the videos did not unintentionally reflect 
these emotions. Participants were also given the option to select “neutral” if they felt that no 
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emotion was expressed. To be considered a valid reflection of happy or fearful emotions, videos 
had to receive a rating of 5 or above on the appropriate emotion scale by the majority of participants 
(>50%), and at the same time, not receive a rating of 5 or above on any other emotion by more than 
20% of participants. Similarly, neutral videos were considered valid if the majority of participants 
(>50%) selected the “neutral” option, and the video was not rated as 5 or above on any emotion by 
more than 20% of participants. Results showed that each of the happy videos were rated 5 or above 
on the happy scale by at least 81% of participants (mean happy rating = 5.80), and none were rated 
5 or above on any other emotion. Fearful videos were each rated 5 or above on the fear scale by at 
least 71% of participants (mean fear rating = 5.68), and were not rated 5 or above on any other 
emotion by more than 14% of participants. For each neutral video, at least 55% of participants 
selected the “neutral” option, and videos were not rated 5 or above on any emotion by more than 
14% of participants. 
 
Table 5.1 
Counter-balanced experiment versions. 
 Fearful condition Happy condition Neutral condition 
Version 1 Word set 1  
+ object set 1 
Word set 2  
+ object set 2 
Word set 3 
+ object set 3 
Version 2 Word set 2 
+ object set 3 
Word set 3 
+ object set 1 
Word set 1 
+ object set 2 
Version 3 Word set 3 
+ object set 2 
Word set 1 
+ object set 3 
Word set 2 
+ object set 1 
 
 
5.3.4 Apparatus 
Children were seated at a 45cm viewing distance from a 22-inch computer screen, on which 
the task was displayed (1680 X 1050 px screen resolution). Eye gaze was measured using an SMI 
eye-tracker, with 120 hertz sampling rate. Areas of Interest (AOI) were specified for the face and 
the object. Eye movements were calibrated using a 5-point grid. Calibration was repeated if the 
error value was more than 1° on the x or y axis. A measure of Dwell Time (i.e., sum of time spent 
looking at a given AOI throughout each trail, measured in milliseconds) was used as the key 
dependent variable for eye-tracking analyses.   
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5.3.5 Procedure  
The task began with three recognition practice trials and three recall practice trials, to ensure 
children understood and could complete the tasks. In each recognition practice trial, four familiar 
objects were presented simultaneously on the computer screen and the children were given both 
written and verbal instructions to point to a target object (e.g., “Which one is the balloon?”). In each 
recall practice trial, one familiar object was presented at a time and children were asked to label 
each object by saying the name out loud.  
Following the training trials, eye movements were calibrated, and children were informed 
that they would be shown videos of a lady telling them the names of some strange toys, and that 
they should try and remember as many of the names as they could. There was a learning phase, in 
which all nine videos were played to the children in random order, followed by a recognition phase. 
In the recognition phase, each trial consisted of four objects presented simultaneously, and children 
were given written and verbal instruction to identify which object matched a particular nonsense 
word (e.g., “Which one is a Modi?”). The four images presented in each recognition trial included 
the target object, one other object from the same emotional condition, and one object from each of 
the other two emotional conditions. The order of trials was pseudorandomised to ensure that 
emotion conditions were evenly spread across the beginning, middle and end of the phase, that the 
target image appeared in each of the four positions a balanced number of times, and that the same 
emotion condition and target object position did not occur more than twice in succession. The 
experimenter live-scored the object to which the child pointed in each trial, and these were later 
scored for accuracy.  
Following the recognition phase, eye movements were re-calibrated, and the learning and 
recognition phases were repeated a second time, and then children completed two recall phases. The 
first recall phase was designed to assess unaided, free recall of the words. Children were presented 
with each object one at a time and asked to label them by saying the word out loud. In the second 
recall phase, children saw each object again one at a time, and the experimenter provided the first 
phoneme of each word as a prompt to aid recall for items which children could not label. In both 
recall phases, trials were pseudorandomised to ensure an even spread of the emotion conditions 
across the phase, and that the same emotion condition did not occur more than two trials in 
succession. The experimenter transcribed children‟s responses in each trial, which were later scored 
as correct if the word was pronounced entirely accurately or with just one inaccurate phoneme (e.g., 
“blickeb” was an acceptable variation of “blicket”). Responses with more than one inaccurate 
phoneme or omitted responses were scored as incorrect.   
Finally, there was a generalisation phase, which was identical to the recognition phases, 
except that alternate versions of the objects (i.e., different colours) were presented. The 
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generalisation phase was conceptually similar to the recognition phases in measuring the ability to 
recognise word-object associations, but determined whether these associations remained stable with 
altered versions of the same objects. Thus, the generalisation phase was included as a third 
recognition phase for analyses. Figure 5.1 displays the order of phases in the word learning task. 
Following completion of the task, the experimenter administered the ACES with children. Parents 
were given the AQ-Child and the CCC-2 to complete during testing.  
 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Procedure of word learning task.
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Behavioural Performance  
AQ-Child scores ranged from 19 to 81 (M = 50.42, SD = 16.70), and were not significantly 
different between genders (Mfemale= 53.09, SDfemale= 16.03; Mmale= 48.15, SDmale = 17.23; t(46) = 
1.02, p = .312).  Participants were split into high and low groups based on the median score of 48. 
As two participants scored 48, these participants and all those with a score under 48 formed the low 
AQ-Child group (n = 25, M = 36.96, SD = 9.08) and participants with a score of 49 or higher 
formed the high AQ-Child group (n = 23, M = 65.04, SD = 8.73). Age did not significantly differ 
between the high and low AQ-Child groups, t(46) = 0.61, p = .546. 
Both recognition and recall accuracy were calculated as the proportion correct out of the 
total number of trials for each emotion condition. Tests of skewness and kurtosis determined data to 
be normally distributed, as all values in each condition were within the acceptable limits of -2 and 
+2 (George & Mallery, 2010). 
5.4.1.1 Recognition. A 3 x 3 x 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed with 
phase (recognition 1, recognition 2, generalisation) and emotion (fear, happy, neutral) as within-
subjects factors, and AQ-Child (low, high) as a between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of phase, F(2, 92) = 21.35, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .317, such that accuracy was significantly 
improved in both the second recognition phase and the generalisation phase compared to the first 
recognition phase, t(47) = 5.29, p < .001, d = 0.73, 95% CI [0.25, 0.11]; t(47) = 5.42, p < .001, d = 
0.78, 95% CI [0.28, 0.13], respectively. There were no significant main or interactive effects of 
emotion or AQ-Child. Table 5.2 presents the means and standard deviations of proportional data in 
each recognition phase, within each emotional condition and AQ-Child group. 
 
Table 5.2 
Proportional recognition accuracy means (standard deviations in parenthesis) for each recognition 
phase as a function of emotion condition and AQ-Child group. 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Generalisation 
 Low AQ-
Child 
High AQ-
Child 
Low AQ-
Child 
High AQ-
Child 
Low AQ-
Child 
High AQ-
Child 
Happy 0.51 (0.35) 0.52 (0.28) 0.68 (0.33) 0.65 (0.34) 0.67 (0.39) 0.70 (0.36) 
Fear 0.62 (0.32) 0.47 (0.36) 0.79 (0.23) 0.74 (0.32) 0.79 (0.23) 0.74 (0.32) 
Neutral 0.52 (0.32) 0.58 (0.35) 0.79 (0.25) 0.64 (0.32) 0.77 (0.28) 0.77 (0.29) 
AQ-Child = Autism-Spectrum Quotient: Children’s version 
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5.4.1.2 Recall. Separate 3 x 2 mixed ANOVAs with emotion (fear, happy, neutral) as a 
within-subjects variable, and AQ-Child (low, high) as a between-subjects variable were conducted 
on free recall performance and prompted recall performance. Neither analysis showed significant 
main effects of emotion or AQ-Child, nor interactions. Table 5.3 presents the proportional means 
and standard deviations of recall accuracy for the free and prompted recall tasks, within each 
emotional condition and AQ-Child group. 
 
Table 5.3 
Proportional recall accuracy means (standard deviations in parenthesis) for free recall and 
prompted recall as a function of emotion condition and AQ-Child group. 
 Free recall Prompted recall 
 Low AQ-Child High AQ-Child Low AQ-Child High AQ-Child 
Happy 0.35 (0.33) 0.35 (0.40) 0.37 (0.33) 0.52 (0.38) 
Fear 0.29 (0.26) 0.35 (0.29) 0.44 (0.32) 0.43 (0.28) 
Neutral 0.28 (0.27) 0.39 (0.33) 0.43 (0.27) 0.55 (0.28) 
AQ-Child = Autism-Spectrum Quotient: Children’s version 
 
5.4.2 Eye-Tracking Analyses 
Twenty-two participants were excluded from the initial eye-tracking analyses due to 
technical error (7), the eye tracker recording less than 60% of the trials (4), or being poorly 
calibrated as determined by an error value greater than 2° on the x or y axis at either the first or 
second time point (i.e., before each exposure to the videos; 11 participants). This left 26 participants 
in the analysis of dwell time, in which a 4-way ANOVA was performed, with phase (1, 2), AOI 
(face, object), and emotion (fear, happy, neutral) as within-subjects variables, and AQ-Child (low, 
high) as a between-subjects variable. The AQ-Child groups were determined by a median split of 
scores of the subset of participants included in the analysis (Mdn = 43.5), resulting in 13 
participants in the low AQ-Child group (M = 32.69, SD = 8.49), and 13 participants in the high AQ-
Child group (M = 62.23, SD = 12.45).  
The ANOVA revealed no main effect of phase (F(1, 24) = 1.70, p = .205, ns), and a 
significant interaction between phase and AOI, F(1, 24) = 10.43, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .303. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the object was looked at for significantly less time in phase two 
compared to phase one, t(25) = 3.77, p = .001, d = 0.74, 95% CI [354.67, 1211.44], but there was no 
difference in time spent looking at the face between the phases, t(25) = 0.46, p = .651, ns. As phase 
did not significantly interact with emotion or AQ-Child, the phases were then collapsed and data 
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from the 10 participants who were poorly calibrated in only one phase were included in the 
subsequent analysis, increasing the sample size to 36 (18 per AQ-Child group, Mdn = 47; MlowAQ = 
36.06, SDlowAQ = 9.07; MhighAQ = 63.56, SDhighAQ = 10.34). For those who were well calibrated in 
both phases, average dwell times to each AOI across the two phases were calculated. For those who 
were only well calibrated in one phase, only dwell time data from one phase were used.  
A 2 (AOI) x 3 (emotion) x 2 (AQ-Child) ANOVA revealed a main effect of AOI, F(1, 34) = 
18.63, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .354, such that the object was looked at for significantly longer than the face, 
t(35) = 4.26, p < .001, d = 0.71, 95% CI [490.72, 1383.78]. Additionally, there was an interaction 
between AOI and emotion, F(2, 68) = 7.43, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .179, and an interaction between AQ-
Child, AOI, and emotion, F(2, 68) = 7.24, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .176. Separate 2-way (AOI x emotion) 
ANOVAs were then performed for each AQ-Child group (see Figure 5.2). Both groups revealed a 
main effect of AOI (Low AQ-Child F(1, 17) = 13.61, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .445; High AQ-Child F(1, 17) 
= 5.33, p = .034, ηp
2
 = .239), with object looked at for longer than face, t(17) = 3.69, p = .002, d = 
0.87, 95% CI [729.71, 1944.60]; t(17) = 2.31, p = .034, d = 0.54, 95% CI [54.95, 1219.74], 
respectively. Additionally, both the low and high AQ-Child groups showed an interaction between 
AOI and emotion, F(2, 34) = 5.88, p = .006, ηp
2
 = .257; F(2, 34) = 8.78, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .340, 
respectively. Pairwise comparisons of emotion condition at each level of AOI were conducted for 
each AQ-Child group. 
In the low AQ-Child group, there were no differences in looking time towards the face 
between emotion conditions, although the object was looked at for significantly longer in the 
neutral condition compared to the two emotional conditions: fear, t(17) = 2.67, p = .016, d = 0.63, 
95% CI [117.34, 1003.18]; happy, t(17) = 2.36, p = .030, d = 0.56, 95% CI [56.49, 1008.23]. 
Looking time toward the object did not differ between the happy and fear conditions.  
In the high AQ-Child group, the face was looked at for longer in the fear condition 
compared to the happy condition, t(17) = 3.00, p = .008, d = 0.71, 95% CI [90.82, 523.21], but 
neither emotional condition differed from neutral. In addition, the object was looked at for 
significantly longer in the happy condition compared to the fear condition, t(17) = 4.40, p < .001, d 
= 1.04, 95% CI [406.48, 1156.27]. However, looking time toward the object in the neutral condition 
did not differ from either the fear or happy conditions.  
5.4.3 Correlations 
Pearson bivariate correlation analyses were performed to determine the relationships 
between dwell time toward face and object and recall and recognition performance in each AQ-
Child group. In the low AQ-Child group, recall performance for the happy condition was positively 
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correlated with looking at the face in the happy condition, r = 0.63, p = .005. In the high AQ-Child 
group, there were no correlations between eye gaze and performance. 
Additionally, correlational analyses were conducted to determine whether there were 
relationships between individual factors (age, ACES score), recall and recognition performance, and 
dwell time data, collapsed across AQ-Child groups given that there were no differences between the 
groups on task performance. Age was not correlated with behavioural performance, but was 
positively correlated with overall looking time toward the face, r = 0.41, p = .012. ACES score was 
positively correlated with recall performance in the happy condition, r = 0.27, p = .041, but was not 
correlated with performance in the fear or neutral conditions, nor with any dwell time measures. 
Finally, age and ACES score were positively correlated with one another, r = 0.34, p = .041. 
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Figure 5.2 Mean dwell time (milliseconds), and standard error, for object and face looking in each emotion condition, separated into low and high 
groups based on Autism-Spectrum Quotient: Children‟s version (AQ-Child) score. 
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5.5 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to determine the influence of emotional cues on eye gaze patterns 
and word learning ability in typically developing school-aged children who varied in their level of 
autism-like traits. Children‟s ability to correctly match an object to a label was measured at two 
time points. Their ability to generalise their recognition to different coloured versions of the objects, 
and to label the objects in free recall and prompted recall tasks was also examined. In addition, eye-
tracking technology measured the duration of looking toward the object or toward the face of the 
speaker during learning.  
5.5.1 Behavioural Performance 
Contrary to predictions, neither recognition nor recall performance was affected by emotion 
or AQ-Child score. The behavioural results for recognition showed that performance increased in 
the second phase and generalisation phase compared to the first phase. This result shows that the 
children effectively learned to associate the nonsense words with the objects after two exposures to 
the videos, and were able to generalise these associations to altered versions of the objects. Recall 
performance was low overall, indicating general difficulty with this task.  
The lack of an effect of emotion on learning performance conflicts with previous research 
showing an impact of emotional information on memory and learning in childhood. Studies 
suggesting that memory is enhanced for emotional stories and events in children (Bergen et al., 
2015; Christodoulou & Burke, 2016; Davidson et al., 2001; Leventon & Bauer, 2016), and that 
emotion is important within education (Immordino-Yang, 2016; Tyng et al., 2017), all include 
emotional information which is meaningful or directly relevant to the individual or task. In this 
aspect, the current study is distinct from previous research, as the emotional information was not 
used as a referent and therefore was not directly relevant to task performance. Even in previous 
child word learning research which included emotional cues, the emotion was used as a referent for 
guiding associations (Berman et al., 2013; Herold et al., 2011; Thurman et al., 2015). The results of 
this study indicate that children under the age of 10 are not automatically influenced by non-
referential emotional cues when learning words. Further, this was the case for all children, and 
patterns of responses did not differ according to the child‟s level of autism-like traits.  
Studies with adults have shown that irrelevant emotional information interferes with word 
learning, particularly for those with lower levels of autism-like traits (West et al., 2017; Chapter 4). 
Thus, our findings highlight a potential age-related difference in the influence of non-referential 
emotional information on word learning, indicating that such an influence might develop after 9 
years of age. As the majority of language learning occurs in childhood, it is possible that learning 
mechanisms are less likely to be impeded in childhood than in adulthood. Further, these results 
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align with the findings of Singh et al. (2004) which showed that happy voices provided no 
advantage for infants‟ recognition of words. Therefore, it is possible that emotional cues may 
capture attention, but may not always influence word learning processes in infants and children. 
Future research should determine more explicitly the degree to which emotion is attended when it is 
peripheral to a task, perhaps by measuring whether the children remembered the emotion associated 
with each object (e.g., “Was this a lovely, scary, or ordinary object?”). Additionally, a delayed test 
of recognition and recall, perhaps on the following day, would be useful to determine whether 
emotional cues impacted word consolidation. Finally, research on the interactions between 
emotions and learning more broadly for children who have attention or learning difficulties is 
warranted.  
5.5.2 Eye-gaze Results 
In regards to eye-gaze, it was expected that children would fixate more on the face of the 
speaker and less on the object when an emotion was being expressed compared to when the speaker 
was neutral. However, children with higher autism-like traits were expected to show less difference 
in their eye gaze patterns between emotional and neutral conditions. The eye gaze results showed, 
firstly, that children looked for longer at the object than the face overall, suggesting that it was 
important for the object to be the primary focus of attention while forming word-object 
associations. It is noted that object looking reduced in the second phase compared to the first, which 
could reflect a potential shift in focus toward word memorisation rather than word-object 
association during the second exposure, perhaps due to improved familiarity with the objects.  
There were no overall differences in face and object looking time between the groups of 
children with low or high levels of autism-like traits, not supporting our hypothesis. In previous 
research showing that children with ASD looked less at a face compared to typically developing 
children during word learning (Norbury et al., 2010; Tenenbaum et al., 2014), the faces provided 
useful referential information (e.g., directional gaze). This is distinct from the current study as there 
was no ambiguity as to which object a word was associated with; therefore, facial information was 
less salient. Thus, fixating on the object appeared to be most useful. There were, however, 
differences between groups in the patterns of eye gaze for each emotional condition. 
The children with lower levels of autism-like traits showed the expected effect of looking 
less at objects in the emotional conditions compared to the neutral condition. This supports 
evidence suggesting that emotional information impacts attentional processes (Hinojosa et al., 2010; 
Singh et al., 2004; Tyng et al., 2017), as the primary focus on the object was lessened when 
emotional cues were presented for these children. However, this result did not coincide with looking 
more at the face in the emotional conditions. It is possible that the relatively shorter looking time 
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toward the face compared to the object caused differences in face looking to be less detectable. 
Alternatively, the distraction caused by the emotional cues may have led to a tendency to look away 
from relevant stimuli in the task. 
As expected, the eye gaze patterns of those with high levels of autism-like traits were 
distinct from those with relatively low levels of autism-like traits. There were no differences in time 
spent looking at the object or the face between the emotional conditions and the neutral condition. 
However, unexpectedly, gaze patterns differed between the two emotion conditions, such that the 
object was looked at less, and the face looked at more, in the fearful condition compared to the 
happy condition. This shows that, for those with higher levels of autism-like traits, there was a 
differential effect of valence in how the conditions affected visual attention. Specifically, negative 
emotional cues diverted attention away from the object and toward the face, positive emotional cues 
diverted attention away from the face and toward the object, and neutral cues did not impact 
attention towards the face or object differently to either emotion. One potential explanation is that 
the fearful faces may have involved more movement than the happy faces, prompting more face 
looking for children with higher levels of autism-like traits. This is consistent with previous 
findings that children with ASD look at moving parts of a face (i.e., the mouth) more than typically 
developing children (Klin et al., 2002; 2003). 
When considering whether emotion processing differences are responsible for the 
differences in visual attention between the groups with low and high levels of autism-like traits, it is 
interesting to note that the current findings are consistent with those of West et al. (2017; Chapter 
4). West et al. showed that both positive and negative emotional cues affected those with lower 
levels of autism-like traits similarly, and distinctly from neutral cues. However, those with higher 
levels of autism-like traits were affected differently by positive and negative cues. For the group 
with higher levels of autism-like traits, fearful cues attracted attention, thus reducing task 
performance, while happy cues did not. Differences in attention elicited by each type of emotion are 
also seen in our findings for the group with higher levels of autism-like traits. Thus, both studies 
suggest that, with regard to attention, fearful and happy emotions are processed differently by those 
with higher levels of autism-like traits, but similarly by those with lower levels of autism-like traits. 
It is evident that both fearful emotional cues and happy emotional cues impacted attention in 
different ways for individuals with high autism-like traits. This is a novel finding which should be 
explored further in future research. 
It is possible that children with higher levels of autism-like traits showed sensitivity to 
different emotion types in a word learning context due to processing demands. For instance, 
Wagner, Luyster, Tager-Flusberg and Nelson (2016) found that infant siblings of children with 
autism showed larger pupil sizes when looking at emotional faces compared to other infants. 
104 
 
Wagner and colleagues suggested that this result indicated greater reactivity and poorer ability to 
modulate responses to emotion in infants at higher risk of autism. It is possible that our results also 
indicate greater reactivity to emotional expressions for children with higher levels of autism-like 
traits. Perhaps the difference in processing for children with autism or high levels of autism-like 
traits lies in the ability to assess the relevance or importance of an emotional expression. This may 
result in heightened reactivity in subsequent approach or avoidance behaviour, but a lack of 
practical understanding. The children with lower levels of autism-like traits, however, while 
showing some attention bias toward emotion more generally, were better able to modulate their 
reactions to the type of emotion due to a greater understanding of the irrelevance of the cues in this 
context. Further research is warranted to explore the plausibility of this speculation.  
It was finally hypothesised that eye gaze would be related to the influence of emotion on 
learning, such that children who looked more at the face would be more influenced by the 
emotional cues. This hypothesis was partially supported among the children with lower levels of 
autism-like traits. This group showed a positive correlation between time spent looking at the face 
and recall performance, specifically for the happy condition. Thus, for these children, watching a 
speaker articulate a word is related to improved ability to produce that word. It is interesting that 
this relationship was apparent for the happy condition specifically. This may be explained by the 
tendency of typically developing children to look more toward to mouth of happy faces (Johnels et 
al., 2017). Additionally, the presence of this relationship only for the group with lower levels of 
autism-like traits supports evidence showing that children with ASD are less sensitive to social cues 
during word learning and use other mechanisms to learn words (Boucher, 2012; Norbury et al., 
2010). Further, the current study showed that increases in general emotional understanding (i.e., 
ACES score) were related to improved recall ability in the happy condition. Age also appears to be 
related to greater attention toward social cues, as results showed that looking time toward the face 
increased with age. Scores on the ACES test also improved with age, which supports previous 
findings that emotional identification gradually improves with age throughout childhood (Widen, 
2013).  
5.5.3 Conclusion 
Overall, our results indicate that emotional cues impact visual attention in children, and do 
so differently for children with low versus high levels of autism-like traits. However, with non-
referential emotional cues, even an impact on visual attention does not translate to behavioural 
differences in word learning performance at this age. It is possible that strong language learning 
abilities in childhood compensate for these attentional distractions. However, differences in 
attention toward emotion may accumulate across development and gradually lead to larger 
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differences in emotion processing and word learning. By adulthood, non-referential emotional cues 
impact word learning performance (West et al., 2017). Therefore, our findings suggest that such 
influence does not become apparent until after the age of 9 years. With regard to autism-like traits, 
it is possible that a wider range in the levels of autism-like traits is needed to capture potential 
behavioural differences, and future research should endeavour to include a broader range. It may be 
important within education to consider the impact of emotion on attention, and that greater 
reactivity to emotional information in childhood may be related to the underlying traits of autism. 
However, despite this consideration, language learning processes in childhood are resilient.  
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Chapter 6. General Discussion 
This thesis aimed to: 1) examine cross-modal emotion processing in both adults and children, 2) 
determine the interaction between emotion and language processes in both adults and children, and 
3) determine the relationship between emotion processing and the broader autism phenotype (BAP). 
These aims were addressed by conducting a series of studies with both children and adults 
investigating how differing levels of autism-like traits influences explicit cross-modal emotion 
recognition, and implicit emotion processing and its impact on language learning. The present 
chapter discusses the implications of the findings, firstly in relation to general emotion processing 
in typical individuals, and then in relation to implications for the BAP. Finally, limitations of the 
present research and potential future directions are discussed, along with the overall thesis 
conclusions.  
6.1 Emotion Processing in Typical Development 
6.1.1 Cross-Modal Integration 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined cross-modal emotion recognition in adults and children, in 
relation to autism-like traits. These studies particularly focused on the identification of emotion in 
speech and the voice, and how the processing of vocal emotional cues impacted or aligned with the 
recognition of emotion in faces. With adults, vocal expressions of emotion impacted the efficiency 
of recognising facial emotions, such that recognition was facilitated when vocal and facial emotions 
were congruent, and hindered when the emotions were incongruent. This study provided evidence 
that adults in general show a shared activation network of emotion from different modalities of 
input, supporting previous work in this area (Carroll & Young, 2005). The finding that even vocal 
expressions of emotion that are not explicitly attended to influence recognition of facial emotions 
suggests that different sources of emotional information can activate the same emotional concepts. 
This finding serves as a replication of previous evidence which has shown congruency effects when 
recognising emotions across modalities, such that congruent emotional inputs improve recognition, 
and incongruent emotions hinder recognition (e.g., de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Pell, 2005; Pell et 
al., 2011). These results strengthen our knowledge regarding the specialised processing of 
emotional information. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that children‟s ability to match emotional voices to emotional faces 
varied depending on the type of emotion. Specifically, angry and sad voices were more accurately 
matched to faces compared to fearful and happy voices. This evidence suggests that the ability to 
integrate emotional information from different modalities is underdeveloped at the ages of 7 to 9 
years, and is particularly dependent on the type of emotion being expressed. Based on our findings, 
it is possible that children of school age are prone to confusing valence and arousal. For instance, 
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they may be likely to mistake any arousing vocal emotional stimulus as being angry, as indicated by 
the common errors in pairing a happy voice with an angry face. The ability to distinguish the 
valence of highly arousing stimuli might gradually improve throughout development.  
Additionally, the ability to identify fearful information is known to develop gradually. In 
particular, the recognition of fearful emotions from the face has been shown to develop later than 
the recognition of happy, sad, and angry facial expressions (Vicari et al., 2000; Widen, 2013). This 
extends to other modalities of emotional expression. Indeed, Nelson, Hudspeth and Russell (2013) 
showed that children relied more on contextual and semantic information for identifying fearful 
expressions compared to both facial expressions and dynamic expressions which incorporated 
facial, vocal, and postural expressions of emotion. Further, children are more accurate up to at least 
7 years at identifying emotional faces with labels, rather than matching similar emotional cues 
(Russell & Widen, 2002). The findings from the current project support this existing research and 
suggest that, when recognising emotions, the ability to integrate information from voices and faces 
continues to develop throughout and beyond later childhood, particularly with regard to fearful 
expressions, which may be due to children‟s difficulties in distinguishing between different 
valences at similar levels of arousal. When considering the results of the adult study (Chapter 2), it 
is possible that the shared activation network for emotion strengthens over the course of 
development, being relatively weaker at the age of 9 years compared to adulthood. 
However, it is important to note the key differences in the approaches used between the 
adult (Chapter 2) and child (Chapter 3) studies. Firstly, the adult study utilised a priming paradigm 
to explore the implicit impact of emotional information from one modality on the explicit 
recognition of emotion in another modality, whereas the child study required explicit recognition of 
emotion from both modalities simultaneously. Therefore, the processes involved in each of these 
tasks were distinct, such that the adult study did not require effortful or purposeful integration of the 
two modalities, but rather examined the automatic overlap in emotion processing from sources 
which are processed distinctly on a sensory level, regardless of the attention given to them. On the 
other hand, children were required to consciously attend to the emotional cues presented by each 
modality and determine the appropriate matches with purposeful integration. Another difference 
between the paradigms was that, while adults were asked to identify whether or not an emotion was 
being expressed (using a yes/no response), children were required to distinguish between specific 
categories of emotion. Therefore, each study examined distinct levels or intricacies of explicit 
emotion recognition. Further, the adult study included a time demand and analysed results based on 
response latency, whereas children were free to answer at whatever speed they liked and responses 
were evaluated for accuracy. As such, the two tasks placed different cognitive demands upon 
participants. 
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Finally, perhaps the most conceptually relevant distinction is the difference between the 
stimuli used, specifically with regard to the vocal stimuli. In the adult study, the vocal stimuli were 
full sentences which conveyed emotion via either prosodic or semantic cues, or a combination of 
both. The cross-modal congruency effects found in this study were only apparent when the vocal 
stimuli combined prosodic and semantic emotional information, and not when emotion was 
expressed through either prosody or semantics alone. In contrast, the vocal stimuli used in the child 
study consisted of brief voice clips saying three-digit numbers, with emotion expressed through 
prosodic cues. There may therefore have been a divergence between adults and children in their 
ability to recognise emotion from the voice, due to differences in speech sample duration. For 
instance, Pell and Kotz (2011) demonstrated that the duration of speech needed to recognise an 
emotion varied depending on the type of emotion, such that fear and sadness could be recognised 
with shorter samples, and happiness and disgust required longer samples. In our research, the vocal 
stimuli in the child study were much shorter than the voices used in the adult study, which could 
have differentially impacted processing.  
Moreover, prosody alone did not activate shared emotion networks in the adult study, and 
the child study only included prosodic expressions of emotion. Previous evidence suggesting that 
children rely more on semantic or contextual information than prosody when recognising vocal 
emotions (Aguert et al., 2013; Morton & Trehub, 2001). Therefore, inferences regarding the 
development of vocal and cross-modal emotion processing from the current evidence are limited. 
Previous work on the ability of children and adults to recognise vocal expressions of emotion must 
be considered when making conclusions about the current pattern of findings (e.g., Nelson & 
Russell, 2011; Pell et al., 2009; Sauter et al., 2013; Wambacq & Jerger, 2004). What can be 
reasonably claimed from the current evidence is that the specific demands of each task provide 
insight into distinct cognitive mechanisms related to cross-modal emotion processing at different 
ages. Specifically, this evidence sheds light on the implicit activation of shared emotion networks in 
adults, and the effortful identification of similar emotions across modalities in children. While some 
broader inferences can be made with regard to the gradual development of cross-modal recognition 
and integration from childhood to adulthood, the two studies cannot be directly compared. 
6.1.2 Emotion, Language, and Learning 
It is firstly noted that the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3, while predominantly 
exploring cross-modal emotion recognition, also provide insight into effective communication of 
emotion through speech and language. In particular, Chapter 2 demonstrated that emotion delivered 
through speech is effectively processed by adults when there are both prosodic cues and semantic 
cues, even when the speech is not explicitly attended to. In contrast, speech which only portrays 
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emotion with prosodic or semantic cues is not processed with the same level of efficiency. Previous 
evidence demonstrates that emotion can be effectively processed and recognised from prosodic or 
semantic information alone (Pell et al., 2009; Wambacq & Jerger, 2004). However, given our 
findings, it is possible that the processing of emotion from either source requires specific attention 
toward such information. The current evidence suggests that when attention is diverted away from 
speech, emotional cues may not be processed unless conveyed with both prosody and semantics.  
When adults are specifically attending to speech, prosodic emotional cues (without semantic 
emotional cues) can influence language processing. Chapters 4 and 5 present studies which 
examined implicit processing of emotion in adults and children, focusing on the influence of 
emotional information on word learning ability and the relation to autism-like traits. For adults 
(Chapter 4), emotional prosody interfered with the ability to learn new words, such that fewer 
words were recalled when they had been spoken with emotional prosody compared to neutral 
prosody. This finding shows that the processing of emotional information occurs even when the 
emotion does not provide any referential information, and reflects an implicit attention bias toward 
emotion. This finding supports previous evidence showing the interconnectedness of emotion and 
other cognitive processes (e.g., Anderson & Shimamura, 2005; Christianson, 1992; Hinojosa et al., 
2010; Touryan et al., 2007). More specifically, our evidence suggests that emotional prosody which 
is not relevant to the context can be distracting and interfere with language processing and learning 
mechanisms in adults.  
For children (Chapter 5), the learning of words presented along with emotional cues was not 
enhanced or diminished relative to the learning of words presented with neutral cues. However, 
emotional cues impacted where children looked when presented with new words. These findings 
indicate that, while children attended to emotional and non-emotional cues differently, emotion did 
not impact language learning ability. This was the case despite the presence of multiple emotional 
cues from different modalities, including prosody, facial expression, and semantic information. 
Children have exceptionally strong learning mechanisms, learning vast amounts of information 
efficiently (Scott, 1962). Language in particular is typically learned effortlessly in typical 
childhood, which contrasts with the high level of cognitive effort required to learn language in 
adulthood (Birdsong, 1999). Therefore, it is possible that superior language learning mechanisms in 
childhood are reflected in the current series of study results. Previous evidence shows that children 
do have an attention bias toward emotion, demonstrated by improved memory for emotional 
information (Bergen et al., 2015; Christodoulou & Burke, 2016; Davidson et al., 2001; Leventon & 
Bauer, 2016). The current findings are consistent with this research, showing that visual attention 
was modulated by emotion. However, it is likely that dominant language learning processes were 
not affected by an emotional attention bias, particularly as the emotional cues were not directly 
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relevant for learning the words. For adults, on the other hand, an emotional attention bias dominated 
processing within the task, given that language learning requires relatively more effort in adulthood 
(Birdsong, 1999).    
Neuroimaging research shows that in very early stages in the time course of information 
processing, emotion is preferentially attended to and processed above all other information in most 
circumstances (Tyng et al., 2017). The eye gaze data in the current child learning study reflects this 
processing preference in showing different visual attention preferences across conditions of emotion 
and neutrality. Whether this preferential perceptual processing of emotion impacts later stages of 
processing likely depends on factors related to the subsequent meaning and usefulness ascribed to 
all available information. In the child study, emotional cues had little use in relation to the demands 
of the task, and learning processes became prioritised. Both the priming paradigm with adults in 
Chapter 2 and the word learning paradigm with adults in Chapter 4 demonstrate preferential 
processing of emotion in early perception. In both of these studies, emotional information impacted 
later processes, though not intentionally. It is possible that improved identification and 
understanding of emotion throughout development (Widen, 2013) coincides with stronger 
prioritisation of emotion regardless of its meaning or utility.    
The current findings do not imply that effective language learning, or any type of learning, 
should be devoid of emotion, or that emotion is inconsequential to learning in childhood. Rather, 
the findings add to growing literature indicating that emotion and learning interact in complex 
ways, warranting the consideration of emotional context within learning situations. Recent 
discussions in neuroscience and education speculate that emotion is a key component of learning 
and should be integrated in teaching methods (Tyng et al., 2017; Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 
2007). Evidence shows that there is a large degree of overlap and integration between the brain 
regions associated with emotion and with learning, including the amygdala, areas of the prefrontal 
cortex, and the hippocampus (Tyng et al., 2017). Immordino-Yang and Damasio (2007) present a 
model which portrays the extent of the overlap, depicting this “emotional thought” as responsible 
for the majority of both conscious and unconscious cognitive processes. This provides a 
neurological explanation for the impact of emotion on learning and memory, such that the processes 
involved in learning and memory may be mediated by emotional perception and experience.  
Immordino-Yang (2016) refers to work which describes effective learning processes as 
being a combination of focused states and reflective states. The default mode network (DMN) is a 
brain network which operates during general non-focused “default” thinking, or reflective or “mind-
wandering” states (Shulman et al., 1997). The DMN is often defined as an opposing set of processes 
to those which are active during focused goal-oriented states, such as during tasks involving 
learning. However, recent work suggests that DMN states are also important for learning and 
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consolidating information (Immordino-Yang, 2016; Raichle, 2015). Specific recognition of emotion 
from a set of external cues is likely to be a focused task which does not involve the DMN. It may be 
inferred that emotion influences learning when there is a complex interaction between DMN and 
non-DMN states, such that information processing requires focused attention, and internal affective 
states induce reflective and critical thinking which further aids information processing. Thus, 
emotional cues may be beneficial for learning when they are personally impactful and applicable to 
one‟s own affect. When emotional recognition is not relevant in this personal way, it does not 
activate any state different from the already focused state required for the learning task, and is 
therefore redundant, or potentially interfering if it diverts focus away from the task. As an 
explanation for the lack of influence of emotional cues on word learning for children in our 
research, this complements the explanation that language learning processes were dominant during 
the task for children, overriding the emotional attention bias. If emotion was incorporated in a 
personally relevant way, this would recruit the DMN into the learning process and potentially aid 
learning.  
The neurological and educational research and theories regarding the importance of emotion 
in learning mainly focus on internal emotional experiences. For instance, Immordino-Yang and 
Damasio (2007) discuss how information which is personally and emotionally relevant to an 
individual can trigger emotions which subsequently influence motivation to learn that information. 
Further, academic and occupational success is more strongly linked with social-emotional 
characteristics of individuals than with their general intelligence (Immordino-Yang, 2016). While 
some studies show that the perception of external emotions expressed by others can also impact 
learning (Berman et al., 2013; Eden et al., 2015; Herold et al., 2011; Hooker et al., 2008), our 
evidence suggests that relevance is key, whether that relevance be personal or relate directly to task 
goals.  
In word learning scenarios in which emotional cues are referential, word learning ability is 
aided by the emotional cues (Berman et al., 2013; Eden et al., 2015; Herold et al., 2011; Hooker et 
al., 2008). In contrast, when emotional cues are not referential, word learning ability can be 
negatively impacted, or not impacted at all, depending on age (Chapters 4 & 5). Thus, in regard to 
mechanisms of teaching, it is essential that emotion be integrated in a relevant and useful way. This 
allows for an attention bias toward emotion to be useful for either directing attention toward the 
necessary information, or linking personal meaning with the information and enhancing motivation. 
Not integrating emotion in this way and isolating factual knowledge from emotion, could be 
detrimental to learning processes long-term, by not accounting for the overlap between emotion and 
cognition. Immordino-Yang and Damasio (2007) take this further by describing the evolutionary 
origins of emotion and cognition interactions. These authors argue that emotion is fundamentally 
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tied to thinking and learning, as complex human cognition has evolved in concomitance with bodily 
states and sensations. Further, social and cultural interactions have been essential for human 
evolution, and thus the link between emotion and cognition not only refers to internal emotional 
states, but to the identification and interpretation of the emotions of others.  
6.2 BAP and Implications for autism spectrum disorders (ASD)  
A key component of the present research was the measurement of “autism-like” traits. ASD 
is a spectrum condition which includes variation in the degrees of clinical traits of those with a 
diagnosis, and it extends to variations of non-clinical levels of traits within the general population 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). The BAP encompasses those with relatively 
high, albeit non-clinical, levels of autism-like traits, which often includes first degree relatives of 
those with a diagnosis, as well as others (Bailey et al., 1996; Christensen et al., 2010; Piven et al., 
1997). Individuals with a diagnosis of ASD have shown differences in their expression, processing, 
recognition, and understanding of emotions, compared to those without a diagnosis of ASD (e.g., 
Begeer et al., 2008; Golan et al., 2006; Nuske et al., 2013). Some evidence has suggested that these 
differences may extend to the BAP (Hermans et al., 2009; Hosokawa et al., 2015; Ingersoll, 2010; 
Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012). The current PhD thesis aimed to shed further light on emotion 
processing within the BAP. Specifically, this thesis examined variations of autism-like traits in 
adults and children in relation to the integration of cross-modal emotional cues during explicit 
emotion recognition, and the implicit influence of emotional cues on language learning. 
Landry and Chouinard (2016) propose that the most effective way to understand the 
particular combinations of traits in those with ASD is to understand how these traits vary in the 
general population. Landry and Chouinard describe several benefits to examining the BAP. Firstly, 
there are practical benefits to examining autism traits in typical populations, such as the ability to 
obtain larger sample sizes, to utilise paradigms which might be difficult to administer with 
individuals with ASD, to control for ASD-related factors, such as co-morbidities and mental age, 
and to examine broader ranges of trait degrees and determine relationships between specific traits 
(rather than having a skewed degree of traits). Beyond these benefits, the examination of the BAP 
allows for the determination of factors which are unique to ASD in contrast with factors which are 
related more broadly to ASD traits. Determining such factors can aid in understanding the 
underlying aetiology of ASD or issues related purely to disordered levels of autism traits. For 
example, reduced IQ is found among many individuals with a diagnosis of ASD (albeit not all), but 
this is not related to the BAP (Szatmari et al., 1995). Therefore, it is likely that IQ has some unique 
relation to clinical levels of ASD traits, but not the traits more broadly. In contrast, visuospatial 
performance is high in individuals with a diagnosis of ASD, and also varies with degree of autism-
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like traits in the BAP (Fugard et al., 2011; Grinter et al., 2009; Stewart et al., 2009). Therefore, it is 
likely that this ability is not impacted directly by extreme levels of autism traits, but is related to 
autism traits more broadly. Landry and Chouinard liken the study of the BAP for understanding 
ASD to the study of animal behaviour for understanding human behaviour, such that BAP research 
is a useful accompaniment to, and framework for, ASD research. Moreover, including BAP 
measures in research with typical samples allows for greater understanding of degrees of individual 
differences within the broad population on any given construct.  
The findings of the current thesis suggest that differences in the implicit processing of 
emotions may be related to the BAP. Chapter 2 showed that, overall, adults‟ ability to recognise 
emotional facial expressions was impacted by the prior presentation of an emotionally salient voice. 
However, this effect was only apparent among those with lower levels of autism-like traits, and not 
among those with higher levels of autism-like traits. In contrast, with children in Chapter 3, the 
ability to match emotions from the face and voice did not differ according to the level of autism-like 
traits. Regarding the impact of emotion on word learning, Chapter 4 presented evidence that 
emotional prosody interferes with word learning ability in adults. For those with relatively lower 
levels of autism-like traits, this effect was apparent for both happy sounding words and fearful 
sounding words. However, for those with relatively higher levels of autism-like traits, only fearful 
sounding words hindered word learning performance. For children, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
behavioural word learning performance did not differ according to emotional cues or levels of 
autism-like traits. However, eye-gaze patterns differed according to levels of autism-like traits. 
Specifically, children with lower levels of autism-like traits looked less toward the novel objects 
when happy and fearful cues were delivered, compared to neutral cues. In contrast, children with 
higher levels of autism-like traits looked less toward the objects and more toward the speaker‟s face 
when fearful cues were delivered, but more toward the object and less toward the face when happy 
cues were delivered. For these children, eye gaze patterns differed between the emotional 
conditions, but neither emotional condition differed from neutral.  
Overall, the current pattern of results suggests that adults with higher levels of autism-like 
traits show less automatic processing of emotional information compared to adults with lower levels 
of autism-like traits. This is evident in the lack of implicit activation of shared emotion networks 
across modalities, as well as in the reduced impact of emotional information on language learning. 
In children, the difference in emotion processing between those with low or high levels of autism-
like traits is less evident. However, the differences between the adult and child cross-modal studies 
(Chapters 2 and 3) should be noted, as described earlier, in that the adult study elicited implicit 
cross-modal integration, and the child study required explicit cross-modal integration. There were 
also differences regarding the measurement of autism-like traits in each cohort. Specifically, the 
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adult AQ is a self-rated measure, whereas the AQ-child is proxy-rated and therefore may be 
relatively less sensitive. Thus, it is unclear whether the differential pattern of results between 
children and adults was due to age-related, task-related, or measurement-related differences. If the 
differences were task-related, the findings would suggest that emotional information presented in 
one modality does not activate shared emotion networks across modalities when not explicitly 
attended to in those with higher levels of autism-like traits. However, when emotional information 
from multiple modalities is explicitly attended to, those with higher levels of autism-like traits are 
just as able to integrate the information as those with lower levels of autism-like traits. Therefore, 
by this interpretation, differences in the implicit non-conscious processing of emotion is related to 
the BAP. 
On the other hand, it is possible that age-related differences could also adequately account 
for the different results regarding emotion processing and levels of autism-like traits between the 
adult and child studies. Within the literature on emotion recognition in ASD, studies more 
consistently show that adults with ASD have difficulties recognising emotions under complex 
circumstances, in comparison to studies with children, the findings of which are more inconsistent 
(Lozier et al., 2014). Therefore, it is possible that differences in the processing of emotion in 
relation to ASD become more pronounced throughout development. Differences in emotion 
processing could be cumulative, such that subtle differences in processing (e.g., visual attention 
toward emotion) in childhood could gradually become larger differences by adulthood. This pattern 
of change may be due to qualitative differences in the exposure and experience of emotion, which 
may be impacted by various other factors related to ASD traits, such as differences in social 
interactions or avoidance of certain situations and stimuli (Chamberlain, Kasari & Rotheram-Fuller, 
2007). 
The results of the word learning study presented in Chapter 5 suggest subtle differences in 
the way children attended to emotional information, as evidenced by differences in eye gaze across 
emotional conditions between those with high and low levels of autism-like traits. However, the 
emotional information did not have any influences on behavioural performance in the word learning 
task, regardless of levels of autism-like traits. In contrast, for adults, emotional information 
influenced word learning performance to different degrees for those with higher or lower levels of 
autism-like traits. This suggests that there were perhaps more extreme differences in the processing 
of emotion between the two groups in adulthood, compared to the difference in processing between 
the groups in childhood. This suggestion supports the notion that differences in emotion processing 
in relation to the BAP are cumulative throughout development. However, it is important to note that 
word learning performance was not affected by emotion for any children. As previously discussed, 
this could be due to superior learning mechanisms in childhood, which could have also outweighed 
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any processing differences between the high and low AQ groups. In this case, there could be 
differences in emotion processing between children with high and low levels of autism-like traits to 
the same degree as in adults, but these differences may not be detectable within a language learning 
task.  
The associations found between emotion processing and the BAP can be useful for the 
development of a risk model for ASD. The more that is known about the underlying traits of ASD, 
the closer we move towards effective identification of families at risk for having children with an 
ASD diagnosis (Persico & Sacco, 2014). Differences in attention toward and processing of emotion 
could potentially be included in risk models of ASD, and evaluation of this ability among adults 
may assist with identifying those who hold genetic markers for ASD. Alternatively, differences in 
emotion processing may be a consequence of autism traits.  
With regard to typical populations, the current evidence sheds light on general individual 
differences in emotion processing. While an attention bias toward emotion is well established (e.g., 
Bergen et al., 2015; Hooker et al., 2008; Kensinger et al., 2007; Leventon & Bauer, 2016; Touryan 
et al., 2007), current evidence indicates that this is somewhat dependent on particular individual 
traits. Some individuals are more susceptible to emotional information than others. For individuals 
with low levels of autism-like traits who are more likely to be influenced by emotion, this might be 
advantageous with regard to social communication and emotion-based learning (Immordino-Yang 
& Damasio, 2007). On the other hand, such individuals may be more susceptible to emotion related 
distractions, which might disrupt the processing of other types of information. Meanwhile, 
individuals with higher levels of autism-like traits, who may be less influenced by emotional 
information, might be advantaged for being able to block irrelevant emotional distractions from 
their awareness. This might partially account for why individuals with higher levels of autism-like 
traits often show superior mathematical or technological skill, as emotion typically holds no 
relevance to such information (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001). However, lower 
sensitivity and attentiveness to emotional and social cues may result in reduced social connection 
for these individuals, and reduced receptiveness to relevant emotional cues incorporated in learning 
contexts. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Directions  
While this research provides a unique contribution to the fields of emotion research and 
ASD research, there are some limitations to consider. First and foremost, as previously mentioned, 
the adult and child studies, while similar, had some disparate components and were not directly 
comparable. The child studies were designed to be more appropriate for use with children, ensuring 
that the instructions were easy to follow and the tasks were not too long or too simple to lose the 
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interest of 7- to 9-year-old children. However, this resulted in differences from the adult studies 
which were not merely practical, but conceptually distinct. For instance, when investigating cross-
modal integration of emotion, the adult study investigated the influence of the implicit emotion 
processing from one modality on the explicit recognition of emotion from another modality. In 
contrast, the child study investigated explicit, intentional matching of emotional information from 
two modalities simultaneously. Further, each task had different demands, such that the adult study 
required yes/no responses for determining whether an expression was emotional, whereas the child 
study required distinction between four different emotion categories. Finally, the adult study 
explored different aspects of emotional expression in the voice, including prosodic and semantic 
information, whereas the child study only included prosodic information.  
As for the word learning studies, the child study incorporated multiple modalities of 
emotional expression, in contrast to the adult study which only utilised prosodic emotional 
information. Further, children completed multiple word recognition tests throughout the task, 
whereas adults were tested for recall throughout the task. These two ways of testing could have 
differential influences on the learning process. For instance, participants were exposed to the words 
again during the recognition task, but not during recall, and thus recognition may further aid 
associative learning and retention. Recognition tasks generally are less cognitively demanding and 
yield greater accuracy than recall tasks (Anderson & Bower, 1972). One final distinction to note 
between both adult and child studies was the potential difference in the sensitivity of the AQ 
measures. The AQ-child may be a relatively less sensitive measure of autism-like traits due to being 
parent-reported, in contrast to the adult AQ which is self-reported. Due to all of these differences, 
any conclusions made regarding the developmental trajectories of emotion processing, word 
learning, and autism-like traits must be considered conjectural. Future research should take care to 
match tasks across age groups, such that any changes made should not impact the concepts being 
examined, in order to improve comparability of the studies. Gaps remain in the literature regarding 
the development of various aspects of emotion processing, as well as the relationship between 
emotional and language processing, from childhood to adulthood. In addition, further research is 
needed to confirm the current findings showing differences in emotion processing between 
individuals with low and high levels of autism-like traits increases in a cumulative manner 
throughout development. 
There are limitations regarding the specific emotional information included in the current 
series of studies. Firstly, the levels of emotional intensity or arousal of the stimuli were not 
considered. Regarding intensity, it is possible that some of the expressions could have been 
perceived as more emotional than others, and thus may have impacted processing differently. The 
level of arousal of an emotional expression refers to the degree of excitability or wakefulness, and is 
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distinct from valence. Where degree of valence ranges from positive to negative, arousal ranges 
from low to high, or sleepy to awake (Posner et al., 2005). The stimuli used in the current research 
were not matched for level of arousal. Thus, it is possible that certain stimuli were processed 
differently according to level of arousal rather than valence. For example, in the child study 
presented in Chapter 3, happy stimuli were often mistaken for angry stimuli, which could have been 
due to confusions regarding arousal. However, as there were no measures of arousal for the stimuli 
used, this conclusion is merely speculative. Future research should ensure that arousal levels of any 
emotional stimuli are measured during validation and controlled or accounted for during the 
experiment and interpretations.  
Emotional stimuli were also limited in their range of emotion type. Both adult and child 
word learning studies included fearful and happy emotional information only, and the adult cross-
modal study included sad and happy emotions only. There is an advantage to having included both 
negative and positive ends of the valence scale, as much previous research on emotion processing 
within language has only included negative emotion (e.g., Dhooge & Hartsuiker, 2011; Slevc & 
Ferreira, 2006). However, including such a limited range of emotions restricts the generalisability of 
the findings with regard to emotion processing more broadly, as it is unknown whether different 
types of emotion would show the same results. The child cross-modal study included additional 
emotions, requiring children to match expressions of fear, anger, sadness, and happiness. However, 
this was still limited, and future inclusion of emotions which children have greater difficulty 
recognising, such as disgust and surprise (Vicari et al., 2000; Widen, 2013), might shed more light 
on processing differences between those with higher or lower levels of autism-like traits. The main 
cause for restricting the emotions is due to the limited availability of more varied stimuli, 
particularly vocal stimuli. Future research is needed in the construction and validation of vocal 
stimuli which reflect a broader range of emotions. 
With regard to the word learning studies specifically, it should be noted that only short-term 
retention was measured, and tests of long-term consolidation of words were not included. Although 
new words can be learnt in a short space of time (Brady & Goodman, 2014; Carey & Bartlett, 1978; 
Dollaghan, 1985; Ramachandra et al., 2009), not including a long-term measure of retention means 
that it is unclear whether the study was testing short-term memorisation, or actual word learning 
processes. Future work should aim to determine the influence of emotional information on long-
term retention and consolidation of new language. Final limitations of the current research to note 
are regarding the participants. Relatively small sample sizes were used in the current studies due to 
practical constraints. Therefore, future studies should aim for larger sample sizes to yield greater 
statistical power to confirm the current pattern of findings. Finally, participants in all studies were 
predominantly white Australians of middle- to high-class status. Therefore, any conclusions made 
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from the current evidence must be considered applicable to this population only. To determine 
whether the current results apply to broader populations, future studies should endeavour to include 
samples of participants from different populations, such as disadvantaged or lower-class 
individuals, and those from different cultures. This issue is of particular concern in developmental 
literature (Nielsen, Haun, Kartner & Legare, 2017). 
This research provides insight into behaviours in the BAP, thereby having some important 
implications for understanding ASD. To progress this knowledge further, future research should 
examine the differences in emotion processing between those with high autism-like traits and those 
with a diagnosis of ASD. In particular, the interaction between emotion, language, and learning 
within those with ASD is an area for research growth. It is often the case with traits related to the 
BAP that there is a hierarchy in the degree to which the traits present, from those with low levels of 
autism-like traits, to those with high levels of traits, to those with a diagnosis (Persicco & Sacco, 
2014). If this is the case with regard to measures of emotion processing and interactions between 
emotion and language processing, then we would expect to see a large difference between those 
with low levels of autism-like traits and those with a diagnosis, and a smaller but significant 
difference between those with high levels of autism-like traits and those with a diagnosis. This 
would allow us to infer that such processes have a direct link to the underlying traits of ASD, which 
may be relevant for understanding aetiologies and risk factors (Landry & Chouinard, 2016; Persicco 
& Sacco, 2014). Additionally, examining emotion processing in those who may be at an increased 
risk of ASD, such as infant siblings or offspring of those with ASD, would be useful for advancing 
our understanding of the role of emotion processing in ASD risk and development. Even an attempt 
to sample a broader range of autism-like traits among the general population would shed further 
light on this topic. For instance, a larger sample of typical individuals could be tested, and then only 
those from the upper and lower ends of typical AQ scores could compared to allow for a more 
distinct contrast. 
The current paradigms and research questions could also apply to other populations which 
are known to have difficulties with emotional expression and understanding. For instance, emotion 
processing and emotion and language interactions could differ for individuals who suffer from 
mental illness in which emotion processing is implicated, such as depression, schizophrenia, and 
alexithymia, among others. (Li, Chan, McAlonan & Gong, 2010; Stuhrmann, Suslow & 
Dannlowski, 2011; Van der Velde et al., 2013). Further, emotion processing should be explored 
among individuals who have physical or sensory impairments which may impact on their 
perception of emotion, such as visual impairments and, particularly with regard to language, hearing 
impairments. It is finally worth reiterating that research focusing on the topic of emotion and 
learning is fast-growing, with important implications for understanding the human brain, 
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development, and education (Tyng et al., 2017; Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 2007). It appears 
from the current findings and the findings of previous studies that the interaction between emotion 
and learning is complex, and there are many more avenues to be explored in order to improve our 
understanding of such interactions. In particular, the parameters which determine whether 
emotional processes aid or hinder learning processes need further exploration.  
A final direction for future research is to utilise neuroimaging methods, such as EEG and 
fMRI, to explore the neural correlates of emotion processing in relation to the BAP. These methods 
can provide further information regarding the cognitive operations involved in emotion processing. 
For instance, studies have shown delayed and reduced ERP components in response to emotional 
facial expressions in children with ASD in comparison to typically developing children, particularly 
for the N170 component in response to fearful expressions (Dawson et al., 2004; Tye et al., 2014; 
Wong, Fung, Chua and McAlonan, 2008). Further, fMRI studies show reduced activation in areas 
involved in facial and social processing in children with ASD, such as the insula, limbic system, 
and the superior temporal sulcus (Dapretto et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2015). The use of such methods 
to explore emotion processing in relation to autism-like traits could inform our understanding of 
neurological differences associated with the BAP.  
6.4 Overall Conclusions  
 This thesis explored the abilities of both adults and children to process and recognise 
emotions from facial and vocal modalities, and to learn new words presented with varied emotional 
information. Moreover, such abilities were explored in relation to levels of autism-like traits. 
Overall, this thesis demonstrated that emotional cues from the face and the voice act 
interdependently in the recognition of emotion. Further, effective integration of such cues develops 
past the age of 9 years. This research also found that non-referential emotional information 
presented in a language learning context attracts attention for both adults and children, which results 
in interference to language learning abilities for adults. These findings have implications for 
educational practices, highlighting the complexities of integrating emotion in learning.  
Importantly, our findings show that emotion processing and its relationship with language 
processing differ for those with higher versus lower levels of autism-like traits under certain 
circumstances. In particular, automatic attention toward emotion appears weaker in those with 
higher levels of autism-like traits. This difference may have a cumulative effect throughout 
development and lead to greater differences in processing by adulthood. This indicates that 
differences in the processing of emotion may be linked to the underlying traits of ASD, and should 
be more closely considered when evaluating ASD risk.  
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The experience and communication of emotion are considered uniquely human 
characteristics (Darwin, 1872). Emotion has considerable power over our thoughts, intentions, 
behaviours, relationships, and interpretations of the world. In order to advance our understanding of 
human psychology, for both typical and atypical individuals, it is essential that we understand the 
processes of emotion and the way in which emotion influences us. This thesis contributes to such 
knowledge by highlighting some of the complexities and individual differences of emotion 
processing. Further, this thesis establishes important directions for continued investigations to 
advance our understanding of emotion processing and the broader autism phenotype.  
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